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ABSTRACT
Historical writing invariably is handicapped by the time 
and place in which it is written as well as by the pre­
dispositions of the writer. Histories of Presidential 
foreign policy decision-making often reflect political and 
temporal bias or over-dramatize minor events.
Early studies of President Eisenhower's foreign policy 
were largely written by historians with a bent for the 
Democratic party at a time when a Democrat occupied the 
White House. They depicted Eisenhower as a do-nothing weak 
sycophant of his Secretary of State. Scholarship of the 
late eighties, written in view of declassified materials, 
has redressed this balance. Although often decried as 
revisionist--a pejorative term connoting naive apologias-- 
the works so based show Eisenhower as a sound thinker 
immersed in the questions of his day.
This thesis has sought to walk the line between the 
scylla of partisan politics and the charybdis of over­
dramatization .
In the policy crisis ocassioned by the deteriorating 
French position during the siege at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, 
the Eisenhower Administration analysts entertained a wide 
range of possible American actions as a team, ultimately 
deciding upon a course chosen by the President himself. In 
making a well thought out decision not to intervene in the 
Indochina War, Eisenhower followed precepts of international 
law including the principle of respect for sovereignty and 
respect for a system of collective security.
The process by which Eisenhower made this decision 
reflects a sophisticated division of labor. Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles was the Administration "tough" 
whose duty it was to present a strident, almost bellicose, 
anti-Communism. Eisenhower, as the constitutionally 
prescribed holder of ultimate authority, represented the 
calming influence who could override his Secretary's remarks 
should those remarks induce adversaries to prepare for war 
or induce allied differences which the Soviets could 
effectively manipulate. Although Dulles' actions may have 
represented the maxim si vis pacem para bellunu amiable Ike, 
by playing golf, let the American public know that all was 
fine.
vi
THE QUIET DIPLOMACY 
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND DIEN BIEN PHU
Chapter One : Introduction 
Eisenhower As Foreign Policy Decision-Maker
Ten years before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the 
National Security Council issued a report that contemplated 
sending 275,000 American troops into French Indochina. The 
day before their report, on April 4, 1954, France had 
petitioned Washington, asking for limited United States 
military intervention in Indochina. In what was to become 
known as Operation Vulture, the French Government requested 
United States bombing raids to lift the North Vietnamese 
siege of the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. 
The French request did not come as a surprise to Washington, 
but, rather, was a result of a previous American offer. 
Washington considered such intervention a golden opportunity 
to check the sweep of international Communism. The 
diplomacy behind President Eisenhower's ultimate decision 
not to intervene offers a unique chance to analyze Cold War
2
decision making as well as Eisenhower's leadership and 
control over foreign policy formulation.
By asking for American air support, the French hoped to 
strengthen their diplomatic hand at the Geneva Conference 
scheduled to begin on April 26, 1954. The purpose of this 
conference was to negotiate an end to war in Korea and 
Indochina. The French had tied their international prestige 
to their ability to defend the fortress outpost at Dien Bien 
Phu. Should Dien Bien Phu collapse, the apparent 
deterioration of France's military status most likely would 
result in an unfavorable denouement at Geneva. In that 
event, France feared a further loss of prestige and 
legitimacy in her North African colonies, as well as the 
certainty of toppling the Laniel Government.1 Operation 
Vulture could also benefit Washington by helping to secure 
Southeast Asia as a source of raw materials enhancing the 
economic well-being of Japan. Japan was important in 
American strategy not only as a strong Pacific ally, but 
also as a buffer to American territorial interests.2 While 
Operation Vulture appeared to benefit both Paris and 
Washington, President Eisenhower's foreign policy was 
informed by many considerations.
Following World War II, America could not return to 
isolationism. Many Americans believed that America had a
4duty to the civilized world to intervene in the internal 
affairs of those states where Communist aggression 
threatened. The Soviet Union already had imposed its will 
on the countries of Eastern Europe and now appeared bent on 
a course of world domination. Mindful of Munich and the 
failure of appeasement, American foreign policy makers 
responded to continued Soviet aggression with the 
"containment" policy. Containment meant that the Soviet 
challenge would be met with some form of American response. 
But, unlike Hitler, Stalin did not have a timetable for 
aggression. Each presidential administration from Truman 
on, therefore, developed its own strategy to meet Communism 
within the containment context. President Eisenhower's
strategy in the spring of 1954 was United Action.
/
United Action was a comprehensive policy capable of 
meeting Soviet advances as well as solidifying American 
leadership of the free world. From an American perspective 
the post-war balance of power had split world allegiances 
into the Communist sphere of influence and the sphere of 
those nations vowed to stop Communist encroachments on 
sovereignty. To harness world allegiances, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union sought to maximize their 
influence in nations within their respective spheres. For 
both, freedom of action to pursue national goals was in
5direct proportion to their credibility. American 
intervention in world affairs depended both on high 
credibility at home— in the form of electoral support and 
favorable popular opinion— and credibility abroad in the 
form of allied and neutral support. Soviet leadership in 
the Communist world depended on both retaining control of 
the overrun countries and the success of Communist 
insurrections in the non-Communist world. To be credible, 
American intervention had to follow a request for support or 
be otherwise within the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. The Soviet Union did not measure credibility in 
terms of adherence to principles of international law, but 
in terms of successful policy. A successful insurrection 
meant the Soviets could ignore principles of state 
sovereignty. Thus, the Soviet Union could exhibit a 
confusing picture as either a traditional nation state 
acting within the community of nations or as an 
ideologically motivated force heedless of the principles of 
that community. Because of this duality, each American 
Presidential Administration had to decide whether Soviet 
action was motivated by ideological or nationalistic goals. 
This determination defined the nature of American response. 
The decision was not whether to act, but whether Soviet 
intentions and capabilities necessitated one course of
6action or another. Each administration developed its own 
sliding scale of means to thwart Communist expansion.
John Lewis Gaddis, in Strategies of Containment, has 
noted five components in President Eisenhower's containment 
strategy.3 The five components were nuclear weapons, 
alliances, psychological warfare, covert action, and 
negotiations.4 In one way or another, the need to maintain 
America's credibility at home and abroad influenced all five 
components. While nuclear weapons were used as a threat in 
Eisenhower's formula of containment, an effort to project 
America's image as an agent for rather than a destroyer of 
world peace may have led to their actual non-use.
Eisenhower sought alliances and psychological warfare to 
obtain world support for American positions. Eisenhower 
used covert action to further American positions in ways 
that, in order to maintain a positive world image, were best 
kept hidden. Eisenhower pursued negotiations to facilitate 
the administration's other components. The most important 
element in Eisenhower's quest to further credibility and 
facilitate American goals was the element of alliances. To 
wit: United Action.
The term "United Action" was first used by Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles in a speech before the Overseas 
Press Club on March 29, 1954.5 Shortly thereafter,
Eisenhower defined Dulles' use of that phrase in the same 
news conference at which he mentioned the "domino theory."6 
For Eisenhower— perhaps consciously bringing a combination 
of the Metternician and Bismarckian systems into the 
twentieth century— a concert of opinion and a concert of 
readiness would maintain the world balance of power. The 
lynch-pin of this system was United Action which demanded 
strong alliances. America would undertake action only with 
the support of allies.
Eisenhower's desire for alliances was formulated with 
an awareness of the world balance of power and American 
credibility. On March 25, 1955, Eisenhower wrote Winston 
Churchill, noting that:
We have come to the point where every 
additional backward step must be deemed 
a defeat for the western world. In 
fact, it is a triple defeat. First, we 
lose a potential ally. Next, we give to 
an implacable enemy another recruit. 
Beyond this, every such retreat creates 
in the minds of neutrals the fear that 
we do not mean what we say when we 
pledge our support to people who want to 
remain free.7
Eisenhower felt that America had a duty to the Western World 
to contain Communism. That duty was the defense of freedom. 
In that defense, Eisenhower felt that America's reputation
8and credibility were on the line. Eisenhower felt that 
United Action was the vehicle to assure neutrals that 
America meant what it said. The Cold War was fought to win 
the hearts and minds of men and women the world over.
Alliances, sought for their innate tactical strength, were
the strategic means to fulfill that duty.
President Eisenhower's foreign policy toward Indochina 
during the Viet Minh siege of the fortress outpost at Dien 
Bien Phu in the Spring of 1954 can be divided into three 
stages. First, from March 13 until March 29, American 
policy makers gave serious credence to Operation Vulture. 
From March 29 until April 24, American foreign policy 
primarily was aimed at eliciting United Action. From April 
24 until May 7, American foreign policy sought to raise 
French morale diplomatically by any means. Although 
American policy had devolved to giving the French moral 
support in Indochina during the third stage, already
Washington had begun to transform the tactical response of
United Action into a strategic policy of collective security 
which culminated in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) in 1955.
The diplomacy during each stage illustrates President
9Eisenhower's control over and his adroit use of the foreign 
policy making establishment. Indeed, Eisenhower's 
leadership during the Dien Bien Phu siege is an example of 
efficacious policy formulation and implementation during 
crisis conditions.
Two articles have analyzed Eisenhower's control over 
foreign policy. In "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the 
Decisions?," Richard Immerman argues that President 
Eisenhower may have had more control over foreign policy 
than some observers have thought.8 Basing his work on 
primary sources, Immerman relates that those in Eisenhower's 
inner circle "almost unanimously support the hypothesis of 
an activist president who was the central figure in 
diplomatic decisions."9 Eisenhower operated behind the 
scenes developing overall strategy while Dulles executed the 
decisions. The result was that "[t]he public would hear and 
see the secretary of state, and not the president,"10 For 
Eisenhower the emphasis was on teamwork where Eisenhower 
delegated to each member a certain amount of responsibility. 
Nevertheless, "[a]11 important matters were to be brought 
directly to the president's attention."11
Fred Greenstein, in "Eisenhower as an Activist 
President: A Look at New Evidence," also believes that 
Eisenhower made all the decisions behind the scenes.12
10
"Eisenhower," he argues, "consistently preferred results to 
publicity."13 Eisenhower's "low-profile" nature of 
leadership manifested itself in a variety of ways. 
Eisenhower, for instance, would reserve comment on positions 
taken at conferences until other participants had spoken.14 
Like Immerman, Greenstein states that Eisenhower delegated 
responsibility in purposeful fashion according to a 
"division of labor." Greenstein states that:
Dulles was assigned the "get tough" side of 
foreign-policy enunciation, thus placating the 
fervently anti-Communist wing of the Republican 
party. Meanwhile, amiable Ike made gestures 
toward peace and international humanitarianism—  
for example, Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, and 
summitry at Geneva.15
By such a division of labor, subordinates "protected the 
president's ability to be perceived as being above the 
fray," thereby giving Eisenhower considerable freedom of 
action.16
From these two articles one can discern a style of 
leadership where Eisenhower was the power behind the scenes, 
content to let subordinates take public credit for policies. 
Such a style might account for Dulles' occasional tendency 
to engage in "bull-in-the-China-shop" diplomacy. Dulles 
might take strong positions, offensive to opponents, but 
eventually Eisenhower was in a position to ameliorate
11
harmful effects. At Geneva in 1954, for instance, the 
diplomatic slight occasioned by Dulles' refusal to shake 
Chou En-Lai's proffered hand was mitigated by Eisenhower's 
appointment of Walter Bedell Smith to head the United States 
delegation. What Dulles could not achieve by stridency, 
Eisenhower, having cultivated an aura of amiability, might 
achieve through public pronouncements of "common sense."
Such a division of labor could free Dulles to scare the 
Communist Chinese with threats of massive retaliation, while 
Eisenhower was equally free to calm allies denying United 
States plans to put ground troops in Indochina.
Eisenhower made judicious use of the foreign policy 
decision making apparatus. Two additional articles attest 
to Eisenhower's effective and responsible use of advisors.
In "Responsibilities of Presidents and Advisors: A Theory 
and Case Study of Vietnam Decision Making," John P. Burke 
states that Eisenhower used advisors to enhance his 
"cognitive and decision-making capabilities," in forming his 
decision not to bomb the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu.17 
Starting with a National Security Council meeting that took 
place before the actual siege, Burke noted that a number of 
possible policy options were presented and discussed. Burke 
then noted that during the next few months alternative 
policies were debated. With particular reference to the
12
Smith Committee, Burke noted that all Eisenhower committees 
served "as independent channels for exploring and analyzing 
policy alternatives."18 Burke stated that at these 
committee meetings Eisenhower was not only an active 
participant, but also encouraged his advisers to regard each 
other "as equals in the advisory process:" Beyond this, 
"Eisenhower also took other steps that fostered a fair, open 
process of advising," making the Smith Committee accountable 
personally to him.19
Burke states that Eisenhower's use of committees was 
only one facet of his use of the policy making apparatus.
The President also made good use of personalities and 
Congress. The role of General Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's 
Special Assistant for National Security, states Burke, is 
particularly instructive. Cutler in a non-partisan and 
detached manner would report to the President all views 
expressed at meetings Eisenhower did not attend and 
interrelate those views with prior policy analyses.20 As 
far as Eisenhower's utilization of Congress, Burke posits 
that contrary to conventional wisdom, Congressional demands 
for British participation in a possible Indochina 
intervention did not influence Eisenhower's decision.
Rather, "Eisenhower and his advisors...had determined 
beforehand that an active role by Britain and other nations
13
would be a necessary precondition to intervention."21 With 
reference to united action, Burke states that extensive 
American intervention had been planned as had alternative 
modes of intervention.22
In "Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the 
Eisenhower Presidency," Richard M. Saunders also remarks on 
Eisenhower's judicious use of the foreign policy making 
apparatus.23 Saunders states that President Eisenhower's 
reluctance to use military force as an instrument of foreign 
policy implementation resulted not from indecision but from 
his world view "and a high level of skill at managing his 
advisory structure."24 Saunders believed that Eisenhower's 
military training taught him to realize organization as an 
instrument to better handle exigencies of world events. As 
a result, Eisenhower was kept well informed by his advisors. 
He "received an unbiased and unfiltered flow of 
information," options presented to him were studied 
adequately, and all relevant options were considered, 
thereby ensuring the President's flexibility of action.25 
Eisenhower accomplished these goals by instilling a sense of 
teamwork and a need for continuous planning. The President 
sought all points of view and relied not on those advisors 
promoting aggressive action but on "the doubters and 
dissenters. "26
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After putting foreign policy questions through such 
rigorous analysis, Saunders believes that Eisenhower's world 
view guided the final product. Specifically, Eisenhower 
placed foreign policy as the first priority of his 
Presidency.27 Eisenhower believed in the importance of 
allies because the United States was an active participant 
in world events and was leader of the free world. Allies 
were needed to spread both the cost and responsibility of 
containing Communism.28 In addition to a need for allies, 
Eisenhower waf "influenced by a deep concern for world 
opinion, by a desire to place U.S. actions within the 
context of international law, and by a high regard for quiet 
diplomacy."29 These aspects of Eisenhower's world view, 
states Saunders, contributed to Eisenhower's decision to 
pose prerequisites to United States intervention in 
Indochina in 1954. According to Saunders, "[t]he conditions 
included legal sanction for the intervention under 
international law and a favorable climate of free world 
opinion."30 The requirement of obeying international law 
precepts led Eisenhower to demand "formal requests for 
assistance from the French and, more importantly, from the 
local governments involved."31 Allied approval met the 
requirement of favorable world public opinion.32 Further, 
states Saunders, the President's decision was influenced by
15
a belief that United States association with colonialism 
would undermine favorable world opinion.33
Saunders believes that Eisenhower's adherence to 
America's constitutional form of government compelled him to 
seek Congressional and public support prior to the use of 
military force, even in situations where Eisenhower believed 
in the correctness of intervention.34 In this regard, 
allied support was required because allies could share the 
costs as well as bolster support for the operation both at 
home and abroad. To this end, Eisenhower "devoted much 
attention to ensuring that no permanent damage to allied 
relations was done" by engaging United States forces.35
A theory of Eisenhower's handling of foreign policy can 
be adduced from the conclusions of the foregoing four 
articles. Eisenhower possessed a strong degree of control 
over foreign policy. His world view, largely influenced by 
his perception of America's post war idealism and 
responsibility, led him to formulate policies consistent 
with America's traditions and values. In reaching foreign 
policy decisions, Eisenhower judiciously used the policy 
making apparatus so that each component was used to its best 
advantage. Eisenhower set-up a division of labor where he
16
allowed all of his advisors to express a point of view no 
matter how far that view might have differed from the norm. 
According to that division of labor, John Foster Dulles was 
the "point man" for administration policies. By allowing 
Dulles to be the "tough guy," Eisenhower reserved to himself 
the opportunity to mollify any of Dulles' excesses. If the 
tough guy approach did not achieve goals consistent with 
Eisenhower's policies, then Eisenhower could calm the airs 
and present himself as a man of peace and sobriety. If 
Dulles' blunt pronouncements achieved Eisenhower's goals 
then so much the better.
Eisenhower critics--perhaps influenced by desires of 
political manipulation known only too well by the Kennedys- 
-labeled Eisenhower as a do-nothing President happy to be 
playing golf instead of immersed in the questions of his 
day. This criticism seemed to readily fit the facts 
Eisenhower made public. As part of his "quiet diplomacy," 
Eisenhower may have felt that Americans would feel that all 
was well if the President took the time to play golf.
Because Eisenhower preferred results to publicity, he may 
have preferred successful policies to an adoring posterity. 
Eisenhower's decision with respect to United States 
involvement in Indochina epitomizes his approach to foreign 
policy decision making.
17
Notes Chapter One
1. Loss of prestige in her African colonies constituted a 
significant dimension of French policy in Indochina. 
Historically, the primary motivation behind French colonial 
policy was a question of power politics; France sought to gain 
great power status in Europe and in the community of nations 
by the acquisition of colonies. John Chipman, French Power 
in Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 
p. 17 & in passim. Having secured a colony territorially, 
French policy makers sought to export the largess of French 
civilization to the native population. In the exercise of 
this so-called mission civilisatrice, the hope was to secure 
French power ideologically. Having exported French
civilization, French leaders could then present France as a 
world power to their fellow Europeans. Such a presentation 
would show the universal appeal of French values and 
traditions. Id. pp. 17-22. Somewhat tautologically, French 
leaders used the presentation of ideas and images as both 
source and proof of French power. The operating premise was 
that only nations that involve themselves with questions 
beyond their own borders, are nations that possess world 
power. A "loss of influence overseas would [then] be 
perceived [by Europeans] as immediately affecting French 
status, prestige, and position in the international system." 
Id. p . 5 .
A defeat in Indochina would encourage independence 
agitation in Africa and the Maghreb, which in turn would 
demote France as a world power in the eyes of the peoples of 
Europe. To French sensibilities, therefore, Indochina 
represented a vain attempt to hang-on to the lost grandeur of 
empire. If France lost Indochina, Europe and the world would 
see that French pre-occupation with internal and European 
problems had created a secondary role for France and that 
France had resigned herself to let world affairs pass to 
others. Id. pp. 27-29. Noting decolonization, John Chipman 
posits that French leaders today use France's status as an 
independent nuclear power and France's seat as a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council in the same way 
as French leaders of yesterday used France's status as a 
colonizer, i.e. to gain for France respect as a world power. 
Id. pp. 29-30.
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2. Japan became the main United States outpost in the 
Pacific in the early postwar period because the Communist 
threat required a countervailing force. The idea was to 
prevent a Communist takeover of the Pacific by creating a 
sovereign Japan allied with the United States. Following 
World War II, the fundamental objective of American foreign 
policy was to protect national security. According to George 
Kennan, the man who articulated the intellectual origins of 
"containment," there were five industrial power centers which 
United States policy must attempt to keep free from Communist 
influence. These centers were the United States, Great 
Britain, the Soviet Union, the Rhine valley with adjacent 
industrial areas— central Europe, and Japan. George F. 
Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967) 
p. 359. The major United States goal was to prevent the re­
establishment of hostile governments in central Europe and 
Japan, otherwise World War II would prove a hollow victory. 
Indeed, on May 8, 1947, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
called for "the reconstruction of those two great workshops 
of Europe and Asia--Germany and Japan— upon which the ultimate 
recovery of the two continents so largely depends." Dean 
Acheson, "The Requirements of Reconstruction" Department of 
State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, May 18, 1947) p. 994.
Japan could become a strong power center in the Pacific if 
it re-armed, joined some form of collective defense with the 
United States or did both. In addressing this question, the 
Eisenhower Administration was sensitive to Japanese 
sovereignty. Because Japan formally regained sovereignty in 
April 1952, John Foster Dulles felt that a decision on 
Japanese rearmament would have to come from the Japanese 
people. Nonetheless, Dulles felt that sovereignty implied 
that Japan be able to defend herself. H.W. Brands, "The 
United States and the Reemergence of Independent Japan," 
Pacific Affairs (vol. 58 no. 3, Fall 1986) pp. 394-395. For 
Eisenhower the problem was that in creating a strong defense 
Japan might weaken her economy. Eisenhower's concern was that 
of a funambulist walking the rope between a strong economy and 
a strong defense; too much effort for one might enervate the 
other. Id. p. 395.
A strong Japanese economy, furthermore, could serve as a 
catalyst for Asian development. Michael Schaller, "Securing 
the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of
Containment in Southeast Asia," Journal of American History 
(vol. 69, September 1982) p. 395. Japanese trade with Asian 
countries could foster independent governments, friendly 
towards the United States and opposed to Communism, which also
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could provide a bulwark against Soviet encroachment. Id. p. 
398. In this way, Schaller argues, the attempt to integrate 
Japan into the Asian community led to containment in Southeast 
Asia. Id. pp. 392-393. The contemporary argument was that 
" [a] secure Japan would help support Southeast Asia against 
Chinese communism, and vice versa." Id. p. 393.
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Oxford University Press, 1982) pp. 147-148.
4. Ibid.
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Chapter Two 
A Stalinist Blind JLLley:
French Indochina and the Truman Administration, 1945-1953
The battle of Dien Bien Phu ended the First 
Indochina War which lasted from 1946 to 1954. The French, a 
repressive colonial power, sought to draw the guerrilla 
elements of Vietnamese Communist and nationalist forces into 
a set-piece conventional battle at Dien Bien Phu, a small 
valley outpost near the Laotian border in northwest Vietnam. 
Instead the French lured close to 50, 000 Vietnamese troops 
supported by heavy artillery to strong defensive positions 
in the hills surrounding the French garrison of 10,000 
soldiers. The resulting siege, which lasted fifty-six days, 
dealt a devastating blow to French morale and contributed to 
the downfall of the French Fourth Republic.
To understand why the French and Vietnamese Communist 
forces were at Dien Bien Phu necessitates a look at the 
history of French Indochina during the previous eight years. 
Prior to World War Two, Indochina had been a French colonial 
possession. During the Second World War the Japanese
23
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coopted the French (now allied with Germany) infrastructure 
and turned Indochina into an agricultural reserve to help 
feed the Japanese armed forces: In the spring of 1945,
Japanese forces overran Indochina and imprisoned their 
French Vichy ally. Five months later the Japanese 
surrendered following the atomic explosion at Hiroshima. 
Vietnamese nationalist groups seized the opportunity created 
by the departure of effective French and Japanese 
stewardship and proclaimed their independence. Undeterred 
by this fait accompli, the French under Charles de Gaulle 
attempted to reassert control. When negotiations proved 
futile the French and Vietnamese resorted to war in December 
1946.
When Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office in January 
1953, therefore, trouble had been brewing in Indochina for 
over eight years. American response to that trouble 
reflected the attitude of each presidential administration 
toward legitimate governance and overarching concern for 
European affairs. The need for strong European allies led 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to abandon outward abhorrence for 
colonial causes. Harry S. Truman held a stronger tolerance 
for colonialism than did Roosevelt, and readily discarded 
ideas of self-determination in favor of neutralizing Soviet 
power in Europe. At first, under Truman, the United States
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only gave token assistance to their European ally in 
Indochina because American domestic opinion would not 
sanction supporting a colonial power. But when Mao Tse- 
tung founded the People's Republic of China on Indochina's 
northern border in 194 9, the United States decided to 
increase aid to France under the aegis of containing Asian 
Communism. At the end of the Truman Administration, the 
United States had established economic and military aid 
missions in each of the Associated States of Indochina, and 
dispatched United States Air Force technicians to help the 
French defend a garrison besieged at a place called Na San. 
The course of American foreign policy in French Indochina 
during the Truman years contrasted with the policy developed 
during the Eisenhower Administration. Even though 
commitments made by Truman bound United States policy, 
Eisenhower, interested in the legitimacy of the French 
government in Indochina, forcefully urged the French to 
recognize the aspirations of the Indochinese people and 
ultimately refused to aid the French.
During the years of the Truman Administration, French 
policy makers had put the future status of Indochina as a 
French colony in doubt. In a vain attempt to recapture the 
glory of faded empire, French policy makers were unwilling 
to grant needed political reforms gracefully. While
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cognizant of the need for reform, American policy between 
1945 and 1953 blithely supported French policy with men, 
money, and material. When the mistakes of French policy 
came to a head during Eisenhower's Presidency, Eisenhower 
faced a choice of continuing the policy of his predecessor 
or developing a creative new approach: Historical
constraints decreed that Eisenhower would continue Truman's 
commitments, yet Eisenhower's conservatism ultimately 
prevented the natural consequence of those commitments-— war 
in Indochina.
From the Treaty of Tientsin in 1885 to World War II, 
Indochina had been a French colony. Because French rule had 
been particularly oppressive, the period was marked by 
Vietnamese resistance activity and guerrilla warfare. When 
Hitler overran France in May 1940, a Vichy regime under Vice 
Admiral Jean Decoux established control in Indochina. That 
September, Admiral Decoux granted airfield rights in Tonkin 
to the Japanese. The Japanese quickly occupied all of 
Indochina and "jointly" ruled the peninsula with Decoux. 
Japanese occupation was as oppressive as French colonial 
rule, further strengthening Vietnamese nationalist groups. 
One such group, the League for the Independence of Vietnam,
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also known as the Viet Minh, became a dominant political 
force. Near the end of the war the Japanese, fearful of 
Gaullist influences, disarmed their French allies on March 
9, 1945. The next day, the Japanese allowed Bao Dai, former 
Emperor of Annam, to rule Vietnam as an independent entity 
under Japanese protection.1 Bao Dai ruled for only five 
months. On August 18, three days after the Japanese 
surrender, the Viet Minh rose up, proclaimed their 
sovereignty and founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV) .2 Quoting from the United States Declaration of 
Independence, Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the Indochinese 
Communist Party and President of the DRV, proclaimed the 
independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.3
Meanwhile, at Potsdam in July 1945, Churchill, Truman, 
and Stalin had decided to split Indochina in two following 
Victory in the Pacific. According to plan, Chinese 
Nationalist troops entered Indochina north of the 16th 
parallel and disarmed the Japanese. The British under Lord 
Louis Montbatten did the same to Japanese forces below the 
16th parallel. When Montbatten landed in Indochina on 
September 12, 1945, he was under the impression that his 
mission was to assist the French in resuming control. The 
Viet Minh decided to cooperate with the British occupation 
forces following a proclamation by British Major-General
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D.D. Gracey, in which Gracey declared impartial treatment of
political and economic matters during the transition from
war to peace. But, on September 23, French prisoners of war
released from Japanese camps by Gracey staged a successful
coup d'etat in Saigon, ousting the Viet Minh Executive
Committee. Vietnamese, angered by French excesses, quickly
retaliated. During the ensuing violence^ on September 26,
the first American— Lt. Col. A. Peter Dewey— was killed in
Vietnam. Lt. Col. Dewey was the nephew of the Governor of
New York, Thomas Dewey.4
After the British ceded occupation rights to the French
on October 9, 1945, Ho Chi Minh tried to discuss the future
of Vietnam with the French, but negotiations during the
following year proved futile. On September 14, 1946 the
French and Ho finally agreed in principle to a Modus Vivendi
establishing a committee to coordinate customs and foreign
trade. Before this agreement was signed, however, the
French announced that they were going to take control of
imports and exports at the customs house at Haiphong Harbor
on October 15, 1946. The French action incited Viet Minh 
*
militiamen who took some French border patrolmen prisoner.
On November 20, the French tried to free the patrolmen by 
force. Although a temporary accord was reached, certain 
French leaders in Paris wanted to use the Haiphong incident
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as a pretext to seize control of the whole city. As a 
consequence, French Premier Georges Bidault gave the 
Commander of French forces in Indochina permission to launch 
an attack. On November 22, Colonel Debes, French Commander 
at Haiphong, issued an ultimatum to the Viet Minh to abandon 
certain parts of the city. Debes demanded that the 
Vietnamese accept his ultimatum by 9 A:M; November 23, 
failing which Debes would "take any measure the situation 
calls for."5 The Viet Minh called the French bluff. In the 
ensuing naval bombardment of Haiphong Harbor, up to 6,000 
Vietnamese were killed.
To many Frenchmen the Haiphong incident provided the 
perfect opportunity to go to war against the Viet Minh, and 
reestablish Indochina as a source of French prestige. To 
have a colony in Indochina represented an opportunity to 
reassert France's role as a major world power. The rice 
fields and rubber plantations were a source of economic 
strength for individual French businesses and for the 
general health of the post-war French economy as a whole. 
Besides, these Frenchmen reasoned, inclusion of Indochina in 
the French Union had brought and could continue to bring 
economic and social benefit to the people of Indochina.
The attempt to use Indochina as a means to re-establish 
France as a world power, however, was hampered by a lack of
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communication between Paris and Hanoi. At this juncture, 
French personnel in Indochina operated with a measure of 
freedom, as France itself was without a government. In 
addition to poor communication, the French faced various 
groups that wanted to rule Vietnam as a separate sovereign 
state. The Viet Minh, for example, wanted to eliminate the 
French presence in Viet Nam including the removal of those 
Vietnamese who had profited from French colonialism.
In addition, the French could not effectuate a strong 
colonial policy and remain a viable power in Europe without 
the assistance of the United States, and the United States 
was at least nominally anti-colonial. But American 
attitudes toward Ho Chi Minh showed American willingness to 
compromise long standing anti-colonial beliefs with the 
newly emergent fear of Russian Communist expansion. After 
World War II, nonetheless, opposition to colonialism 
continued to be a potent political issue in America. The 
ease with which Japan had conquered Western colonial 
possessions in Asia and the Pacific in contrast to 
resistance the Japanese faced by Filipinos, who were 
promised independence, convinced many Americans that the age 
of colonialism was at an end.6 American anti-colonialism 
was reflected in the principles of the Atlantic Charter of 
1941. In Paragraph 3 of the Charter the United States and
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Great Britain declared that it was their policy that "they 
respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they will live."7
President Roosevelt, who had expressed both 
anti-colonial and anti-French feelings^ faced a dilemma.8 
At the Tehran Conference in 1943, Roosevelt had proposed an 
international trusteeship system to administer the previous 
French colony of Indochina. Churchill, fearing outside 
interference in Britain's control of India, noted his 
disapproval.9 The United States Navy, anxious to establish 
a system of Pacific island bases, also raised concerns over 
Roosevelt's idea. In response to this opposition, the 
United States followed a policy acceptable to both Britain 
and France. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, 
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed that possible 
trusteeship status depended upon voluntary admission. 
Indochina would come under the trusteeship structure only if 
the French volunteered. American policy toward Indochina, 
therefore, deferred the decision as to the legitimacy of the 
French government in Indochina to the French.
Fear of Communist expansion ultimately silenced the 
trusteeship issue and American anti-colonial attitudes. 
Respect for state legitimacy gave way to a need to have 
nations strong enough to resist Communist advances on their
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own. American policy toward the Soviet Union at this time, 
however, was not animated by ideological anti-Communism as 
much as it was formulated in response to questions of power 
, politics. The first concern of United States policy was to 
formulate a balance of power to meet the challenge raised by 
Russian expansionism in Europe. Containment of Russian 
expansion became "doctrine" as American policy makers 
drummed-up domestic support for the newly created balance of 
power in Europe. In Asia, the time lag between decisions of 
power politics and development of doctrine was longer than 
the time between events and doctrine in Europe because the 
perceived threat still resided in Europe. In this respect, 
Pacific island naval bases and strong alliances with the 
"former" colonial powers of Europe— decisions of power 
politics— took on added significance. To protect strategic 
interests in the Pacific and to assure British and French 
cooperation after the war, United States policy compromised 
traditional American antipathy toward colonialism. Many 
felt that to argue otherwise would threaten the passage of 
the United Nations Treaty in the Senate, and that, in turn, 
would threaten collective security. Thus, three years 
later, without serious opposition to the problem of 
colonies, the Senate ratified the U.N. Treaty. A 
bi-partisan foreign policy, formed during the war years to
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confront Hitler with a united America, was reapplied to 
confront Stalin. The desideratum was to make the new United 
Nations stronger than its predecessor.
In 1945, however, some American policy makers wanted to 
effectuate an anti-colonial policy. With respect to the 
French colony of Indochina, analysts in the State Department 
were split into two schools of thought: the Office of 
European Affairs (EUR) and the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 
(FE).10 The position of the EUR was to follow a hands off 
policy which basically favored French reoccupation. This 
view held that the former colonial powers of Europe would 
oppose any action by the United States that ran counter to 
French wishes. Such an event would undermine United States 
efforts to strengthen France and Western Europe in a 
European balance of power that checked Soviet aggression.11 
The FE wanted a more vigorous anti-colonial position.- They 
noted that President Roosevelt "realized that dynamic forces 
leading toward self-government are growing in Asia; that the 
United States— as a great democracy— cannot and must not try 
to retard this development but rather act in harmony with 
it."12 They argued that acts undertaken by the United 
States in furtherance of "self-rule in close, willing 
association with major Western powers would not only be in 
harmony with political trends in the area, but would appear
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to be the one practical solution which will assure peace and 
stability in the Far East."13
Politics decreed that the EUR position would carry the 
day. On June 2, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius 
Jr., met with Bidault and the French Ambassador to the 
United States, Henri Bonnet. Stettinius "made it 
clear...that the record was entirely innocent of any 
official statement of this government questioning even by 
implication, French sovereignty, over Indochina."14 On June 
22, 1945 the State Department issued a paper which 
summarized the United States position on colonial 
questions.15 The paper noted the two contradictory aims of 
the United States. Specifically, the United States felt 
that peace and security in the Far East required increased 
political freedom for the inhabitants of colonial 
territories. Generally, however, the United States felt 
that world peace and security necessitated cooperation with 
the colonial powers. In an effort to harmonize these two 
contradictory goals, the ideal gave way to the real. The 
paper noted:
The United States Government may properly 
continue to state the political principle which it 
has frequently announced, that dependent peoples 
should be given the opportunity...to achieve an 
increased measure of self-government, but it 
should avoid any course of action which would
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seriously impair the unity of the major United 
Nations .16
Perhaps mindful of possible criticism for abandoning 
traditional American ideals, the paper paid lip service to 
self-government in its conclusion.
The United States recognizes French 
sovereignty over Indochina. It Is; however, the 
general policy of the United States to favor a 
policy which would allow colonial peoples an 
opportunity to prepare themselves for increased 
participation in their own government with 
eventual self-government as the goal.17
Significantly, the United States position was solidified 
in a pro-French posture; the need for French friendship in 
Europe prevented the United States from risking French 
enmity in Indochina. Both the State Department and Congress, 
were willing to compromise traditional American beliefs in 
order to secure foreign policy objectives. Critics of this 
policy attacked it as abandoning the major policy goal of 
achieving world peace and stability through rule of 
legitimate self-government, out of fear of Soviet 
intentions. Additionally, the contrasting positions of EUR 
and FE served to define the parameters of the entire 
Indochina question for American foreign policy. American 
policy in the Pacific in 1945 largely was determined by 
events transpiring in Europe.
Meanwhile, in Vietnam the French tried to settle the
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question of Vietnam's legitimate government unhindered by 
outside opinion. On March 6, 1946, in Hanoi the French 
agreed to recognize the DRV as a "free state" within the 
French Union, in exchange for the "amicable" return of 
French troops to replace the Nationalist Chinese troops in 
northern Vietnam.18 By "free state" was meant that 
ostensibly the DRV would have its own government and army. 
But precisely what this meant in practice was called into 
question because sovereignty was not part of the French 
concept of "free state." According to the French 
constitution of October 13, 1946, France itself would 
dominate the French Union.19 The French Union, a quasi- 
federal structure, was not an association of equal partners 
like the British Commonwealth. Rather, Paris was to the 
French Union as Rome is to the Catholic Church.20 France 
faced the dilemma of meeting Vietnamese aspirations while 
retaining Indochina within the French Union. Because 
American policy toward the area was made within the context 
of United States-French relations, the United States 
deferred important decisions to the French. The consequence 
of deferment (or neglect) was to inadequately examine the 
legitimacy of the French position.
Even though many French and Viet Minh officials 
distrusted each other, Ho Chi Minh preferred to resolve the
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question of legitimacy through negotiation. The status of 
the Republic of Cochin China-^declared a "free republic" on 
June 1— dominated negotiations held at Fontainebleau 
beginning in July 1946. The talks showed the differences 
between the two sides. According to historian R.E.M.
Irving,
[T]he French regard[ed] the problem of 
the status of Vietnam essentially as one of 
internal constitutional law, and the Vietnamese 
s[aw] it in terms of international law; for the 
'former it was a question of 'autonomy within the 
French bloc', whereas for the latter it was a 
question of 'independence complemented with 
association with France.'21
During these negotiations, the French showed a lack of
respect for the Viet Minh as legitimate representatives of
the Vietnamese people by calling another conference at Dalat
with representatives of the Royal Governments of Cambodia,
Laos, Cochin China and of ethnic minorities. Protesting
lack of French good faith, the Viet Minh left Fontainebleau.
Ho Chi Minh, however, stayed behind and worked out a Modus
Vivendi with the French Government dated September 14, 1946.
As noted above, events in Indochina outpaced diplomatic
initiatives as the French shelled Haiphong Harbor before
this agreement was signed.22 The French, soon thereafter,
occupied Hanoi, forcing Ho to the countryside as conflict
spread throughout Vietnam.23 On the evening of December 20,
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by radio broadcast, President Ho called for the national 
resistance war to start.24 The First Indochina War had 
begun.
Despite repeated efforts by Ho Chi Minh to negotiate, 
some members of the French government, such as Admiral 
Thierry d'Argenlieu, French High Commissioner in Saigon 
appointed by de Gaulle, did not trust Ho: Instead,
d'Argenlieu sought a military solution. In October 1947, 
d'Argenlieu inaugurated a large scale offensive against the 
Viet Minh. When this military solution ultimately proved 
inadequate, d'Argenlieu decided that resurrecting a 
government headed by the former Emperor Bao Dai was France's 
best solution. By supporting the traditional ruling class, 
the French hoped to weaken the popular support of the Viet 
Minh. To this end, the French agreed to have Bao Dai return 
to Vietnam as Head of State. The terms were signed in the 
Elysee Agreement on March 8, 1949 .25 Yet, because three 
years had elapsed before this agreement was signed, the "Bao 
Dai solution" "was discredited before it was properly 
implemented.1,26
During the period between Ho's proclamation of war and 
the signing of the Elysee Agreements, American policy makers 
were pre-occupied with Soviet Communism in Europe. Harry S. 
Truman had replaced Roosevelt as President of the United
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States and Truman, more tolerant of colonialism, readily 
discarded anti-colonial policies. Even so, Roosevelt only 
had entertained vague ideas about promoting 
self-determination and ending colonialism by means of a 
trusteeship system. Because Roosevelt's public 
pronouncements favored the supposed colonial powers, the 
proper moment for implementing ideas promoting self- 
determination never arrived. In short, Truman and the 
American Congress did not face a real choice.
President Truman, pre-occupied with questions of 
European security was not inclined to even consider Asian 
self-determination. The Truman Doctrine (of intervention) 
was proclaimed on March 12, 1947. In May 1947, Congress 
passed the Greek-Turkish aid bill as well as a humanitarian 
relief bill to help five European countries and China 
survive economic difficulties following the Second World 
War.27 Soon thereafter, other bills were passed, including 
the China Aid Act of 1948. In Europe, the Soviet challenge 
solidified American resolve not to appease aggression 
anywhere. The Czechoslovakian Government fell February 25,
1948. The countries of Western Europe responded with the 
Brussels Pact to ensure collective security and economic 
collaboration. On April 1, 1948, the Soviets began the 
blockade of Berlin. President Truman responded with the
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Berlin airlift, which lasted from June 21, 1948 to May 12,
1949. In June, the United States Congress approved Marshall 
Plan funds under the Economic Cooperation Act. In July, 
negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty Association 
began, culminating in the creation of NATO on April 4,
1949 .28
The precedent set by bold response in Europe, however, 
did not easily translate to conditions in Asia. The problem 
for United States policy makers was how to handle changes in 
the Asian balance of power spawned by colonial revolutions.
Although American policy makers were pre-occupied with 
European security, deferment to the French version of events 
in Indochina was not unequivocal. On September 27, 1948, 
the Department of State issued a paper entitled "Policy 
Statement on Indochina." This paper stated:
Some solution must be found which will strike 
a balance between the aspirations of the peoples 
of Indochina and the interests of the 
French....Post-war French governments have never 
understood, or have chosen to underestimate, the 
strength of the national movement with which they 
must deal in Indochina.
[The paper concluded that] Ho Chi Minh is the 
strongest and...ablest figure in Indochina and 
that any... solution which excludes him is an 
expedient of uncertain outcome. We are naturally 
hesitant to press the French too strongly or to 
become deeply involved as long as we are not in a 
position to suggest a solution or until we are 
prepared to accept the onus of intervention.29
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Nevertheless, the goal of achieving a strong French buffer 
in Europe took precedence over Asian nationalism. While the 
Department of State may have questioned French policy toward 
Indochina, it felt constrained to await developments. As a 
result, the Truman Administration never challenged the 
legitimacy of the French position in Indochina.
At this juncture, the major focus of State Department 
concern in Asia was Mao Tse-tung and the Communist conquest 
of China. On March 3, 1949, the National Security Council 
issued NSC 34/2 which adopted a wait and see approach hoping 
for the creation of an independent China. While NSC 34/2 
acknowledged that the creation of an independent China may 
take a long time, the document noted that ”[T]he Kremlin 
waited twenty-five years for the fulfillment of its 
revolution in China. We may have to persevere as long or 
longer."30 In the meantime, the United States should 
attempt to create rifts in the Chinese Communist Party, as 
well as between China and the Soviet Union.31 In Indochina, 
Mao not only began to supply the Viet Minh, but also to send 
troops to the Indochina border in December 1949. Because 
Southeast Asia remained a low priority, American policy 
makers were content to let the Bao Dai experiment have a 
chance. Besides, as a former ruler, Bao Dai had a claim to 
legitimacy. Should Bao Dai actualize that claim the United
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States could formally acknowledge his government.
By signing the Elysee Agreement on March 8, 194 9 with 
Emperor Bao Dai, the French recognized that the principal 
problem in Indochina was political.32 According to this 
agreement, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were to become 
Associated States within the French Union; Although each 
associated state could form its own government, France would 
dictate foreign and defense policy as well as exert economic 
dominance over them.33 The new relationship, however, 
failed to meet adequately the aspirations of the Indochinese 
people. Soon, Bao Dai himself began to realize that the 
"new" arrangement was just camouflage for French rule.34 
Finding little to favor the Elysee Agreement because it 
doubted the Bao Dai government enjoyed popular support, the
Department of State entertained ideas of collective efforts
\
by western nations to figure out a solution which also could 
check the spread of Communism in Asia.35
On March 29, 1949, the Policy Planning Staff issued a 
paper which questioned the correctness of deferring 
decisions concerning Indochinese aspirations strictly to 
French interpretations. This paper stated that the United 
States should accept the fact that Indochinese nationalism 
could not be resolved by full support of either the French, 
or the nationalists or by evading the issue. Because France
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held the key to meeting indigenous demands, the United 
States should endeavor to induce "the French to adapt their 
policies to the realities of the current situation in 
Southeast Asia."36 As part of this inducement, the 
Department of State sent a memorandum to the French Foreign 
Office on June 6, 1949. The memo stated that the "United 
States Government believes that the Vietnamese will 
willingly accept a partnership with France only if the 
equality of Vietnam is recognized and if...the sovereignty 
of Vietnam is acknowledged."37 Despite such a pointed 
stance, however, field officers continued to implement the 
old policy. On June 29, Ambassador David Bruce told French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman that the United States would 
support French goals including the limited sovereignty 
granted in the Elysee Agreements.
On July 1, 1949, the National Security Council 
considered a State Department report entitled "U.S. Policy 
Toward Southeast Asia."38 The report noted that French 
military pressure in Indochina had forced some non-Communist 
nationalists to rely on the Communists. The report 
recommended that the French yield "their claims to 
sovereignty to a native regime. Only if that is done will 
the false issue of French imperialism, which cements 
communists and non-communists in unity, be dissolved.1139
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The report stated that the French could yield their claim to 
sovereignty to Pro-French Vietnamese or to the Viet Minh. 
Either choice, the report stated, would lead to civil war, 
during which the United States could woric "through a screen 
of anti-communist Asiatics, to ensure;::the triumph of 
Indochinese nationalism over Red imperialism.1,40 But either 
way was preferable to current French policy which was 
leading the area down a "Stalinist blind alley."41 American 
policy makers were not only beginning to question the 
correctness of the French approach, but also to supply 
alternatives. Such questioning reflected increased State 
Department attention to the area brought about by Mao's 
success in China.
The Congress also expressed concern about the spread of 
Communism in Asia. In the spring of 194 9, Congress extended 
the China Aid Act of 1948. In addition, another bill— the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 or MDAP— included a 
provision extending unvouchered funds to forces fighting 
Communism in the "general area of China."42 The provision, 
Title III, section 303, was well known to the French as the 
wording included Indochina. Another provision of MDAP 
authorized the President to send noncombatant military 
advisors anywhere in the world, thus providing the basis for 
possible future intervention.43
45
On December 30, 1949, the National Security Council 
issued NSC 48/2, entitled "The Position of the United States 
with Respect to Asia."44 Paying heed to the principle of 
sovereignty, the document stated that the United States 
should try to foster regional associations of non-Communist 
states, which the United States might assist if invited.45 
The United States, therefore, should not take an active part 
in the initial stages of any such association because the 
associations should reflect genuine desires of the 
participants. Noting that the United States should help the 
governments of South Asia "in their efforts to meet the 
minimum aspirations of their people and to maintain 
internal security," NSC 48/2 stated with regard to Indochina 
that:
The United States should continue to use its 
influence in Asia toward resolving the colonial- 
nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy 
the fundamental demands of the nationalist 
movement while at the same time minimizing the 
strain on the colonial powers who are our Western 
allies. Particular attention should be given to 
the problem of...the obtaining by Bao Dai or other 
non-Communist nationalist leaders of the support 
of a substantial portion of the Vietnamese.46
Acknowledging Bao Dai's slim claim to legitimacy, the 
position of the United States was that there was no 
satisfactory alternative and that the United States should 
recognize his government soon after the French ratified the
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Elysee Agreement.47
The Gravel edition of The Pentagon Papers concluded that 
at this juncture:
in the closing months of 1949; the course of 
U.S. policy was set to block Communist expansion 
in Asia: by collective security if the Asians were 
forthcoming, by collaboration with major European 
allies and commonwealth nations, if possible, but 
bi-laterally if necessary; On that policy course 
lay the Korean War of 1950-53, the forming of the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization of 1954, and 
the progressively deepening U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam.48
The defense of Indochina assumed greater importance to 
American policy makers with the Communist victory in China 
in 1949. By the end of the year Chiang Kai-Shek had fled to 
Formosa and Mao Tse-tung had established the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) on Indochina's northern border. On 
January 17, 1950, the People's Republic extended recognition 
to the DRV. Two weeks later, on January 30, the Soviet 
Union followed suit.49 The attention of American policy 
makers, only recently drawn to Asia, now was clearly focused 
on Indochina. Secretary of State Dean Acheson noted that 
the Soviet recognition of the DRV "should remove any 
illusions as to the 'nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's 
aims and [it] reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal 
enemy of native independence in Indochina."50 No longer 
were American policy makers content to defer to French
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policy. Secretary Acheson had given an additional reason 
for American aid— anti-communism.51
The French formally transferred "sovereignty” to the 
State of Vietnam by ratifying the Elysee Agreement on 
February 2, 1950; By recognizing Bao Dai two days later, 
the United States was only a small step away from direct 
involvement. For, in light of Soviet and PRC recognition of 
the DRV, American credibility as leader of the free world 
was now at stake. The loss of Indochina to international 
communism might cause neighboring countries to lose faith in 
the viability of democratic institutions which, ultimately, 
might lead to the loss of those countries as well. On 
February 16th the French asked the United States for 
economic and military assistance in Indochina. Noting 
Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV, French 
Ambassador Henri Bonnet asked Secretary of State Acheson for 
economic and military aid from the United States.52 As 
Washington considered the French request, the war for 
Indochinese independence was becoming a proving ground in 
the Cold War.
On April 14, 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson 
sent a letter to Secretary Acheson which underscored the 
prevailing Cold War attitude. Johnson, whose views were 
supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), stated that
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"Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of 
containment from Japan southward and around to the Indian 
Peninsula."53 Besides outlining the application of 
perimeter containment, Johnson noted that Southeast Asia was 
of such great economic importance that the United States 
should not let the area enrich the Soviets. Johnson then 
outlined his view of the domino theory: ^the fall of 
Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of... Southeast 
Asia" and threaten United States security interests in "the 
Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia," as well as the "Pacific 
littoral of Asia."54 Johnson concluded that the United 
States should send a military aid mission to Indochina to 
screen requests for military assistance.55 In a very real 
sense, American commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia 
had begun. Not only was containment applied to Asia, but 
peculiarities of the Asian situation were recast to support 
the application of a containment policy.
Because Indochina was assuming such great importance, 
the NSC focused exclusively on the area in a separate study. 
On April 24, 1950 President Truman approved NSC 64, entitled 
"The Position of the United States with Respect to 
Indochina."56 NSC 64 framed the defense of Indochina as 
defending against a comprehensive plan of Communist 
aggression. "[T]he threat of communist aggression against
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Indochina," the report noted, "is only one phase of 
anticipated communist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia," 
and United States efforts to defend Indochina should include 
defense of the general area.57 NSC 64 recommended that the 
United States become actively involved in the war in 
Indochina. Based on NSC 48, NSC 64 noted that the Chinese 
Communists had approached the Indochinese border and that 
France and her Indochinese forces could not "contain" Ho's 
forces should China aid or reinforce Ho.58 Fearing the loss 
of Thailand and Burma should Indochina become 
Communist-dominated, NSC 64 recommended that the United 
States prepare a program to protect United States security 
interests there.59 To that end, President Truman approved 
$10 million of military aid for the French in Indochina on 
May 1.60
The program to protect United States security interests 
in Indochina, recommended by NSC 64, soon took shape. On 
May 8, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the 
United States would begin to provide economic assistance to 
the Associated States. Acheson had met with Robert Schuman, 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and agreed that France 
should have the "primary responsibility" in Indochina. 
Secretly, the two also agreed that any United States aid to 
the Associated States would necessitate prior consultation
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with the French.61 Significantly, Acheson announced 
American aid to Indochina before the outbreak of the Korean 
War.62
Previously, the State Department had sent an aid survey 
mission on economic assistance under R: Allen Griffin, to 
analyze the situation in Indochina. On May 11, Acting 
Secretary of State James Webb publicly noted Griffin's 
recommendation that Marshall Plan China Aid funds be spent 
to provide economic assistance to Indochina, and that MDAP 
"general area of China" funds be spent for military 
assistance.63 In his report Griffin noted that France had 
"a large stake in prestige" in Indochina. Griffin noted 
intense emotional friction between the three major groups in 
Vietnam: (1) Bao Dai's conflict with the French as he tried
to win over fence-sitters (attentists) who were afraid of 
Viet Minh reprisal should they align with Bao Dai; (2) Ho's 
popularity and his connections with Moscow; and (3) French 
desires to further the French Union. Griffin mentioned a 
fourth group— the Chinese— who were apolitical but unlikely 
to align with Bao Dai. Although a minority, the Chinese 
presence served as a reminder of centuries old 
Chinese-Vietnamese enmity, and possible Communist Chinese 
invasion. Chinese-Vietnamese ethnic conflict, noted 
Griffin, ironically might serve to elevate the French to a
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position of protector.64
In May 1950/ Congress extended Marshall Plan aid by 
passing the Foreign Economic Assistance Act (FEAA), of which 
Title IV or "point 4," was called the "Act for International 
Development." Point 4 provided $40 million of aid for use 
in the "general area of China" presumably to help less 
developed countries improve their standards of living. In 
the case of Indochina— the main target of FEAA— the idea was 
that improved economic standards would lead to increased 
political strength in order to withstand possible Communist 
insurgency.65 FEAA established economic aid missions to 
each Associated State, which, coupled with the military aid 
missions approved by MDAP, facilitated future United States 
intervention in the Indochina war. American policy makers 
later used these missions to exert pressure on the French to 
increase self-government in the Associated States. At the 
time of its passage, many Republicans and conservative 
Democrats opposed the point 4 program, claiming that it 
would lead to open-ended foreign aid. Indeed, in August 
1950, Truman requested $303 million for use in the 
Philippines, Indochina, and Southeast Asia.66
American perceptions of world-wide Communist intent were 
reinforced, if not justified, when North Korean troops 
crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, on June 25,
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1950. On June 27th, President Truman announced increased 
United States military assistance to France and sent 
military missions to each of the Associated States as 
recommended by NSC 64. To demonstrate American resolve to 
Europeans, Truman also dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the 
Formosan Straits. The North Korean invasion provided 
tangible evidence to many Americans that Communism was 
intent on world domination. The effect was to encourage 
Congress to approve increased defense spending and foreign 
military assistance.
In Indochina, however, the North Korean invasion and 
subsequent American troop commitment there, made it unlikely 
that the United States would respond in Indochina as well.
At this time the United States lacked a military strategy to 
wage battle in Third World revolutionary struggles. Plans 
to deter Communist aggression in Indochina were based on 
conventional tactics, as was the case in Korea, not 
guerrilla warfare.67 At the highest levels of government, 
decision makers would seek to address this deficiency. 
Domestically, the Korean invasion had other consequences. 
Truman committed United States troops in a foreign war 
without the prior approval of Congress. Truman paid lip 
service to Congressional consultation by holding two 
one-half hour meetings with top Congressional (mostly
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Democratic) leaders.68 Basically, however, Truman involved 
the United States in war based on his constitutional 
authority as Commander-in-Chief and on United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions to aid Korea; Truman's quick 
response assumed importance in subsequent United States 
intervention decisions.
With combat troops in Korea; the Statd Department 
continued to wage the fight in Indochina on the diplomatic 
front. Even though French assessments would inform American 
policy, some analysts found solutions to the Indochina 
problem at odds with French estimates. On August 7, 1950, 
John F. Melby, Special Assistant to Dean Rusk (who was then 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East), cabled the 
findings of a joint State-Defense survey mission to the Far 
East. Referring to Communists as perpetrators of a 
"hydra-headed policy of force, terror, propaganda, 
penetration, and cynical exploitation of any opportunity," 
Melby's views reflected the anti-Communism prevalent during 
the Truman Administration. Melby stated that the defense of 
Indochina was the "keystone" to holding all of Southeast 
Asia, and that a total French withdrawal would be 
disastrous. Yet, Melby also stated that French apathy and 
strategy of static defense reflected the improbability of a 
military solution. Suggesting short-term stop-gap military
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measures, Melby stated such measures would not solve the 
long-range political problems; Politically, Melby stated 
the French should grant the Vietnamese independence as they 
"will have it regardless of anything else;" Melby stated 
that granting independence, while not "likely to provoke 
dancing in the streets of Paris," was the only "real 
prospect for salvaging anything." Melby noted:
If Vietnam is determined on complete 
independence as all evidence suggests, it probably 
cannot get it for a long time in face of French 
opposition, but it can create the kind of uproar 
which will constitute a continuing drain on French 
strength and in [the] end benefit only Communists. 
Coincidentally, American identification with 
French in such eventuality will further weaken 
American influence in Asia. Historically no 
ruling group has ever remained more or less 
indefinitely in power in face of active or even 
passive resistance from the governed, or without 
ruining itself in the process. There is no 
convincing evidence Nationalism in Indochina 
proposes to be an exception.69
Melby's views were outweighed by the views of those who 
feared antagonizing Paris. The American legation in Saigon, 
for instance, believed that military success might follow 
such measures as the creation of a Vietnamese National Army 
and increased United States influence over the conduct of 
the war.70
Of particular concern to American policy makers was 
possible Chinese intervention in Indochina. On August 16,
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1950, the Policy Planning Staff issued a memorandum 
entitled: "United States Policy Toward Indochina in the 
Light of Recent Developments." The memorandum noted that 
the French doubted their ability to withstand a Chinese 
Communist reinforced Viet Minh, and that the United States 
most likely would refrain from supplying American ground 
troops to bridge the gap: Instead of expecting ground
reinforcements, the memorandum noted, Paris should implement 
political measures designed to bring a greater degree of 
self-government to the Associated States.71 "If Paris does 
not feel that it can adopt a bolder political approach with 
respect to Indochina," the memorandum concluded, "we must 
recognize that the French and we may well be heading into a 
debacle which neither of us can afford."72 On September 11, 
1950, Dean Rusk wrote a memorandum for Secretary Acheson 
entitled "Possible Invasion of Indochina," by Communist 
forces.73 Noting that the French Army was the only defense 
against Communist aggression, Rusk noted that the United 
States had no choice but to assist the French or give up. 
Instead of asking whether a military or a political solution 
was most desirable, American policy makers were now asking 
whether the United States would intervene or not, and if the 
decision were to intervene then to what degree. 
Significantly, Dean Rusk was advocating United States entry
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into Indochina at this time.
In October 1950, the Chinese entered the Korean War and 
any thought of direct United States intervention in 
Indochina was shelved. With this action; argue the authors 
of The Pentagon Papers. "China had replaced the Soviet Union 
as the principal source of the perceived Communist threat in 
Southeast Asia."74 Chinese entry in Korea led some analysts 
to consider scrapping projects in Indochina altogether. On 
November 20, 1950 John Ohly, Deputy Director of MDAP in 
Vietnam, sent a memorandum to Secretary Acheson. Ohly 
expressed a need to re-evaluate United States policy in 
Indochina, because pursuit of the present course could 
divert money better allocated elsewhere, such as in Western 
Europe. Specifically, Ohly felt that the advent of Chinese 
forces in the Korean conflict could lead to Chinese 
intervention in Indochina. Ohly recommended "that before 
any further substantial commitments of equipment, prestige 
or forces are made in Indochina," the United States reassess 
its policy there. Noting limited resources, Ohly stated 
that the United States might have to abandon certain 
world-wide objectives. As an added caveat, Ohly warned that 
the United States was "gradually increasing" its stake in 
the outcome in Indochina and that American efforts were 
beginning to supplant, and not complement, French efforts.
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Such an outcome, Ohly noted, would make a scapegoat out of 
the United States, as though the United States were the 
chief party at fault and in interest.75
The upper echelons of policy making also advocated 
leaving Indochina alone. A JCS memorandum dated November 
28, 1950, and another memorandum written by the Pentagon's 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee dated November 17, 1950, 
advised against the use of United States troops to assist 
France. The Pentagon memo stated that assisting France in 
the absence of a previous Chinese attack would provoke China 
to militarily intervene in behalf of the Viet Minh, which, 
in turn, would lead to global war. Such an eventuality, the 
memo noted, was ill-advised because the United States then 
would be fighting the Soviets in Western Europe, and 
the armies of Western Europe were incapable of meeting 
objectives in Asia and Europe simultaneously.76 The 
Pentagon memo, therefore, advised the United States to 
increase political pressure to induce France to grant 
greater autonomy to the Associated States. The Joint 
Chiefs, basing recommendations upon the Pentagon memo, also 
urged measures to induce France to eliminate its colonial 
policies.77 They recommended against the use of foreign 
troops in Indochina and were against referring the matter to 
the United Nations. They felt the United States should
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encourage a regional security arrangement under the auspices 
of the U.N. Charter which would necessitate entry of the 
Associated States into the United Nations.78 This 
memorandum became NSC 64/1, and formed the basis of United 
States policy until the French left Indochina.79
In the meantime, the French tried to fulfill United 
States desires. Ironically, such attempts led to increased 
need for United States aid. On December 8, 1950, the French 
and Vietnamese signed a military convention creating a 
Vietnamese national army by transferring units from French 
to Vietnamese control. Ten days later, the French requested 
United States aid to equip this army. The French request 
came shortly after the French National Assembly had voted on 
November 22 to reinforce the French Army in Indochina and 
declare the War an anti-Communist fight. The vote 
symbolized France's inability to solve the Indochina problem 
on their own.80 By recasting the Indochina War as part of 
the greater anti-Communist struggle, France hoped to enlist 
greater American support. On December 23rd, the United 
States signed bilateral mutual defense assistance agreements 
with France and the Associated States.
By the end of the year, United States policy makers 
recognized the inadequacy of French policies and the need 
for collective defense. On December 29, 1950, the Central
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Intelligence Agency coordinated a "National Intelligence 
Estimate" on Indochina. This paper stated that the military 
situation in Indochina favored the Viet Minh. The paper 
noted that French officers killed in Vietnam equaled the 
number graduated at St. Cyr each year, and that 37% of 
France's 1949 military budget was spent in Indochina without 
showing any gains: Such figures, the paper stated, lent
credence to the view that France had lost the will to fight. 
The situation could only get worse because the new 
Vietnamese Army would not be operational for another year 
and the Viet Minh could probably defeat the French in 
between six to nine months. The shadow of overt Chinese 
intervention, the paper noted, only confirmed this 
assessment. Because the loss of Indochina would affect 
neighboring areas, the paper advocated Western assistance to 
those areas.81
With the new year, United States policy makers continued 
to weigh the possibility of an overt Chinese attack in 
Indochina. This fear led to debate as to whether the United 
States should enter into consultations with Britain and 
France in hopes of averting a French "sell-out" to Mao. On 
January 1, 1951, Donald R. Heath, American Minister to the 
Associated States, informed Acheson of the view from Saigon. 
Heath stated that a Chinese invasion was imminent, and that
60
except for the area from Hanoi to Haiphong, the entire north 
would fall to the Viet Minh. Heath felt that Haiphong would 
fall within six months if the Chinese invaded. He stated 
that recent French concessions were intefpreted by many 
Vietnamese as a prelude to French withdrawal, so the United 
States should encourage Bao to provide better leadership.
Heath hysteria— fear of Chinese military intervention—  
gripped Washington. On January 31, Dean Rusk sent a 
memorandum to Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews. Rusk felt that Chinese 
invasion of Burma and Indochina was imminent. This 
assessment was not based on Chinese intentions but on their 
increased "ability to do so." Rusk reiterated the domino 
theory: "if Indochina were to fall under control of the 
Communists, Burma and Thailand would follow suit almost 
immediately," and Indonesia and India would be hard-pressed 
"to remain outside the Soviet-dominated Asian-bloc." For 
this reason, Indochina "is the keystone of our policy in the 
rest of Southeast Asia." Rusk stated that United States 
policy— to prevent a Communist takeover by every means 
possible and to induce France to create a stable nationalist 
government in Indochina--gelled in late 1948-early 1949. In 
the face of possible Chinese intervention and lack of 
further French political efforts, Rusk felt the United
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States should participate more; Indeed, to protect our 
"investment" Rusk felt the United States should persevere 
"to the utmost of our ability."82
As fear gripped Washington, despondency gripped the 
French leadership in Indochina. On March 11, 1951, Heath 
wrote Acheson stating that General Jean de Lattre de 
Tassigny (French High Commissioner and Commander of French 
Forces in Indochina) had launched into an "analysis of the 
state of French spirit as a result of the last war" and 
French economic losses and inferiority. De Lattre felt the 
United States "must reckon with the inferiority complex and 
feeling of the humiliation in the French Government and 
among their people." De Lattre mentioned there existed 
"forces in the US that were pushing American policy in IC to 
actions injurious to French prestige."83 R.E.M. Irving also 
notes the feeling of humiliation following the Second World 
War among French politicians and soldiers. Irving states 
that this psychological problem made decolonization 
following the war a major problem for the French.84 Irving 
states that France's desire to reassert herself on the world 
stage following the humiliation of World War II was the 
primary motive of French policy in Indochina after receipt 
of Marshall Plan aid. For the French leadership, "with 
their Resistance background, the motive of national prestige
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was probably more important than any other single factor in 
their Indochina policy.”85
French despair led to American appraisal of the loss of 
Indochina in view of a possible Chinese invasion. On March 
20, 1951, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed 
the will and ability of Thailand, Burma and Malaya to resist 
Communist pressures or invasion should the Viet Minh defeat 
the French. The NIE noted that these countries could 
withstand Communist pressures if the Viet Minh attained 
victory without Chinese intervention, but otherwise would be 
forced to seek an accommodation with the Chinese in the 
absence of outside (Western) support. The NIE stated that 
the interested nations could not organize a regional defense 
in time should the Chinese roll through Indochina. The 
prospects for Malaya were not favorable if the Chinese did 
so.86 Although defeatism marked United States assessments 
at this time, a collective security arrangement seemed to 
offer some chance for success.
On May 17, 1951, Truman approved NSC 48/5 which stated 
that the United States could not prevent the loss of 
Indochina should China invade.87 The NSC Staff also dated a 
paper that day which noted that "[t]he guiding principle of 
U.S. foreign policy as it relates to meeting the threat of 
Soviet aggression is the promotion of a...[collective
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security system] based on the principles of the U.N. 
Charter." Such a system, tbe paper noted, is "fundamental 
to our world-wide struggle for security against Soviet 
aggression."88 To that end, the United States should 
continue education, information, and psychological warfare 
efforts in Asia. In Indochina, the paper recommended 
supplemental aid to the indigenous forces and encouraged 
movements toward internal autonomy.
By late summer, fear of a Chinese attack had subsided 
temporarily. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) dated 
August 7, 1951, stated that the Chinese could change the 
military balance in Indochina, but would hesitate to 
intervene openly while negotiating for a Korean 
settlement.89 The NIE decided that increased activity on 
the Indochinese border reflected Chinese interest in 
facilitating aid to the Viet Minh and did not represent 
plans to intervene. The NIE concluded that a stalemate was 
likely through the end of 1951, as Chinese aid matched 
American aid and French reinforcements.90
French despair and consequent American defeatism did not 
prevent further French requests for United States aid. On 
September 1, 1951, French Foreign Minister Schuman told 
Acheson that France could not stay in Indochina after July 
1, 1952, and meet her NATO commitments without massive doses
64
of American aid.91 Even though Korea demanded a great 
effort, the French manipulated American fears to procure 
more funds. Action for the sake of action became the quid 
pro quo or ransom for French blackmail:
Not all Americans in Indochina stood idly by and watched 
as French despair led to stalemate. Robert Blum, the CIA 
mission chief in Saigon, felt that to undercut Communist 
strength in Indochina the United States should pressure the 
French into granting indigenous demands for political 
autonomy. Blum's efforts infuriated the French leadership 
in Hanoi. What was to become known as the "Blum 
controversy" reflected nothing more than Blum's efforts "to 
foster indigenous resistance to Communism." Nevertheless, 
Blum left Vietnam in late 1951 at French insistence.92 
Other Americans also urged the French to mollify the 
stridency of colonial policies. Indeed, during 1951,
United States personnel began to intervene in the internal 
politics of Indochina by seeking to replace Bao Dai with Ngo 
Dinh Diem, a nationalist Vietnamese Catholic and attentiste 
who opposed both the French and the Viet Minh.93 United 
States efforts were in response to the political stalemate 
engendered by Bao Dai's policies. For all intents and 
purposes, Bao Dai himself had become an attentiste— "a 
spectator as the French and Americans tested their strength
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against each other, and against the Viet Minh."94
The French did not see the idealism espoused by American 
personnel as a blessing. When General de Lattre visited 
Washington in September i951, he complained about the way 
some Americans saw their presence in Indochina. De Lattre 
noted that some problems were "caused by the fact that a 
number of young men with a ^missionary zeal' were dispensing 
economic aid with the result that there was a feeling on the 
part of some that they were using this aid to extend 
American influence." De Lattre mentioned that the problem 
had improved after finding out that Blum was no longer in 
Indochina. But de Lattre's problem remained. With the 
increased aid came increased American desires to intervene 
and influence events. Blum's attitudes were shared by 
Edmund A. Gullion, Counselor of Embassy at Saigon, and R. 
Allen Griffin, now Special Far East Representative in charge 
of Marshall Plan foreign aid missions.95 They felt that 
American aid should come at the price of American influence. 
They felt that Bao Dai and his premier, Tran Van Huu, were 
not representative of the people and were not desirous of 
seeking the needed political solution. Indeed, Bao Dai 
looked to the United States to gain concessions from the 
French.96 According to the authors of The Pentagon Papers, 
"[T]he 'Bao Dai solution' ultimately solved nothing. The
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outcome rested rather on France's military struggle with the 
Viet Minh, and its contest of leverage with the United 
States.,|97
By December 1951, official United States policy was to 
use American troops only to help the French evacuate.98 On 
December 19, 1951, General Omar Bradley> Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated at a joint State-Defense-JCS 
meeting on Indochina, that he doubted the American public 
would go along with using American troops in Indochina.99 
At the end of the month, David Bruce, Ambassador in France, 
cabled that French public opinion was gradually favoring a 
withdrawal of French troops from Indochina, absent 
internationalization of the war or a larger dose of foreign 
aid.100 Bruce noted that one reason the French did not 
withdraw was "humiliation of national pride and loss of 
prestige abroad," including adverse repercussions in North 
Africa.101 Even though the French despaired, their pride and 
the fear of further encroachments upon the French Union kept 
them in Indochina.
Events in Asia at the start of 1952 did not favor 
American policy. Korean armistice talks that had begun in 
July 1951, were not making serious progress. With Maoist 
forces on the Indochinese border, policy makers in 
Washington gave more thought to an international solution.
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On January 11, 1952, at a tripartite military conference in 
Washington, the military chiefs of Britain, France, and the 
United States agreed that their respective governments 
should issue a warning to the Chinese stating that 
aggression in Southeast Asia would be met by "certain 
retaliation from the three powers, not necessarily limited 
to the area of aggression;"102 They alsB agreed to set-up a 
committee with representatives from Australia and New 
Zealand to discuss measures in the event the Chinese failed 
to heed the warning.103 Although vetoed by the three powers 
in June, such a warning is evidence that the Truman 
Administration would use international moral suasion.
At executive sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on January 14 and February 8, 1952, Acheson stated 
that some form of international position should be made 
known to the Chinese.104 Acheson showed little concern for 
the aspirations of the Indochinese people. He stated:
The problem in Indochina, Senator, is no 
longer any conflict between the French and the 
Vietnamese. The Vietnamese have got all the 
liberty and opportunity that they can possibly 
handle or want. Their difficulty now is in 
getting the people who can both carry on and 
administer the country which is turned over to 
them, and can raise the army and get the 
resources to maintain both. The level of the 
personnel in the indigenous government, the 
Vietnamese Government, is not high enough or 
vigorous enough. Their financial resources are 
low.105
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Acheson's views, made in Washington, supported by those of 
Rusk, overrode the views of Blum, Melby; Ohly, and others 
who, having witnessed events first-hand; sought legitimate 
rule in Vietnam.
On February 13, 1952, the Senior istaff of the NSC 
circulated a paper— NSC 124/l--that approved a joint warning 
to the Chinese.106 The paper also stated that the United 
States should oppose any negotiations between France and the 
Viet Minh, because settlement would give the Communists 
victory. The paper noted that Communist domination of 
Southeast Asia would have a negative psychological impact on 
the will and determination of other nations to resist 
Communist pressure. Such psychological impact, the paper 
noted, would be felt in the Middle East and that in turn 
would undermine the balance of power in Europe.
Economically, the loss of Indochina would cause Japan to 
seek Soviet-controlled markets and threaten the United 
States offshore island defensive chain. The paper then 
noted that the security of Indochina was an internal 
problem. The study recommended collective action but 
opposed unilateral action. Although the paper suggested 
other military action, such as blockade of the China coast 
and use of air and naval units, the paper rejected the use
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of ground forces. Nevertheless, the proposed use of air and 
naval forces was the first favorable mention of the use of 
United States troops in Indochina. Pandora's box had been 
opened.
On June 25, 1952, Truman approved NSC 124/2— the third 
position paper on Indochina, replacing NSC 48 and NSC 
64— entitled "United States Objectives and Course of Action 
with Respect to Southeast Asia." NSC 124/2 took a stronger 
position than did its predecessors by advocating unilateral 
military action against China if necessary to save 
Indochina. NSC 124/2 answered the need for a Presidential 
policy in the event of overt Chinese aggression in Indochina 
now that such aggression was deemed imminent.107 Three 
factors influenced the debate concerning NSC 124/2. The 
first was American efforts to secure French approval of the 
European Defense Community, which called for the rearming of 
West Germany as a defense to Soviet power in Eastern Europe. 
The nations of Western Europe had signed the treaty on May 
27, 1952. Because the French also signed, American policy 
makers did not want to impose additional pressure on the 
French. In actual fact the French Parliament rejected the 
treaty in 1954. Second, the Pentagon, reluctant to face the 
consequences of provoking a response from the People's 
Republic of China, did not want to commit ground forces in
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Indochina. Last, American policy makers were fearful of a 
French withdrawal from Indochina and the United States was 
unable to wage the fight alone.108 NSC 124/2 stated that 
Indochina was a h;Lgh security interest of the United States 
and that a Viet Minh rebellion was the primary threat.109 
NSC 124/2 stated that in the event of overt Chinese 
aggression, or covert attempts to undermine French 
possession of the Tonkin Delta, the United States should 
pursue military action. Primarily limited to use of naval 
and air support of French Union ground troops, such action 
would also include a blockade of China, air attacks on 
Chinese military targets, and covert operations.110
The purpose of NSC 124/2 was to prevent the drift of 
Southeast Asia into the Communist orbit by developing the 
will of indigenous populations to resist Communism. The 
premise was that communist domination of Southeast Asia 
would "critically endanger...United States security 
interests.”111 NSC 124/2 stated that the loss of any part of 
Southeast Asia would have profound psychological, political, 
and economic consequences. If Southeast Asia were to align 
with communism, the Middle East would be affected and so too 
would the balance of power in Europe. The document 
discounted the likelihood of a Chinese Communist invasion, 
stating the probability of subversion instead.
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NSC 124/2 also discussed United States responses in 
light of possible Chinese intervention. If the Chinese did 
not attack, the document recommended helping France build 
the armies of the Associated States and develop internal 
security against the Viet Minh. In the event of a Chinese 
attack, the document recommended pursuing a diplomatic 
course seeking United Nations assistance or at least getting 
allies to help in the defense of Indochina. Militarily, the 
document recommended letting France carry the burden of 
ground troops yet permitting the United States to interdict 
Chinese lines of communication. Among other steps, the 
United States could blockade the Chinese coast, intensify 
covert operations, and in general conduct joint air and 
naval action against "suitable military targets in China."112
On October 15, 1952, the Viet Minh launched an offensive 
in northwest Tonkin. The French were losing a battle at Na 
San and desperately needed American help. Truman responded 
by assigning United States Air Force mechanics to help the 
French on a temporary basis.
By the end of the Truman administration, American policy 
in Indochina had progressed from a policy of deference to 
French interests to a policy which challenged French
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decision making. At the end of World War II, President 
Roosevelt had sublimated his strong anti-colonialism to the 
need to establish a viable balance of power both in Europe 
and in Asia. In Europe, Roosevelt felt a heed for a strong 
Great Britain and a strong France to check any possible 
future continental aggression; To this en&> Roosevelt 
steered away from antagonizing either Britain or France in 
their colonial possessions. In Asia, the United States Navy 
was advocating a need for Pacific island bases in order to 
check any possible future aggression there. Such advocacy 
quashed questioning of Pacific colonial possessions. When 
Truman entered the White House, aggressive Soviet maneuvers 
in Europe threatened the emerging balance of power. The 
American policy of Containment developed as a result of this 
Soviet aggression. By the time the Containment policy 
proved successful in establishing a predictable if tense 
equilibrium in Europe, Mao Tse-tung had conquered China.
The attention of the American State Department began to 
focus on Asia.
Before Asia became the hot spot of the Cold War,
American policy makers had assigned a low priority to 
Indochina. The war in Indochina was France's war and 
American policy makers were content to mind their own 
business. Besides, any American interference in the conduct
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of that war might induce France to jeopardize American 
interests in Europe. Thus, France exercised considerable 
leverage over United States policy. The United States 
needed French support in Europe; and any attempt by the 
United States to manipulate French policy by qualifying 
Marshall Plan and NATO aid might create the very end 
American policy was supposed to defeat--a weak France. 
Indeed, manipulating French aid could lead to a Communist 
takeover because the Communist Party was the pre-eminent 
party in France.113 In short, the United States considered 
French support in Europe more important than fulfilling the 
aspirations of the people of Indochina.
Mao's victory in China in 1949, coupled with Chinese and 
Soviet recognition of the DRV in Indochina, changed American 
thinking in Asia. United States policy makers viewed events 
in China, coming upon the heels of a newly restored 
equilibrium in Europe, as a co-ordinated attempt by the 
Soviet Union to extend Soviet influence in a new sphere. 
Based on this assumption, these policy makers decided to 
check such expansion as resolutely as they had checked the 
spread of Soviet influence in Europe. It was essential to 
show China, and ultimately the Soviet Union, that the free 
world would not succumb to intimidation anywhere. As a 
result, the United States went to war in Korea and the war
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in Indochina received magnified attention. In changing 
their focus from a virtual "attentiste" to an interested 
party, United States policy makers failed to account for the 
French reaction. The problem was that the French had become 
used to having the United States defer ciecisions to French 
authority.
While the United States strategic vision had changed, 
leading to American aid to the French in Indochina, the 
French view had not changed. The French were still fighting 
a colonial war for themselves— from which they could 
withdraw if victory appeared impossible. The French, 
however, would not fight an anti-Communist war for the 
United States, grant independence, and withdraw following 
victory. The result was that in the conduct of the war, the 
French could call the shots, including screening American 
aid deliveries. While the United States might suggest 
methods to "win" the war, the French were free to choose 
only those suggestions which would fulfill the French war 
aim of establishing French control. As long as the French 
felt the United States would continue their aid program, the 
French could continue to attempt to reassert French rule.
The United States objective of establishing a legitimate 
non-Communist government was never entertained by the 
French. Having control of Indochina, would secure for
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France a strategic position in the East-West struggle from 
which France could assert world power status.114
The Eisenhower administration not only inherited this 
constraint of overriding French leverage* but also 
perpetuated it by attaching great importance to the European 
Defense Community. The added French leverage led to the 
inclusion of Indochina, at French insistence, at the Geneva 
Conference in 1954. Ironically, such inclusion— part of a 
search for an acceptable political exit from the war— led in 
turn not only to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, but 
also to the importance of that defeat by drawing the world's 
attention to it.
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Chapter Three 
Dien Bien Phu: The Jungle Verdun
French Indochina 
and United States Foreign Policy, January 1953-March 1954
In the early years of his Presidency, Eisenhower 
seriously considered direct United States intervention to 
help France's deteriorating predicament in Indochina. The 
French position was desperate and lacked assurance of 
getting better. Before committing United States troops, 
however, Eisenhower drew up three basic requirements. In 
his own words, "The first requirement was a legal right 
under international law; second, was a favorable climate of 
Free World opinion; and third, favorable action by the 
Congress."1 To fulfill the first requirement, Eisenhower 
demanded official requests for United States intervention 
from the French and from the Associated States. Such 
requests would render American intervention "legal" or 
"just" under international law if the requests were made by 
the legitimate sovereign governments that ruled the
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territory intervened. French approval alone was not enough, 
because intervention so based would open up the United 
States to the charge of supporting colonialism.
Furthermore, approval of the Associated States would have 
the additional benefit of presenting the United States as 
champions of independence. Thus, only legitimate 
intervention could remove the taint of imperialism and might 
elevate such intervention to a moral plane. Fulfillment of 
the President's first requirement, therefore, would create 
the foundation for the second.
Favorable world opinion was a sine qua non for 
Eisenhower, because he wanted to protect America's image as 
a resister of aggression and not as an aggressor itself.
One way to achieve the desired result was for the Associated 
States themselves to request aid directly from the United 
Nations. This possibility seemed unlikely concerning 
Indochina assistance, for the Soviet Union would most likely 
veto any favorable decision. Previously, during discussion 
of U. N. entry into Korea, the Soviet delegation had 
boycotted Security Council proceedings, protesting Security 
Council refusal to deny Nationalist China its seat. Beyond 
this, bringing Indochina to the United Nations might damage 
relations with France. Eisenhower courted favorable world 
opinion because he wanted to add "real moral standing to a
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venture" which otherwise might appear as overt imperial 
aggression. This need was particularly glaring for "there 
was no incontrovertible evidence of overt Red Chinese 
participation in the Indochina conflict:” Thus, Eisenhower 
restricted possible United States entry to participation in 
a coalition. For Eisenhower, such a coalition had to 
include Britain.2 A coalition, if it were broad enough, 
could supply the moral element, justifying intervention in 
the eyes of the world, which would be needed in the absence 
of complete de facto independence. But, even in concert 
with others, Eisenhower wanted to restrict United States 
participation to air and naval units.3
Favorable action by Congress would give the imprimatur 
to intervention domestically, just as favorable world 
approval would sanction intervention internationally. 
Congressional endorsement, therefore, was not Eisenhower's 
first requisite. The first hurdle was to obtain a legal 
right for intervention under international law. This 
demanded a sovereign legal status for the Associated States. 
On this fundamental requisite United States policy and 
French policy always differed.
American policy at this time was to investigate a 
military solution while concurrently developing a political 
climate to facilitate future United States involvement
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should the military solution prove inadequate. When the 
Eisenhower administration attempted to lay the political 
groundwork for legal intervention, they met French 
resistance. The situation in Indochina was not beneficial, 
for France would not both grant independence and fight the 
Viet Minh. Further, France would not both fight the Viet 
Minh and support the creation of the European Defense 
Community (EDC), a treaty originally sponsored by the Truman 
Administration which called for a rearmed West Germany as a 
bulwark against Soviet encroachment. Faced with a 
deterioration in France's ability to save Indochina, the 
Eisenhower administration also contended with problems of 
collective security in Europe. In Indochina, Eisenhower 
sought to support the French, but simultaneously pursued a 
separate policy supporting indigenous anti-Communist 
movements as well. Diplomatically, Eisenhower accepted 
discussion of Indochina at an international conference, yet 
he formulated the concept of "United Action," which tended 
to vitiate the need for that conference. Further, 
Eisenhower's policy included acceptance of a new French plan 
for military victory.
The consensus among United States policy makers was that 
France should develop the armies of the Associated States 
and go on the offensive. French acceptance of this policy
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highlighted the divergence in the allies? strategies. Where 
the United States sought political considerations— de facto 
independence— to improve the military position, the French 
pursued military strategies to improve tiie political mess 
created by the deterioration of French control. The French 
placed emphasis on a military strategy for the additional 
reason that it might provide an opportunity to withdraw from 
Indochina without damaging the French reputation in the rest 
of the French Union.4 United States policy makers 
acknowledged the diplomatic advantages of a military 
solution. In time, they believed military success would 
strengthen America's hand at any upcoming conference. As a 
consequence, the United States continued to seek a political 
solution without questioning the legality of France's 
position.
Soon after Eisenhower entered the White House in January 
1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reassessed the role of the 
United States military in Indochina. In a memorandum to 
Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson dated March 13, 1953, 
entitled "Broadening the Participation of the United States 
in Indochina Operation", the JCS recommended that the United 
States stay out of active combat in Indochina.5 The memo 
recommended that because broadening United States 
participation might impinge upon France's "primary"
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responsibilities, United States aid should await concrete 
proposals from the French Government. The memo recommended 
transporting Korean Military Advisory Group personnel to 
Indochina to help train indigenous forces, but not to offer 
any "further United States participation in the training of 
the Vietnamese forces...unless specifically invited."6 The 
idea was to avoid violating international law principles of 
nonintervention. The Joint Chiefs recommended increased 
military autonomy for the Vietnamese forces, and aid to 
improve the port facilities at Haiphong and air facilities 
near Hanoi. Over the next few months the United States 
became more actively involved in military matters in 
Indochina. Specifically, American personnel originally sent 
by Truman advised the French on military operations and the 
training of indigenous troops.7
On March 26, 1953, President Eisenhower met with French 
Prime Minister Rene Mayer, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Georges Bidault, and Jean Letourneau, Minister in Charge of 
Relations with the Associated States. The meeting occurred 
aboard the Presidential yacht Williamsburg. Eisenhower 
stated that many Americans viewed the war in Indochina as a 
colonial war and would not support the French effort there 
if they felt the French were delaying action on the European 
Defense Community in order to secure that support. In view
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of this, Eisenhower wanted the French to detail any 
conditions precedent to the ratification of the EDC treaty, 
as well as to present their military and political plans 
concerning Indochina.8 Eisenhower recalled the meeting in 
his memoirs, stating that Bidault "evaded, refusing to 
commit himself to an out-and-out renunciation of any French 
colonial purpose.”9
Before the French arrival, Secretary of State Dulles had 
telegrammed the United States Ambassador in France asking 
him to conduct exploratory conversations eliciting a French 
plan to defeat the Viet Minh. Dulles felt that such a plan 
should aim to liquidate enemy forces within two years in 
order for the Executive branch to convince Congress to 
appropriate the required funds.10 In Washington, the French 
presented such a plan. Jean Letourneau proposed using 
French and newly created Vietnamese battalions to defeat the 
Viet Minh by the first half of 1955. Operationally, the 
plan called for a series of offensive "cleanup" maneuvers 
beginning in the south and moving northward. As the regular 
forces moved northward, pro-French Vietnamese commando 
forces would follow to police the liberated areas and 
maintain security. The plan envisaged a "final battle" in 
late 1954 or early 1955.
American reaction to the Letourneau plan was mixed. The
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Department of Defense felt the plan was too slow because it 
deferred military operations in the nortii* the most 
important theater of operations. Walter Robertson,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, raised 
another concern. He felt the plan necessitated transferring 
an increased share of decision making to the Vietnamese 
Government, thereby causing potential political friction 
with the French. But Robertson brushed aside his own 
objection, stating that if Defense found the plan militarily 
feasible the Department of State should support its 
political ramifications.11
Following their talks, the two nations issued a joint 
communique on March 28.12 The communique noted that should 
China take advantage of a possible armistice in Korea to 
launch an assault elsewhere in East Asia, such an attack 
would have the most serious consequences on world peace.13 
That day, Mayer announced that France would welcome a United 
States military mission in Indochina to evaluate the 
Letourneau plan. On May 18, after two months studying 
feasible implementation, Under Secretary of State Walter 
Bedell Smith telegramed Paris informing Mayer that the 
Department of Defense had agreed to send a mission. Smith 
suggested sending the mission on June 10, in order to give 
the new French Commander in Indochina, General Henri Eugene
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Navarre, a month to get acquainted with the country.
Navarre had just reported in Saigon on May 19.14 At this 
time, Mayer also requested 400 to 500 million dollars to 
continue the fight.15
During the interval between Mayer's Bffer and Smith's 
telegramed acceptance, various agencies of the Executive 
Branch in Washington analyzed the situation in Indochina.
The Joint Chiefs discussed the Letourneau plan and wrote a 
memorandum of their findings to Secretary of Defense Wilson v 
on April 23, 1953.16 Not favoring the plan, the JCS felt 
constrained to endorse it. They felt that the United States 
should bring political pressure against France to wage the 
fight more aggressively and to transfer responsibility for 
the fighting to indigenous troops.17 At a joint meeting on 
April 24, the JCS, the CIA, and the Department of State 
agreed that the Letourneau plan was flawed but better than 
nothing. Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, 
stated: "we probably should go along and give this plan a 
try even though it may not achieve what the French are 
saying it might."18 The Department of State cabled 
Secretary of State Dulles then in Paris at a tripartite 
Foreign Ministers conference to have him suggest that the 
French should try to cut the Viet Minh supply line to 
Communist China and build up the armies of the Associated
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States with native officers. Dulles told the French that 
Congress had to approve any American aid> and that Congress 
would favor a more aggressive posture in Indochina.19
While the United States investigated sending a military 
mission to Indochina, the military situation changed. The 
Viet Minh launched a successful attack in northwest Tonkin, 
and invaded Laos on April 9, 1953. When..the magnitude of 
the Viet Minh attack became known, Mayer requested direct 
American aid from Dulles. On April 27, Dulles informed 
Eisenhower that Mayer had inquired about the possibility of 
American Air Force personnel flying transport missions in 
Indochina. Dulles, who was still in Paris, suggested 
American civilian pilots of the Civil Air Transport (CAT) 
then stationed on Formosa. Soon thereafter, the JCS 
approved the use of six CAT pilots to fly C-119 sorties in 
Indochina.
The decision to approve the use of CAT pilots caused 
Eisenhower to scrutinize French prospects in Indochina. The 
President was not impressed. On May 6, speaking at a 
National Security Council meeting, Eisenhower noted French 
preoccupation with prestige and stated "that if the French 
really desired to cut the best figure before the world, the 
obvious course to pursue was first to defeat the Viet Minh 
forces and then magnanimously to offer independence to the
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Associated States."20 The next day, Eisenhower sent a 
letter to Rene Mayer stressing this belief. In a meeting 
with Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson also on May 7, 
Eisenhower reiterated his view by analogy; stating that as
was proven in the case of General Braddock regulars cannot
beat guerrillas when supported by the native populace.21
On May 8, the French appointed General Henri-Eugene 
Navarre Commander in Chief of French Union Forces in 
Indochina. Strategically, Navarre faced a difficult task. 
His predecessors had followed a strategy of strongpoint 
defense with particular emphasis in Tonkin. The result of 
this policy was that nearly seventy percent of his troops 
were tied down in defense duties throughout Indochina. The 
Viet Minh, with less total forces, had more troops at their 
disposal for offensive action.22 According to one estimate, 
the Viet Minh had greater than a two to one superiority over
the French in the numbers of troops available for mobile
operations.23 Another difficulty for the new commander was 
his ignorance. General Navarre never had served in 
Indochina prior to his appointment, and he knew little about 
the country.
A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Indochina 
issued on June 4, acknowledged that the recent Viet Minh 
success in northwest Tonkin and Laos had affected the tone
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of the war. Among anticipated consequences were a 
deterioration of the French military situation, which, 
coupled with Vietnamese uncertainty and suspicions as to 
French political goals, were thought to lead to a decreased 
will to fight the Viet Minh. Moreover, the recent Laotian 
campaign renewed Viet Minh prestige and caused domestic 
pressure in France to wage the war less, aggressively. At 
this time, the French had not agreed to grant complete 
independence for fear "the French National Assembly would 
then refuse to support a war in a 'lost' portion of the 
French Union." Sensing this, many Vietnamese felt the 
French wished only to retain control.24 The Estimate stated 
that the "French are fearful that they cannot achieve a 
military decision in Indochina." Fear of eventual German 
rearmament following passage of the EDC treaty led many 
Frenchmen to want to recall troops assigned to Indochina; 
but loss of prestige in Africa and desires not to lose their 
Indochina investment led many to consider staying. The 
Estimate also stated that the Chinese would not intervene 
but might use "peace maneuvers" to attain their goals in 
Indochina.25 As a result, the Estimate concluded that 
"[T]he over-all French Union position in Indochina...will 
probably deteriorate during the period of this estimate."26
The Viet Minh military success also may have contributed
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to the American decision to send a mission to Indochina.
The man chosen to lead that mission was Lieutenant General 
John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, Commanding General, United 
States Army, Pacific. 0 'Daniel was a questionable choice 
because he had no in-depth knowledge of the special mixture 
of political and military elements in the Indochina 
problem.27 Even so, in an earlier visit,to Indochina,
0'Daniel noted that "the enemy was able to blend in with the 
local population and exact from them by terrorism a large 
measure of cooperation. In the face of superior forces the 
enemy faded away only to return when such forces were no 
longer present."28
On June 20, the United States Military Mission to 
Indochina under General 0'Daniel left Washington. As 
instructed, 0'Daniel told Navarre that French Union Forces 
should take the initiative by making greater use of guerilla 
tactics and developing indigenous leaders and troops.29 
Navarre responded by handing O'Daniel a statement of 
aggressive action, which became known as the Navarre Plan. 
The Navarre Plan was a seven part plan for ending the war by 
early 1955. The plan called for:
(1) expanded forces; (2) increased supplies;
(3) development of commando-type offensive units;
(4) more intensive use land-and carrier-based 
tactical aircraft; (5) adoption of a continuing 
and vigorous offensive strategy; (6) increased
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emphasis upon psychological warfare; and (7) 
political measures to gain popular support for the 
national governments.30
After analyzing the plan, 0'Daniel recommended two 
additions which Navarre agreed to include; These consisted 
of an offensive in Tonkin to begin September 15, 1953, and a 
reorganization of mobile groups into divisions. When 
Navarre reported his plan to Paris in July; however, these 
American recommendations were not included. Further,
Navarre reported that his only offensive operation scheduled 
for the 1953-1954 combat season was an attack— subsequently 
called Operation Atlante— in Annam. Navarre's reported 
proposal for the Tonkin area was to respond defensively to 
whatever attack Vo Nguyen Giap (Commander in Chief of the 
People's Army of Vietnam) might launch.31 According to the 
reported plan, while Navarre envisaged the Dien Bien Phu 
campaign as a defense to Giap's actions against Laos, the 
French undertook Operation Atlante between January 20 and 
early March 1954, in an effort to regain the initiative and 
offensive spirit. Despite having deceived 0'Daniel, the 
French still asked the United States for funds to implement 
the plan. Regardless of French duplicity, the Navarre Plan 
was militarily sound.32
Soon after returning to Washington, General 0'Daniel 
reported the findings of his mission to the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff on July 14, 1953. O'Daniel reported that Navarre had 
agreed to include United States officers in the French units 
training indigenous troops and to keep tjie United States 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (U.S: MAAG, a military 
service of the Executive Branch) in Indochina informed of 
all French plans. Navarre aiso agreed t8 have two Americans 
stationed in Hanoi to relay intelligence^ihformation to 
Washington. Further, the French Commander agreed to return 
the six C-119s previously loaned to his command and to step- 
up training of French pilots and mechanics.33 Because, the 
new French plans were to cost an additional 150 billion 
francs, Laniel informed Dillon on July 29 that unless the 
United States furnished this sum the French would have to 
withdraw from Indochina. Laniel stated that without 
increased American assistance, the French could not balance 
her budget which, in turn, would hurt France's ability to 
contribute to the European and Atlantic communities.34
By the time 0 'Daniel reported to the JCS, President 
Eisenhower already had requested $400 million in mutual 
security funds for Indochina. The bright picture portrayed 
by the 0 'Daniel report led to the passage of this fund, but 
not before significant congressional debate. In late June, 
Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) offered an amendment that 
no money be allocated until the Government of France gave
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the United States assurance that France would make a 
declaration "to the people of the Associated States setting 
a target date for the adoption of a constitution for such 
States, and for the establishment of their complete 
independence.”35 Goldwater drew an analogy to the American 
Declaration of Independence and the anti-colonial cause that 
had inspired it. Goldwater stressed tHat the United States 
should help the people of Indochina meet their legitimate 
aspirations as a people. Or, Goldwater warned, "as surely 
as day follows night our boys will follow this $400 
million."36 Goldwater's support came from conservative 
Republicans, including Everett McKinley Dirksen (R-Ill) who 
had just completed a visit to Vietnam with Warren G.
Magnuson (D-Wash),37 Dirksen, who later supported the war 
in the 1960s, asked:
What makes them [the Viet Minh] so tough?
What is the force that makes them resist? It is 
an ideological force. It is the nationalism which 
they preach. They do not preach communism. They 
preach nationalism and freedom. If they can do 
that, does anyone believe that sending additional 
planes, or $400 million worth of equipment there, 
is likely to do the job, when there are still so 
many official fence-sitters who believe that Ho 
Chi Minh will win, and who are waiting for that 
day?
The amendment failed. Although many Senators felt a need to 
pressure France to address legitimate aspirations of the 
people of Indochina, few dared to risk French withdrawal.38
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New responsibilities in Asia following tiie outbreak of the 
Korean war did not sow th£ seeds for re-election.
On July 27, 1953, the signing of ttie Korean armistice 
changed the nature of American involvement in Indochina. 
Following the cease-fire, Mao had begun to supply arms and 
equipment to the Viet Minh. As a consequence, American 
policy makers became even more fearful of Chinese 
intervention. Before the armistice was signed, on July 10, 
in a Joint Chiefs of Staff-State Department meeting, the 
consensus opinion was not to send American ground troops 
into Indochina.39 American policy was predicated on the 
presence of French and indigenous troops who could do the 
fighting. But, the French were not cooperating. In Paris, 
many French officials looked for ways to save face and 
extricate France from the war. French Foreign Minister 
Bidault, for instance, told Dulles that the French public 
would not understand why the United States deemed 
negotiations acceptable for Korea but not for Indochina.40 
Dulles replied that in Korea the allies could employ 
"unpleasant" alternatives to negotiation not present in 
Indochina. Beyond this, Dulles liked the chances for 
success of implementing the Navarre Plan.41 Thus, the 
signing of the Korean armistice increased United States 
fears of Chinese entry into Indochina at the same time the
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O'Daniel report suggested the adequacy of the French 
presence to wage the fight;
The emergency of the situation created by American fears 
of Chinese intervention had two consequences. First, they 
dampened the chances for success of any "political" riders 
to the granting of United States aid such as that offered by 
Goldwater. Additionally; American pressure to keep France 
in the war intensified. One form of that pressure was 
increased aid.
On August 6 the National Security Council met to discuss 
French requests for additional funds. Before them was a 
report written by the Department of State which recommended 
granting the request. The State Department felt that the 
Laniel Government was the last French Government likely to 
continue the war in Indochina. Given Laniel's threat of 
withdrawal should the the United States not grant the funds, 
the State Department warned "If the French actually decided 
to withdraw, the U.S. would have to consider most seriously 
whether to take over in this area."42 On August 28, the JCS 
sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Wilson 
recommending additional aid to implement the Navarre plan. 
The Chiefs, however, felt military success depended on the 
development of a political atmosphere which would induce 
native intelligence gathering. Because General Navarre was
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not energetically fulfilling recommendations of the O'Daniel 
mission, the Chiefs felt the United States should condition 
additional support on French willingness to entertain 
seriously United States military advice;43
Although the interested parties had sighed an armistice, 
they considered an international conference necessary to 
negotiate an end to the Korean war. Hoping to prevent talks 
on Indochina at this conference, or at least hoping that 
added dollars could lead to military victories and allow the 
French to negotiate from strength if Indochina were 
included, in September 1953 Washington approved an 
additional $385 million for French use. Many Congressmen 
based their approval on General O'Daniel's optimism for the 
success of the Navarre Plan. Navarre himself in a secret 
report to Paris noted that a stalemate— or a coup nul— was 
the best that France could hope for.44 Washington feared 
the threat of French withdrawal if the new money were not 
appropriated.
While pursuing a policy aimed at keeping France in the 
war, Eisenhower's Secretary of State also tried to keep the 
Chinese out. On September 2, 1953, Dulles mentioned in a 
speech in St. Louis that the United States would welcome an 
opportunity to discuss the Indochina war at the upcoming 
conference to settle the Korean dispute, so long as
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Communist China wanted to hold such a conference. Dulles 
reiterated a warning to China that "a second aggression 
could not occur without grave consequences which might not 
be confined to Indochina."45 The following day, Dulles 
repeated the United States willingness to hold such a 
conference if the Chinese were also wiilirig.46
While pressuring France to stay on in Indochina, 
Eisenhower continued to entertain the hope that the French 
would listen to American proposals concerning the political 
situation. On September 8, in a paper prepared for the 
National Security Council meeting on the following day, 
Eisenhower is quoted as saying that:
we must get the French to commit themselves 
publicly to a program which will insure the 
support and cooperation of the native Indochinese.
The later increments of our increased aid should 
be provided only if the French have made real 
progress in giving the natives greater 
independence.... If we are to give greatly 
increased support, the French must invite our 
close military advice in the conduct of the war in 
Indochina.
Eisenhower also demanded French assurances regarding passage 
of the European Defense Community Treaty.47
On September 9, the National Security Council met with 
Secretary of State Dulles to discuss France's request for 
additional money and iron out the position of the executive 
branch. Dulles stated that the money would encourage the
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French to remain and discourage the Chinese Communists from 
entering Indochina. Dulles also reported Eisenhower's 
position on Indochina. Eisenhower felt that Indochina was 
the first priority of United States foreign policy; a loss 
in Korea might be confined to Korea, but a loss in Indochina 
might lead to a Communist conquest of the rest of Southeast 
Asia. Eisenhower also wanted Congressional consultation so 
as to prevent handing Congress a fait accompli.48 Although 
the Senate had defeated the Goldwater rider, the NSC set 
three conditions on their approval of the French request. 
They wanted France to publicly announce a program of support 
and cooperation with the Associated States and to accept 
closer United States military advise in Indochina. The NSC 
also wanted French assurance of passage of the European 
Defense Community.49
On September 29, Bidault wrote to Ambassador Dillon 
accepting these conditions for receiving additional United 
States aid. Bidault mentioned that France was committed to 
"perfecting" the independence of the Associated States. As 
per the Navarre Plan, Bidault acknowledged France's 
willingness to initiate an offensive with increased 
participation by indigenous forces. Reserving primary 
responsibility for France, Bidault agreed to listen to 
American military advice and to provide the United States
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with France's economic information. Finally, Bidault stated 
France's intent to meet her NATO obligations. Dillon, in a 
reply to Bidault, agreed on behalf of the United States to 
provide France $385 million by the end 6£ 1954 .50
Meanwhile, in Indochina, the major political question 
concerning the relationship between the Associated States 
and France continued to develop. On July 3> 1953, France 
had announced intentions to grant independence and 
sovereignty to the Associated States.51 In a declaration, 
the French Government stated that
there is every reason to complete the 
independence and sovereignty of the Associated 
States of Indochina by insuring, in agreement with 
each of the three interested governments, the 
transfer of the powers that she [France] had still 
retained in the interests of the States 
themselves, because of the perilous circumstances 
resulting from the state of war.
The July 3rd declaration was the result of increased demands 
for political autonomy made by the Associated States. The 
problem was that French officials appear "to have been 
rather slow to recognize the serious limitations of 
'independence within the French Union.'"52 The July 
declaration reflected France's inability to meet Vietnamese 
wishes for self-rule, and at the same time reassert French 
dominance following possible military success. The French 
felt that Vietnamese aspirations could be met under the
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umbrella of the French Union. But, unlike the British 
Commonwealth system, the French Union gave France a dominant 
role, as the French constitution did not provide for the 
independence of overseas territories.53 Such dominance of 
one nation over another negates the very principle of 
sovereignty. Adding to the French dilemma was the fact that 
the French colony of North Africa would .regard jealously any 
grant of sovereignty given to the Indochina States. Despite 
retaining the notion of French dominance, the language was 
acceptable to United States policy makers. Secretary of 
State Dulles stated in a speech in St. Louis on September 24 
that the United States could increase aid to the French "in 
good conscience."54
To the Vietnamese, the declaration recognized the 
equality between two sovereigns. As part of the effort to 
achieve sovereign status, Bao Dai announced the convening of 
a Vietnamese Congress to select representatives to meet with 
the French. Before Bao Dai could act, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Ngo 
Dinh Diem's brother, created the Movement of National Union 
for Independence and Peace and held an unofficial Congress. 
The National Congress stated that because international 
cooperation rested on the principle of free and equal 
sovereign nations acting independently, and because the 
French Union was one of dominance contrary to the principle
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of sovereignty, the people of Vietnam decided not to stay 
within the French Union.55 The National Congress also
i
decided that treaties would have to be signed between 
Vietnam and the French, which then must fee ratified by a 
General Assembly of Vietnam, constituted by universal 
suffrage.56 Bao Dai's Congress, which met October 15-17, 
1953, adopted a resolution similar to positions espoused at 
Nhu's Congress. A Few days later, after pressure from 
France and the United States on Bao Dai, the resolution was 
modified to read the people of Vietnam chose not to stay 
within the French Union "in its present form."57
To convince Indochinese that their desires for 
independence could be met within the French Union, the 
French had to clarify the legal relationship between the 
Associated States and herself. To this end, Laos and France 
signed a treaty of amity on October 22, 1953, explaining the 
French concept of sovereignty.58 Stating that Laos was "a 
fully independent and sovereign State," the treaty also 
reaffirmed the position of Laos within the French Union.
For France the French Union was "an association of 
independent and sovereign peoples" where "all the associates 
place in common their resources in order to guarantee the 
defense of the Union as a whole."59 On October 27, Laniel 
further defined the French Union in a speech before the
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French National Assembly; "The French Union is founded upon 
a vital notion," Laniel stated, "the necessity of placing in 
common the appropriate resources for the defense of the 
member States, from which proceeds the necessity of 
recognizing France's coordinating role in the use of these 
resources. "60
In the meantime, Navarre started to.implement his plan. 
On November 20, Navarre parachuted a large force into the 
northwest Tonkin village of Dien Bien Phu. Navarre chose to 
land a force at Dien Bien Phu in an effort to prevent Giap 
from entering Laos. Navarre justifiably decided to defend 
that country in the fall of 1953. As Navarre stated in 
1963: "Suppose that I had... abandoned Laos on my own 
initiative and opened to the Viet-Minh the road toward total 
victory: I would be branded today as the man who had 
betrayed the honor of his country."61 The decision to 
select Dien Bien Phu as the place to conduct that defense 
was Navarre's responsibility. Navarre knew the French 
commanders in Indochina were opposed to the mission.62 
Nevertheless, Navarre ignored their advice and decided to 
set-up a fortified airhead astride Viet Minh supply lines to 
Laos. Even though the position could not be reinforced or 
supplied by road, and it was at the maximum operating range 
of French air support in Hanoi, Navarre went ahead with the
Ill
plan because his intelligence staff reported that the 
operation carried little or no risk.63 Having committed his 
forces, Navarre felt that Giap lacked the logistic 
capability to get his artillery and ammunition to the hills 
which surrounded the Dien Bien Phu valiey:64 That 
underestimation of the enemy would prove costly.
While French forces were digging in..around Dien Bien 
Phu, the Viet Minh sent peace feelers to the Laniel 
government. On November 26, 1953, Ho Chi Minh offered to 
negotiate with the French during an interview with the 
Swedish Newspaper Expressen. Upon learning of Ho's 
overture, Georges Bidault stated that Ho was "on the point 
of capitulating" and negotiations should await the success 
of the Navarre Plan.65
On January 8, 1954, the National Security Council 
debated recent developments in Indochina. Allen Dulles, 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), addressed 
the military situation at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles stated that 
three Viet Minh divisions had surrounded the French 
garrison, and that the French, though in a strong position, 
were "locked up in it." Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then informed the meeting that 
General Navarre had assured him that although the Viet Minh 
were strong enough to capture Dien Bien Phu, they probably
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would not because they would suffer many casualties and 
wanted to advance into Laos instead. Allen Dulles replied, 
however, that the psychological and political damage to the 
French will to carry on in Indochina occasioned by the 
possible demise of Dien Bien Phu was worth heavy losses to 
the Viet Minh.66
After Allen Dulles' presentation; Jseneral Robert Cutler 
(Special Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs) presented a briefing on United States policy in 
Indochina. Following this, Eisenhower asked why the French 
did not allow the Associated States to bring the issue of 
Communist aggression before the UN, now that France had 
declared the Associated States independent. Secretary John 
Foster Dulles replied that France feared opening the door to 
raising the issue of Morocco's independence before the U.N. 
According to a Memorandum prepared three days after the 
meeting, Eisenhower retorted that the French did not know 
"whether to go it alone or to get assistance from other 
nations clandestinely." Eisenhower stated "with great 
force," that "he simply could not imagine the United States 
putting ground forces anywhere in Southeast Asia, except 
possibly in Malaya, which we would have to defend as a 
bulwark to our off-shore island chain. But to do this 
anywhere else was simply beyond his contemplation."
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Eisenhower felt that it was senseless for the United States 
to replace the French for "the key to winning this war was 
to get the Vietnamese to fight." Otherwise, the President 
stated, "the Vietnamese could be expecteci to transfer their 
hatred of the French to us." Indeed, Eisenhower stated 
"with vehemence" that he was "bitterly opposed...to such a 
course of action." The President conclucied that "[T]his war 
in Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions!"67 In 
Eisenhower's judgment, while Indochina may have occupied a 
strategic geographic area, replete with vast economic 
resources, the United States would not commit armed services 
personnel in a situation where military success seemed 
unlikely and, even if likely, where prospects for subsequent 
political success were nil.
Eisenhower's declaration did not preclude further 
debate. Vice-President Richard M. Nixon promptly voiced his 
doubts about the strength of a Vietnamese national army. 
Nixon said "the French are fighting in the hope of keeping 
Vietnam in the French Union, whereas the Vietnamese really 
want independence outside the French Union." Thus, Nixon 
concluded, the French probably would prove unwilling to 
allow American assistance in training such an army. Richard 
Nixon then avowed that if the French allowed the Vietnamese 
to become strong enough to defend themselves, the Vietnamese
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probably would remove Vietnam from the French Union. 
Eisenhower replied: "if the French had been smart they would 
long since have offered the Associated States independence 
on the latters' own terms." Eisenhower stated that if the 
French let the United States take over part of the training 
of indigenous troops, this would free up French troops for 
combat.68 Even though the majority of bis forces were 
committed to defensive positions, Navarre later rejected 
this proposal.69
In other discussion at the meeting, Admiral Radford felt 
"the United States should do everything possible to 
forestall a French defeat at Dien Bien Phu." Radford 
suggested sending over an aircraft carrier to help defend 
the garrison. George Humphrey, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, felt that the loss of Dien Bien Phu could not be 
"bad enough to involve the United States in combat in 
Indochina." Eisenhower agreed but submitted that if the 
United States did not send pilots why not send planes and 
maintenance personnel. Radford concurred, stating that 
United States planes could destroy Viet Minh anti-aircraft 
guns at Dien Bien Phu, which the French felt incapable of 
destroying on their own. Humphrey, supported by Robert 
Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, felt that such a commitment would lead to
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greater commitments. Radford again proposed a one day air 
strike saying: "We [are] already in this thing in such a big 
way that it seemed foolish not to make the one small extra 
move which might be essential to success:"70 President 
Eisenhower suggested the use of CIA CAT pilots. The
i *
President then ended the meeting with tiie Defense Department 
and CIA agreeing to make a report to the. NSC on possible 
policy alternatives the United States could pursue in 
achieving the success of the "Laniel-Navarre" Plan.71
Four days after Admiral Radford suggested sending United 
States carrier-based aircraft to bomb the Viet Minh 
encircling Dien Bien Phu, Secretary Dulles gave a foreign 
policy address before the Council on Foreign Relations. 
Dulles began by lauding the policies of the Truman 
administration, stating that Truman's bold response was the 
appropriate remedy to counter Soviet inspired emergencies. 
But, Dulles averred, a policy based on coping with 
emergencies is too short-term. "Emergency measures are 
costly; they are superficial; and they imply that the enemy 
has the initiative."72 The United States needs a long range 
strategy, Dulles stated, worked out in compliance with our 
"true purposes."73 "We need allies and collective 
security," pursued at minimal cost. "This can be done by 
placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence
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on local defensive power."74 Dulles then outlined the 
basics of this new, efficient policy:
Local defenses must be reinforced by the 
further deterrent of massive retaliatory power....
The way to deter aggression is for the free 
community to be willing and able to respond 
vigorously at places and with means of its own 
choosing....
[The President and the National Security 
Council have made the] basic decision;;.to depend 
primarily upon a great capacity tcMretaliate, 
instantly, by means and at places of our 
choosing.75
Having outlined the administration's general strategy,
Dulles detailed certain specifics. Dulles stated that in 
the Far East the new policy led to an armistice in Korea as 
the fighting had "spread beyond the limits and methods 
which" the Communists had selected. Dulles reiterated his 
warning to the PRC that open aggression in Indochina would 
meet with "grave consequences which might not be confined to 
Indochina."76 Dulles concluded his remarks stating his 
belief as to what the new policy would accomplish: "[w]e 
intend that our conduct and example shall continue, as in 
the past, to show all men how good can be the fruits of 
freedom." The ultimate hope is that the Soviet leaders will 
realize "that there are limits to the power of any rulers 
indefinitely to suppress the human spirit."77
Dulles' speech was meant for three audiences.
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Domestically, Dulles demonstrated coherent leadership at the 
top of the foreign policy hierarchy. Eisenhower and the NSC 
had worked out an effective strategy to counter Communism 
consistent with American ideals and designed to avoid 
economic hardship. As such, the speech was consonant with 
American idealism for America would lead primarily through 
good example. To the Communist world, the address was 
designed to forestall aggressive advances anywhere in the 
world. In Indochina in particular, Dulles sought to 
dissuade possible Chinese intervention on behalf of the Viet 
Minh. Because the Chinese not only did not enter the fray 
with ground forces, but also, in tandem with the Soviets, 
pressured the Viet Minh to accept less favorable conditions
f
at the bargaining table in the summer of 1954, this part of 
Dulles' address may have been successful. To America's 
allies, the speech sought to instill courage in the defense 
of freedom. The problem was that Dulles did not foresee 
that his language would serve to frighten allies. This 
unforeseen consequence would reveal itself during late April 
when Great Britain checked United States efforts to relieve 
the fortress outpost at Dien Bien Phu.
On January 14, the National Security Council met to 
discuss the current state of United States foreign policy as 
announced in NSC 5405. On December 8, 1953 the United
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States Army had pointed out to the NSC Planning Board that 
the United States did not possess enough ground forces to 
meet European and Asian troop commitments and also 
supplement French troops in Indochina:78 NSC 5405 sought to 
answer that difficulty. NSC 5405, originally was two 
documents: NSC 177, written December 31; 1953, and NSC 177 
Special Annex, written by the JCS' Joint Strategic and 
Logistics Plans Committees.79 Because the Special Annex 
espoused sending American troops to Indochina given certain 
conditions, the NSC withdrew the document on January 8,
1954. At the NSC meeting of January 14, Secretary of State 
Dulles said that if France withdrew the United States should 
recruit Vietnamese to conduct guerilla operations against 
the Communists. Vice President Nixon doubted the ability of 
the United States to recruit Vietnamese as guerrillas, but 
felt a French departure would resurrect the Indochinese 
"will to fight," and allow American personnel an opportunity 
to train indigenous forces. The NSC then approved NSC 177, 
renumbering it NSC 5405. Because NSC 5405 was a rewrite of 
NSC 124/2 of June 1952, American policy remained static.80 
Two days later, on January 16, 1954 President Eisenhower 
approved NSC 5405 entitled "United States Objectives and 
Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia."
At this time, Eisenhower decided that the mounting
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crisis in Indochina deserved additional action. On January 
16, 1954, he empowered an ad hoc committee to study the 
Indochina problem and ways to support the Navarre plan. 
Called the Special Committee on Indochina and led by Under 
Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith; the Committee was a 
self-contained independent think-tank personally accountable 
to the President. In addition to Smith; Eisenhower's Chief 
of Staff during World War II and Director of the CIA to 
February 9, 1953, other members included Allen Dulles, 
Admiral Radford, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes, and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.81 At the first meeting of this 
group, Eisenhower requested that an "area plan" be drawn up 
to discuss courses of action should Indochina fall.82 This 
request signaled a shift in administration attitude.
Concern about the domino effect seemed to have been placed 
on the back burner. As Smith told an executive session of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 16, 1954, 
"part of Indochina might be lost without losing the rest of 
Southeast Asia." Smith suggested that Communism could be 
checked, in that event, by "an area defense pact."83
The Special Committee met on January 29, 1954 to discuss 
a recent French request for planes and 400 American Air 
Force aircraft technicians. The French needed assistance 
for the French air maintenance force was one-third
120
understrength.84 Radford opposed sending the technicians; 
Smith proposed sending 200. Kyes felt sending 200 would 
lead to sending more. Smith, noting tii<e difference between 
maintenance personnel and ground forces; stated that he 
would favor intervention with air and naval forces. Radford 
agreed. Understanding that only the President could decide 
whether to intervene or not, the Smith Sommittee decided to 
send 200 technicians provided they be stationed away from 
areas of possible combat.85 The Committee also agreed to 
send CIA-hired United States civilian pilots to fly planes 
from the CIA-owned airline— Civil Air Transport (CAT)— to 
help transport French forces and supplies.86 President 
Eisenhower approved the Smith Committee's recommendations 
later that day.87
In the meantime, the Smith Committee had set up a 
Working Committee headed by General G.B. Erskine, Director 
of Special Operations of the Department of Defense. Other 
members of the Working Group consisted of representatives 
from the JCS, the CIA, and the Departments of State and 
Defense.88 The Erskine Committee wrote a report considering 
United States options, short of using United States troops, 
for the Smith Committee's perusal at the January 29 meeting. 
Radford, aware that consideration of the domino effect was 
absent, sent the report back for further review to consider
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options of using United States troops and not using United 
States troops. Smith agreed.89
News of President Eisenhower's decision to send 200 
American personnel to Indochina was met by strong 
Congressional reaction. Senator John C; Stennis (D-Miss) 
expressed a concern previously entertained by Humphrey and 
Kyes. He was worried that "we should certainly stop short 
of sending our troops... for....when we send one group, we 
shall have to send another to protect the first and we shall 
thus be fully involved in a short time."90 Senator Stennis' 
fears sound similar to a genre of later criticisms of United 
States policies based on the "quagmire theory" of American 
participation in the Vietnamese civil war. David 
Halberstam, for one, wrote that President Johnson escalated 
American involvement in Vietnam for "the protection of our 
men and material, which meant the arrival of our boys, which 
of course meant more boys to protect our boys (and later 
greater bombing of the North to protect our boys, who were 
of course there originally to protect the airfields.)"91 
Why the United States went to war in 1965 based on this 
model of analysis and not in 1954 for the same reasons is 
not explained.
Other legislators echoed Senator Stennis' concerns. As 
a result, on February 3, 1954, Eisenhower told Smith to
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consult with Congressional leaders before sending the 
technicians. Radford and Kyes met with the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. Soon thereafter, on February 8, 
Eisenhower met with Senate Republican leaders, where Senator 
Saltonstall (R-Mass), Chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, told Eisenhower that the Committee objected to 
sending uniformed American personnel to Indochina. 
Saltonstall stated that opposition in the Committee would 
diminish if the administration unequivocally announced that 
the technicians would be removed by June 15, regardless of 
French ability to meet the requirement. Eisenhower replied 
that the technicians could be removed by that date and 
telephoned Wilson to devise a plan accordingly. Eisenhower 
agreed to use civilian personnel after June 15, if 
Saltonstall would support the use of Air Force personnel 
until then.92 Eisenhower's plan, similar to the later Nixon 
Doctrine, was to use "indigenous troops in any Asian 
battles, with the United States providing a mobile reserve 
for the overall security of the free world."93
While Congress debated the technician commitment, three 
reports of Congressional missions to Indochina were 
circulating on Capitol Hill. Senator Mike Mansfield (D- 
Mont) visited Indochina in September 1953. In his report, 
Mansfield wrote that "The issue in this war [is]...the
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continued freedom of the non-Communist world, the 
containment of Communist aggression, and the welfare and 
security of our country." Senator H. Alexander Smith (R- 
N.J.) also visited Indochina and wrote a report published 
January 25, 1954. Denying universalism; Smith wrote: "[W]e 
must not try to rebuild these countries in the image of 
America." He also felt a heed to reirivigdrate the will to 
fight, assure independence, support a regional security 
pact, and warn the native population about the danger posed 
by the Chinese.94 A House Foreign Affairs Committee 
delegation also visited Indochina and issued a "committee 
print" of their report in February 1954.. They felt that 
"[F]or the free world to seek a truce with the Communists in 
Indochina is to engage in appeasement equivalent to an 
Indochinese 'Munich.'"95
Senator Smith's report on the impact of American foreign 
policy in the Far East is a significant document relating 
America's postwar idealism and foreign policy. Smith stated 
that Moscow's overall strategy to dominate Asia involved the 
combination of Chinese manpower, Japanese industrial 
capacity, and the rich raw materials of Southeast Asia. Of 
this strategy, Smith noted that China was now in Communist 
hands, that the conquest of Japan had been stopped in Korea 
at the 38th parallel, and that the Kremlin was actively
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intent on winning the struggle in Indochina. Smith felt 
that because the Marshall Plan and NATO iiad rebuffed the 
Soviets in Europe, the Communists had placed primary 
emphasis in the East, making Asia the new battleground. The 
Soviets' main weapon in their conquest Bf Asia, Smith noted, 
was in co-opting native sentiment against foreigners. By 
branding western efforts ks colonial;„.Smith observed, the 
Soviets furthered their own imperial designs and invidiously 
endangered the future freedom of the area and the world.96
Smith made a few recommendations for future American 
foreign policy. He felt that independence was the 
fundamental solution. M[T]here can be no more imperialism, 
no more colonialism, no more totalitarian dictatorships."97 
Smith felt that the United States should try to understand 
and appreciate the point of view of the people of Asia, and 
to help them understand the West. Smith recommended 
continued assistance to the anti-Communist nations of Asia, 
including the training of native Asian troops. He felt that 
the United States should encourage the idea of collective 
security, and resist moves "to appease the Communist 
aggressors." He stated: "Our policies should be pursued 
with firmness and patience." Emphasizing the need for 
negotiations, Smith felt that recognition of the People's 
Republic of China would put the stamp of appeasement on
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Communist conquest in the area. Smith stated that it is not 
enough to condemn communism, but the United States must 
"demonstrate the positive values of the democratic way of 
life."98 Smith‘stated that: "[w]e must not seek to dominate 
or dictate. We must not try to rebuild these countries in 
the image of America. We must help them in their keen 
eagerness to work out their own future
Smith concluded by noting his aversion to the use of 
force. Smith noted that in this struggle, "[f]inal and 
lasting victory can be won by winning the critical war of 
ideas." He noted that the struggle in Indochina for the 
loyalty of the people was a "battle of ideologies, " as well 
as a military fight. Smith noted France's dual 
responsibility of trying to hold out full freedom to the 
Vietnamese while continuing to fight the Viet Minh. He 
noted the difficulty of winning over the fence-sitters who 
feared retribution from the Viet Minh. He noted the 
relationship between French politics and French prosecution 
of the war; notably, French war weariness, left-wing 
sympathy for Ho, right-wing fear of a rearmed Germany and 
the inconsistency of defending an area whose inhabitants 
have been granted independence. Additionally, he noted the 
strategic position of Indochina drawing reference to the 
fact that Japan conquered this area before attacking the
126
United States at Pearl Harbor.100
The House Study Mission to Indochina was led by Walter
H. Judd (R-Minn), a highly respected senior Republican. The 
Judd report, dated January 29, 1954, but distributed in 
early February, was a country-by-country analysis of 
American foreign policy in Southeast AsiS; With respect to 
Korea, the Judd report stated that United States policy must 
continue "to support the goal of a free, independent Korea." 
Yet, the report was wary of attaining that goal via 
negotiation with the Soviets. The report recommended that 
if at any conference scheduled to unify Korea, the Communist 
representatives give evidence of using the conference to 
engage in propaganda, abuse and delay, the United States 
representatives should withdraw promptly.101 With respect to 
Japan, the report recognized Japan's need to acquire 
markets. The report stated that if Japan could not trade 
with the free world, they would be driven to trading with 
the Communists.102 Concerning Indochina, the report 
disparaged French military strategy. Noting France's 
"Maginot-line" mentality of strongpoint defense the report 
concluded: "[C]learly, the war cannot be won from fixed 
positions."103 Politically, the Judd report also noted the 
inadequacy of French policy. Judd felt that granting 
independence would win over the fence-sitters, and
127
strengthen the "real problem" of Bao Dai's "weak political 
base."104 The report acknowledged, however, that 
independence would signal the end of French rule in 
Indochina:
The real issue for France is how far it can 
lessen the heavy burden on itself without 
sacrificing all hope for a role in postwar 
Indochina. Neither the present state of the 
French Government nor of1 the French economy 
encourages the continuance of a struggle in which 
France stands to bear the burden of defeat and, if 
victorious, cannot return to its former 
position.... the French recognize that their heavy 
burdens in Southeast Asia are part of the price 
they must pay for continuance as a world power and 
even for their freedom in Europe."105
In larger terms, the report felt the war had turned into an
international conflict from an anti-colonial revolt. In
that struggle, the report felt that to agree to a truce was
unwise, and that the French could "truce" away the entire
country.106 The report concluded its section on Indochina
stating "[t]he struggle in Indochina today is at best a
touch-and-go proposition."107
Many of the conclusions of the Judd report coincided 
with the conclusions of the Smith report, including the 
premise that the United States had a significant stake in 
Indochina. Judd, too, sensed a "larger Communist strategy" 
to dominate Asia. Likewise, he felt the Communists would 
combine "the manpower of China, plus the industrial capacity
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of north Asia, plus the agricultural and raw material 
resources of South Asia," and "create a most formidable 
power element moving against the free world;"108 Like Smith, 
Judd felt recognition of the PRC would constitute 
appeasement, and "[h]istory proves that there is no peace in 
appeasement.11109 Judd also agreed that tfie experience of the 
Korean War showed the need for collective security. Yet, he 
thought the initiative for a Pacific pact must come from 
Asians confident that America will support their proposal.110 
Judd felt that before Asian anti-Communists could act they 
had to be assured of United States support. He noted that 
Asians must attempt to understand the history behind western 
political ideas in order to effectuate their goal of 
establishing a western polity. But, he reasoned that "Asian 
nations must work out their own political pattern in the 
light of their own background and experience."111
While Capital Hill was abuzz with the struggle in 
Indochina, the National Security Council held its weekly 
meeting on February 11. High-level government assessments 
on the military situation at Dien Bien Phu were optimistic. 
Allen Dulles reported that the Viet Minh were by-passing 
Dien Bien Phu and moving into Laos. Dulles felt that a 
frontal assault on Dien Bien Phu was unlikely, and felt 
confident in the Navarre Plan's success.112 On February 21,
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Navarre himself told Ambassador Heath that Dien Bien Phu was 
not threatened. Navarre stated: "Dien Bien Phu is a 
veritable jungle Verdun which he hopes will be attacked as 
it will result in terrific casualties t8 the Viet Minh and 
will not fall."113
On February 16, at an executive session of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee attended by._Smith and Radford, 
Radford assured the Senators that the deterioration of the 
French military position as played up in recent press 
reports was exaggerated. Senator H. Alexander Smith said he 
felt relieved, because he felt that from his recent trip to 
Indochina that Navarre and the French could win in two 
years. Two days later, Radford and Bedell Smith attended an 
executive session of the House Foreign Relations Committee. 
Radford stated that there was "no danger" of losing Dien 
Bien Phu to the Viet Minh. "The Viet Minh," Radford stated, 
"are not anxious to engage in a showdown fight, because 
their ammunition supplies are not large, and a great deal of 
it is homemade."114
At the Berlin Conference, which ended February 18, the 
Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain,
France and the Soviet Union agreed to hold a conference in 
Geneva scheduled to begin on April 26, 1954, to discuss an 
end to the Korean war. At the insistence of the French, the
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Geneva Conference would also discuss the problem in 
Indochina. Initially opposed, the United States acquiesced 
after Bidault threatened to scuttle the EDC, and the British 
supported the French.115 Realizing that Indochina was 
France's war, and that the Laniel Government might fall into 
disfavor with an unsympathetic French pufeiic, Dulles gave in 
to French leverage. Viet Minh peace feelers since Ho's 
Expressen interview had heightened French domestic sentiment 
for an end to the war.116 Many Frenchmen hoped that the 
armistice agreement negotiated at Panmunjom had provided a 
worthy precedent.117 Dulles, however, felt negotiations 
should await military gains on the battlefield. Reports 
from American observers convinced Dulles that the Navarre 
Plan promised victory. At Dien Bien Phu, Chinese aid had 
allowed Giap to change tactics from guerrilla operations to 
conventional warfare, and would prove American observers 
wrong. Intense diplomatic activity ensued during the 
interim between the end of the Berlin Conference and the 
scheduled beginning of the Geneva Conference.
On February 24, in an executive session of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dulles felt 
that if the United States had not acquiesced at Berlin, the 
Laniel-Bidault Government in France would have fallen.
Dulles felt that this was the best government the United
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States could hope for in France in view of American 
interests in Indochina and the European Defense Community. 
Dulles also noted that the United States was not bound to 
remain at the Conference should events necessitate 
leaving.118 Dulles also told the Committee "there probably 
will not be any major or anything like decisive engagements 
during the remaining 2 months of March arid April of the 
fighting season." Dulles felt that if the French could hold 
on until the end of April, the rainy season would last six 
months when the fighting could resume. In the interval, 
Dulles hoped for the development of the French will to, 
fight, the development of national armies, and for China to 
decide to stop aiding the Viet Minh.119 In a February 2 6 
report to the NSC, Dulles noted that had the United States 
vetoed the French proposal at Berlin, the French would have 
declined to join the EDC and probably would have withdrawn 
from Indochina.120
Optimism about the situation in Indochina continued. In 
the first week of March, Harold Stassen, Director for 
Foreign Operations, reported to the National Security 
Council that the French hoped for a Viet Minh attack because 
they were sure to defeat it.121 While the French may have 
evinced optimism, many wanted to leave the country. On 
March 5, speaking before the French National Assembly,
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Laniel stated that all of France is united "in desiring a 
settlement through negotiation."122 French optimism 
reflected the hope of holding on until Geneva where 
diplomacy could effect a face-saving.
Despite the optimism of the French and American 
observers, the Working Group of the Smith Committee 
continued to weigh United States options in Indochina. On 
March 11, 1954, Under Secretary of State Smith sent 
Eisenhower Part 1 of a two-part report prepared by the 
Working Committee of the Special Committee. The report 
stated that there was enough equipment, supplies and 
manpower in Indochina to defeat the Communists, but that 
success was dependent on French willingness to inspire and 
utilize the native potential and instill a sense of fighting 
for freedom. The Erskine group recommended that short of 
direct involvement, the United States should continue aid to 
France; strengthen the United States military mission with 
"advisory authority over training and planning;" assign 
United States personnel with duties within the French 
forces; have Eisenhower write to the Heads of State of the 
Associated States to explain American motives; and encourage 
Bao Dai to be more active. Barring Chinese intervention and 
French discouragement, the Group felt their recommendations 
could lead to victory.123
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The same day Eisenhower received part one of the Erskine 
report, he stated at a press conference that "...there is 
going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a 
result of the constitutional process that is placed upon 
Congress to declare it."124 Eisenhower's public 
pronouncements were consistently anti-interventionist. 
Shortly after announcing his technician^commitment, 
Eisenhower had declared at a news conference on February 10, 
that "...no one could be more bitterly opposed to ever 
getting the United States involved in a hot war in that 
region than I am....I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy 
for America than get heavily involved now in an all-out 
war.. .particularly with large units."125 Significantly, the 
President's public posture paralleled his stance taken at 
the January 8th NSC meeting. The President's resolve would 
soon receive a major test.
On March 14, 1954 Ambassador Heath sent a cable to the 
Department of State:
The long expected Viet Minh attack on Dien 
Bien Phu, the 'Verdun' which the French military 
command threw up in the 'Thai country' in northern 
Indochina early last winter, began last evening at 
6 o'clock [March 13, in Washington]...[Ambassador] 
Dejean is confident that the French will be able 
to hold Dien Bien Phu because of the strength of 
its fortifications and its fire-power and inflict 
heavy losses on the attackers....Not only does 
Dejean think the French will hold Dien Bien Phu 
but he regards the Viet Minh decision to attack as
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evidencing elements of desperation and weakness.126
Against the backdrop of the deteriorating French 
position at Dien Bien Phuwas the Geneva~~Conference just six 
weeks away. President Eisenhower wouid liave to decide how 
to combat Asian Communism and still adhere to principles of 
international law.
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Chapter Four
A Concert of Readiness:
From Operation Vulture to United Action
The decision to discuss Indochina at the Geneva 
Conference magnified the importance of the Viet Minh attack 
at Dien Bien Phu. While the siege continued, American 
policy makers debated the ramifications of that decision. 
Although many pinned their hopes on the success of the 
Navarre Plan and a French military victory, others debated 
the consequences of defeat.
In a memorandum dated March 12, 1954, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff wrote to Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of 
Defense, that "the loss of Indochina to the Communists would 
constitute a political and military setback of the most 
serious consequences." It was their opinion that "a 
negotiated settlement...would fail to provide reasonably 
adequate assurance of the future political and territorial 
integrity of Indochina." Because of this, "the United 
States should decline to associate itself with such a
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settlement, thereby preserving freedom of action to pursue" 
other alternatives.1 Fearful that Communist propaganda 
could make a negotiated settlement appear to be a Communist 
victory, the JCS worried about the impact of the loss of 
Indochina on neighboring countries, particularly Japan, "the 
keystone of United States policy in the Far East."2 The JCS 
concluded that the United States should prevent the loss of 
Indochina to Communists either "in concert with the French; 
or in the event the French elect to withdraw, in concert 
with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally."3
Ironically, while Washington was discussing the American 
position at Geneva, General Giap of the Vietnamese People's 
Army was preparing to scuttle the Navarre Plan. According 
to Bernard Fall, Navarre felt Dien Bien Phu was the perfect 
place to lure the Communists away from guerilla tactics and 
into the open in a set-piece battle where the French "could 
outmaneuver and outgun the enemy."4 Nevertheless, by 
January 1954, Giap's troops in the mountains surrounding the 
French garrison outnumbered the French by about five to one. 
Since the Berlin Conference in February, both the French and 
the Viet Minh realized that military victory in the field 
would augment their respective positions at the bargaining 
table. Accordingly, after three months of siege, on March 
13, 1954, Giap switched to the offensive. That night, the
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Viet Minh overran the French outer position named 
Strongpoint Beatrice, killing almost seventy-five percent of 
the defenders. By morning the Viet Minh were dug-in and 
ready to fire on the main camp.
In the meantime, the Smith Committee continued to 
discuss the importance of Indochina. On March 17, General 
Erskine sent the second part of his report to this 
committee. Erskine stated that military victory was the 
only acceptable United States objective, but that active 
involvement should await Geneva in light of the trouble at 
Dien Bien Phu. Specifically, it recommended that "no 
solution to the Indochina problem short of victory is 
acceptable." Should the French accept a settlement short of 
this goal, the "U.S. should decline to associate itself with
such a settlement." Further, the Report recommended that
<»
political steps could be taken to force French and British 
acceptance of the U.S. position, including "possible 
pressure against the French position in North Africa, and in 
NATO."5 The United States should inform the British and 
French before the start of the Geneva Conference, that the 
United States would not associate with an outcome which 
falls short of military victory. Rejecting proposals to 
negotiate an end to the war— a cease-fire, coalition 
government, partition of Vietnam, or free elections— the
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Working Group felt that the United States should continue 
fighting if the French withdrew, yet, in concert with 
allies. The Group noted that the NSC should ascertain 
domestic and world opinion on the necessity of continuing 
the fight. Specifically, the United States should address 
American willingness to commit United States troops with or 
without French cooperation.6
Following the Erskine Report, Eisenhower redistributed 
the Special Annex to NSC 177, which had been withdrawn at 
the National Security Council meeting on January 8. The 
Annex outlined the basic choices facing Washington: 
accepting the loss of Indochina while strengthening the rest 
of Southeast Asia, or undertaking direct military 
intervention prior to Geneva. Two plans of action were 
drawn up--one based on a scenario in which France continued 
to fight, the other on French withdrawal. Under the first 
possibility, the Annex pointed out that the issue of the 
Independence of the Associated States should be settled, 
that indigenous units be built up with American material 
support, and that French troop levels remain constant. 
Generally, the Annex report recommended that preparations 
should be made for possible United States entry in the 
Indochina conflict. Under the scenario of a French 
withdrawal, the Annex reiterated the Erskine line, which was
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the choice of accepting the loss of Indochina or active 
intervention. The Annex argued that the best course under 
the latter option would be "to join with indigenous forces 
in combating the Viet Minh until they were reduced 'to the 
status of scattered guerilla bands.'" The Annex stipulated 
that should the Chinese or Soviets intervene, or should 
hostilities resume in Korea, the American position would 
have to be re-evaluated.7
Meanwhile, the military situation at Dien Bien Phu 
looked bleak. On March 18, at the weekly NSC meeting, Allen 
Dulles stated that the French had a 50-50 chance of 
surviving the Viet Minh attack.8 Eisenhower was perplexed. 
Stating that news from Indochina was serious, Eisenhower 
wondered that "[i]t was difficult to understand, in light of 
General Navarre's earlier statements that he hoped to be 
attacked by the enemy at Dien Bien Phu, why the French 
suddenly had become so very pessimistic."9 Secretary of 
State Dulles noted that Bidault told him the Viet Minh 
attack was an effort to gain a stronger hand at Geneva.10 
The next day, Radford ordered an Attack Carrier Striking 
Group to lie off the Indochinese coast on a three-hour alert 
to undertake offensive operations.11
Despondency was not confined to within Dien Bien Phu. 
According to The Pentagon Papers. "[t]his fortress in
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Northern Vietnam was to take on a political and 
psychological importance far out of proportion to its actual 
strategic value because of the upcoming Geneva 
Conference."12 The French felt that they were doomed 
"unless they received a formidable dose of outside help.
Only the United States could furnish that aid quickly and 
effectively. So another engagement had to be fought in 
Washington."13 Thus, on March 20, 1954, General Paul Ely 
(Chief of Staff of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff) at 
Admiral Radford's invitation, flew to Washington.14 Because 
Washington thought that France was ready to negotiate, "it 
became increasingly clear to the American leaders that they 
would have to commit the United States more deeply to the 
struggle. "15
On the night of March 20, a stag dinner was held for 
General Ely. In attendance were Admiral Radford, General 
Ridgway, Vice-President Nixon, Douglas MacArthur II, and 
Allen Dulles. During discussion, Ely told Nixon that a 
defeat at Dien Bien Phu would have adverse effects on French 
public opinion and the strength of the Laniel government. 
Yet, Ely felt the Viet Minh would effect only a political 
victory while suffering many casualties.16
After a day of talks with American officials, Ely met 
Eisenhower on March 22. Ely presented specific requests of
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aid from Navarre to Eisenhower and Radford. Principally,
f>
Ely asked for twenty-five additional B-26 bombers to assist 
in the defense of Dien Bien Phu. This request was met.17 
But Ely was not through. Historian Philippe Devillers 
suggests that M[t]he main object of Ely's mission covered 
the guarantee of American action in the case of Chinese air 
intervention.”18 MIG-15's allegedly bearing Viet Minh 
insignia had been spotted standing on Chinese airfields near 
the Indochinese border. France wanted American aid, but not 
at the cost of alarming China. Dulles later stated that he 
could not give Ely an answer at that time to an American 
response to Chinese intervention.19 That day, the Attack 
Carrier Striking Group lying off the Indochinese coast was 
ordered to prepare for a possible attack on the Communists 
at Dien Bien Phu. The Group was ordered not to tell the 
French about these preparations.20
While Ely was talking with Eisenhower and Radford, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles held a press 
conference on March 23, in which he reported the defense of 
Dien Bien Phu. Dulles stated that the United States had 
always made it a point to listen to French requests for aid. 
Dulles mentioned that he had yet to meet with Ely, but that 
Ely had met with Admiral Radford and presumably requested 
additional aid. Although he had yet to speak with Ely,
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Dulles stated that as long as China supported the Viet Minh 
the United States would rule out a negotiated peace.21 At 
this early date, Dulles had stated an uncompromising 
American policy the significance of which would not become 
apparent until much later.
That evening, Dulles finally met General Ely. Ely told 
him that "France was now determined upon a settlement."22 
In a memorandum to Eisenhower, Dulles stated that Ely was 
worried about Chinese intervention. Ely asked Dulles about 
United States help should the Chinese send fighters to 
Indochina. Dulles told Eisenhower that he replied:
that if the United States sent its flag and its 
own military establishment— land, sea or air—  
into the Indochina war, then the prestige of the 
United States would be engaged to a point where we 
would want to have a success. We could not afford 
thus to engage the prestige of the United States 
and suffer a defeat which would have worldwide 
repercussions.23
Dulles warned Ely that overt American participation would 
incur American pressure for independence of the Associated 
States and the training of indigenous forces.24 Ely 
admitted to Dulles that the primary problem in Indochina was 
political, not military. Ely felt that the Viet Minh attack 
at Dien Bien Phu was inspired to reap political advantage at 
Geneva, because the military value of the valley was not 
worth the effort expended by the Viet Minh.25 Ely did not
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say why the French thought the valley important enough to 
commit a large French force there in the first place.
On March 24, Radford telephoned Secretary Dulles stating 
that the talks with Ely had made little progress in Franco- 
American relations. Dulles felt that wherever France 
occupied territory in the world, a power-vacuum would occur. 
The East-West challenge was to determine who would fill that 
vacuum. Radford stated that Ely had concerns about the 
benefits of American aid. Reminiscent of the Blum 
controversy, Ely stated that "Americans act as if the United 
States sought to control and operate everything of 
importance," and "the United States appears to have an 
invading nature as they undertake everything in such great 
numbers of people."26 Radford concluded:
I am gravely fearful that the measures being 
undertaken by the French will prove to be 
inadequate and initiated too late....If Dien Bien 
Phu is lost, this deterioration may occur very 
rapidly due to the loss of morale among the mass 
of the native population. In such a situation 
only prompt and forceful intervention by the 
United States could avert the loss of all of 
Southeast Asia to Communist domination. I am 
convinced that the United States must be prepared 
to take such action.27
President Eisenhower met with Secretary Dulles, Radford, 
and the NSC on March 25, 1954. Eisenhower criticized French 
judgment in choosing Dien Bien Phu, and stressed the domino 
effect should Indochina fall. Yet, Eisenhower felt
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intervention to prevent that fall would require UN approval. 
Eisenhower noted that if France asked the UN for help, some 
countries would object to the UN supporting colonialism. 
Eisenhower, therefore, felt that the Associated States 
themselves should seek UN assistance. Eisenhower stated 
that the United States would not intervene in Indochina 
"unless the Vietnamese welcomed our intervention."28 
Eisenhower felt a mutual security arrangement along the 
lines of an expanded ANZUS treaty would facilitate United 
States intervention under the auspices of the UN. 
Additionally, a mutual security treaty would have the 
advantage of garnering the necessary two-thirds majority for 
Senate ratification. Eisenhower stated too "that the 
Congress would have to be in on any move by the United 
States to intervene in Indochina. It was simply academic to 
imagine otherwise."29
Dulles felt there was plenty of time to explore 
intervention with Congress or to secure UN backing, because 
the Communists were seeking a political victory at Dien Bien 
Phu and not a military victory. Dulles then reiterated a 
point he had made to Radford over the phone the day before. 
Dulles stated that the West was witnessing the collapse of 
France as a great power, and he wondered who would fill the 
void left by France, especially in the colonial areas.30
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Dulles finished by stating the United States could not 
intervene until an adequate study estimating world-wide 
repercussions of such intervention were made.31 The meeting 
ended with the Planning Board charged with drawing up 
recommendations on possible United States intervention.
His mission accomplished, Ely was prepared to go home. 
Curiously, however, he was asked to stay on another twenty- 
four hours. On March 25th, Admiral Radford proposed to 
General Ely that the United States could launch tactical air 
strikes to relieve Dien Bien Phu regardless of possible 
Chinese reaction. The Radford proposal--called by the 
French, Operation Vulture— was for a joint Air Force and 
Navy nighttime raid on the perimeter of Dien Bien Phu.
Sixty B-29 heavy bombers stationed at Clark Field in the 
Philippines, escorted by 150 fighters of the United States 
Seventh Fleet, could execute saturation bombing in an effort 
to weaken the will of the Viet Minh.32
At the time and afterward Operation Vulture was the 
object of confusion and controversy. Although Vulture was 
"originally devised by French and American officers in 
Saigon, 1,33 "no record of Operation Vulture has been found 
in the files examined" by the authors of the Pentagon 
Papers,34 In 1965, at the Dulles Oral History Project at 
Princeton University, Admiral Radford described his meeting
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with Ely. Radford said that Ely failed to understand that 
he, Radford, "had no authority to commit the United States" 
and that should the United States intervene it would 
internationalize the war. It was Radford's opinion that 
"Ely wanted us to come in, strike Dien Bien Phu, and break 
the siege...then withdraw and leave the fighting to them." 
But, said Radford, "you can't just get one foot wet and then 
pull out again."35 Whether or not Ely knew that Radford was 
not speaking officially, Ely at least formed the impression 
that formal authority to commence Operation Vulture merely 
awaited the French request.36 In any event, by Radford's 
plan the United States would have some say in the planning 
of military operations. On March 26, Ely flew back to 
Paris.
On March 2 9, Admiral Radford sent a memorandum to the 
Smith Committee concerning his conversations with General 
Ely. Despite the crisis at Dien Bien Phu, when cohesion of 
purpose dictated unity, Radford wrote that there was great 
friction among the allies. Radford wanted a direct role for 
the United States MAAG in training indigenous troops, to 
which he felt "the French are disposed firmly to resist."
Ely expressed similar sentiments with respect to direct 
United States operations in psychological, clandestine and 
guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, Ely had mentioned to him
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eight areas of discord. Particularly, Ely felt that 
American aid was accompanied by overly zealous American 
administrators. Radford wrote that he had endeavored to 
meet Ely on each point of conflict, stressing "the fact that 
Americans were growing very impatient with France over its 
lack of action on the EDC and German rearmament and French 
tendencies to overemphasize their prestige and 
sensitivities." Radford concluded with a recommendation 
that the United States be ready to intervene. Strangely, he 
did not mention Operation Vulture.37 Although, as he later 
acknowledged, he had no authority to commit the United 
States to such action, it seems odd that in an internal memo 
he would not mention that he had put forward such an 
unequivocal plan.
Although primarily concerned with the crisis at Dien 
Bien Phu, the Radford memorandum highlighted another 
important aspect of Franco-American relations: the proposed 
European Defense Community. If this multi-nation treaty 
were passed, then it would allow for the rearmament of West 
Germany. The object of the Treaty was for Europe to be able 
to meet a possible Soviet invasion on its own. Three 
problems arose. First, France felt that she could not 
financially support troops in both Europe and Indochina. 
Second, France did not fear a Soviet invasion of Western
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Europe. Third, France did fear a rearmed West Germany.
The basic problem was that France did not feel the need 
for EDC while America considered it essential. The authors 
of The Pentagon Papers observe that, "[b]ecause of the high 
priority given to EDC in American planning, there was a 
strong reluctance to antagonize the French in Indochina," 
yet, "the French in being able to threaten to withdraw 
possessed an important instrument of blackmail."38 The 
United States wanted an anti-Chinese Southeast Asia and an 
anti-Soviet Europe. The result of this conflict of needs 
was that France retained complete control over the situation 
in Indochina, a point underscored in Radford's memorandum 
concerning Ely's areas of discord. Thus, "French leverage 
over the United States was made possible by the conviction, 
apparently firmly held in Washington, that the maintenance 
of a non-Communist Indochina was vital to Western—  
specifically American--interests."39 The French retained 
control because not only did they not want EDC, but also, 
and more importantly, many Frenchmen wanted to get out of 
Indochina. The United States was more determined to achieve 
victory than France was. The result was French leverage, 
which, as Stanley Karnow has written, was "the polite term 
for blackmail."40
One of the more elemental paradoxes of United States
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involvement in Vietnam concerns this question of leverage. 
According to Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, it was a paradox 
between American goals, strengths, ends and means. "As 
American aid and involvement increased, American leverage 
decreased. The French tail could wag the American dog." 
Furthermore, "as U.S. leverage shrank, so too did the chance 
of inducing Paris to make the necessary reforms and 
compromises in Vietnam."41 Thus, the two were inextricably 
linked; as U.S. aid grew U.S. leverage shrank, making both 
political and military reforms impossible.
In addition to differences over the necessity of the 
EDC, the French and the Americans disagreed about the 
conduct of the war. While the French wanted complete 
autonomy in Indochina, the United States wanted enough of a 
say to help direct the efforts in the field, as well as to 
persuade Paris to make needed reforms leading to 
independence for the Associated States. The United States 
felt that reforms would create a will to fight among the 
indigenous forces, as well as provide a way to remove the 
taint of colonialism. Should the United States overtly 
intervene, colonialism would create a negative reaction in 
American public opinion. The American public would not 
support a colonial or neo-colonial war in Asia, especially 
so soon after the Korean conflict. Perhaps Operation
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Vulture was an attempt by Admiral Radford to increase 
American influence while the French, in light of Dien Bien 
Phu, faced a harsh judgment at Geneva. Vulture would lead 
to the internationalization of the war and could have led to 
an increased United States stake in the decision making on 
the war. In such an analysis, the prospect of relief for 
Dien Bien Phu was the ransom for American dominance. Ely's 
complaint— that "Americans acted as if the United States 
sought to control and operate everything of importance 
becomes, then, a real complaint, and American impatience 
becomes American frustration at an inability to bend France 
to United States will. In effect, Vulture may have been an 
attempt to blackmail the blackmailer. In any event, the 
desideratum was to avoid a course of overt action which 
would not have the support of the American public.
While Admiral Radford was pursuing Operation Vulture, 
President Eisenhower instructed Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles to begin a different line of "attack" to 
appeal to American public opinion. This began on March 29, 
1954, in a speech--previously scrutinized by Eisenhower—  
before the Overseas Press Club. The thrust of his speech 
was to broaden possible American intervention by making it 
part of a united venture:
Under the conditions of today, the imposition
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on Southeast Asia of the political system of 
Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, 
by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the 
whole free community. The United States feels 
that possibility should not be passively accepted, 
but should be met by united action. This might 
involve serious risks. But these risks are far 
less than those that will face us a few weeks from 
now, if we dare not be resolute today.42
Dulles said that Ho Chi Minh— who "was indoctrinated in
Moscow"— was being used by the Soviets in order for the
Soviets to "amalgamate," or to bring into the Soviet orbit,
the area known as Indochina. To this end, noted Dulles,
Communist China trained and equipped Ho's nationalists— as
did Russia with munitions made by the Skoda Munitions Works
in Czechoslovakia. Dulles then outlined the "Scope of the
Danger" in terms of the domino theory. The Communists'
purpose, he stated, "is to dominate all of Southeast Asia."
Because "[t]he area has great strategic value,...Communist
control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the
Philippines, Australia and New Zealand....The entire Western
Pacific area...would be strategically endangered."43 Dulles
then declared that America would meet aggression with
"united action." Dulles said that recent American
statements were "designed to impress upon potential
aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places
and by means of free-world choosing, so that aggression
would cost more than it could gain."44
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Dulles next turned his attention to the People's 
Republic of China. He stated that the United States 
recognized Communist China as the de facto government of 
China, but would not favor admission of the People's 
Republic to the United Nations. Dulles hoped that the 
Communist Chinese would "cease and desist" their "conquest 
of Southeast Asia." Finally, he likened the free world 
resolve to thwart Communism to the situation at Dien Bien 
Phu. In both defenses the enemy "continue unceasingly to 
burrow and tunnel to advance their positions against the 
citadels of freedom."45
Dulles' speech was important for many reasons. First, 
it was a strategic outline of the diplomatic aim for 
achieving a collective defense pact— united action— in the 
Western Pacific. Perhaps no speech was more indicative of 
the Eisenhower strategy of containment, as outlined by John 
Lewis Gaddis. This policy was consistent with most post­
war American formulations in that the policy-makers 
"perceived themselves as responding to rather than 
initiating challenges to the existing international 
order."46 Gaddis called the Eisenhower-Dulles conception an 
asymmetrical response or strategy. He defined his use of 
this phrase in Dulles' own words. It was a strategy "of 
applying one's own strengths against adversary weaknesses,
165
rather than attempting to match the adversary in all of his 
capabilities."47 Or, in other words, "to respond vigorously 
at places and means of its [our] own choosing." This meant, 
"the certainty of a response with uncertainty as to its 
nature."48 The bottom line of Dulles' theory of 
.asymmetrical strategic deterrence was "massive retaliation."
But, noted Gaddis, for Eisenhower "means;" such as nuclear
weapons, were subordinated to "ends," so that whatever could 
be used to thwart Communism would be used. Besides nuclear 
weapons, more appropriate "means" included alliances, 
psychological warfare, covert action, and negotiation.49
In his speech, Dulles warned the Chinese Communists to 
desist from supplying the Viet Minh or face an American 
reaction. While leaving the nature of that reaction vague, 
Dulles did say that "aggression would cost more than it 
could gain." His speech was also a call to the free-world 
nations to meet future aggression via a defense pact or
united action. Dulles wanted freedom of action to pursue
whatever means any change in the situation in Indochina 
dictated--be it nuclear weapons in response to overt Chinese 
aggression or an alliance system to protect against future 
losses. Thus, there appeared to the public to be a 
contradiction of means in Dulles' comments. This 
contradiction was accented, but not explained, in the
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"heading" to the article which detailed Dulles' speech in 
U.S. News and World Reports. This heading read, in part:
Blunt notice now given to Communists that 
U.S. does not intend to let Indochina be gobbled 
up, even if it means big war.... Secretary of State 
Dulles calls for 'united action' to meet the 
threat of Communist aggression in that part of the 
world.50
The result of such a dichotomy of means was, as Gaddis has 
written, to "confuse the public, alarm allies, and bewilder 
adversaries. "51
Thus, the first meaning of Dulles' speech was a 
strategic summary of the Eisenhower-Dulles asymmetrical 
approach to achieve security within the context of the 
containment doctrine. The choice of response would be 
determined by the choice of aggression, the importance of 
the interest and the ability of that interest to withstand 
aggression by itself.
The second meaning of Dulles' speech, therefore, was 
that Indochina became an arena of cold war significance to 
be developed in the consciousness of the American people.
The public was made aware, in no uncertain terms, that 
Indochina was a region of prime interest. The "rice-bowl" 
of Asia, rich in tin, oil, rubber, and iron ore, was viewed 
as a key trading partner for Japanese markets. If Southeast 
Asia "fell" economic benefit would accrue to the Communists
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and strategic geo-political danger would ensue. A stand 
would have to be taken. One historian plausibly argues that 
Dulles' speech was designed to allow a national debate on 
the wisdom of intervention and that Eisenhower hoped a 
consensus would form against such intervention.52 Be that 
as it may, American public opinion would support 
intervention in concert with allies if those allies--France 
and the Associated States— requested the intervention. In 
that event, the United States also would have a legal claim, 
under principles of international law, to invade the 
territory of a sovereign state.
The third major significance of Dulles' speech was that 
a pervasive sense of urgency was given to the Indochinese 
war. Action for the sake of action become an imperative.
At Dien Bien Phu, and in the world at large, the Communists 
were ceaseless burrowers against the citadels of freedom. 
And, like the types of rodents who burrow and tunnel in 
efforts to weaken foundations, they must be stopped. To 
state that Communist action demanded urgent response by the 
West implied that current defenses were inadequate. Only a 
United States-sponsored coalition, it seemed, could meet the 
challenge. American diplomacy during the next few weeks 
would seek to create such a coalition and prevent France 
from negotiating Indochina away. Even though the speech
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might have stymied negotiation efforts, and even though 
Dulles may have revealed information compromising French 
intelligence sources, the speech was well received by 
Frenchmen anxious to have some sort of help in Indochina.53 
Doubtless, the speech encouraged the will to fight.
On March 31, at his weekly news conference, President 
Eisenhower commented on his Secretary of State's speech. 
Merriman Smith asked Eisenhower if he could enlarge upon 
Dulles' remark that the United States was ready to take 
united action in the Far East. The President said that "the 
speech must stand by itself," that he had gone "over every 
word of it beforehand" with Dulles and that they were "in 
complete agreement."54 Eisenhower said "that it is in 
united action of all nations and peoples and countries 
affected in that region that we can successfully oppose the 
encroachment of Communism, and should be prepared to meet 
any kind of attack that would come in there."55 Martin 
Agronsky then asked about the possibility of "direct 
intervention or direct use, more accurately, of American 
troops." Eisenhower replied that he could "conceive of no 
greater disadvantage to America than to be employing its own 
ground forces, and any other kind of forces, in great 
numbers around the world, meeting each little situation as 
it arises." Eisenhower continued "what we are trying to do
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is to make our friends strong enough to take care of local 
situations by themselves."56 In response to a question on 
the European Defense Community, the President replied that 
"I am all out for the approval of EDC and establishing it as 
a factor that will insure Europe's safety."57
The significance of this news conference was, first, the 
idea that the press had absorbed the concept of "united 
action." The press was worried about the engagement of 
American troops in another ground war in Asia— a possibility 
Eisenhower disavowed. Second, Eisenhower not only endorsed 
Dulles' policy statement, but also had approved every word. 
Third, that united action was part of a broader policy 
confidence in alliance systems, a fact evidenced by 
Eisenhower's strong support of EDC. Fourth, ideological 
anti-Communism was complemented by a political realism which 
included alliances and the "use" of indigenous ground 
forces. The Eisenhower administration was faced with a 
crisis in Indochina, and joint Western involvement in tandem 
with local forces was the only option made public. If 
Dulles' policy address confused the public and alarmed 
allies, then Eisenhower's follow up comments might have been 
aimed at reducing those fears at the same time that 
adversaries were left bewildered.
Meanwhile, the top echelons of American policy making
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debated the relative merits of Operation Vulture. On three 
separate occasions— March 31, April 2, and April 3— Radford 
asked the Joint Chiefs for their position on intervention. 
All three times, the Chiefs opposed committing United States 
personnel.58 Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew B.
Ridgway, was particularly vociferous. In his autobiography, 
Soldier, General Ridgway, wrote that he strongly disapproved 
of Vulture. Probably referring to Harold Stassen, Ridgway 
wrote that he was concerned to hear of individuals stating 
"that now was the time, and here, in Indo-China, was the 
place to 'test the New Look,' for us to intervene."59 As a 
result of such pro-interventionist sentiment, Ridgway sent 
an Army team of experts to investigate the terrain. "I felt 
sure," Ridgway asserted, "that if we committed air and naval 
power to that area, we would have to follow them immediately 
with ground forces in support."60 Ridgway felt that in this 
eventuality, America faced a problem of unsound logistics. 
"The area...was practically devoid of those facilities which 
modern forces such as ours find essential to the waging of 
war."61 But, Ridgway stated, if the United States did go in 
to Indochina, we had to go in to win and the United States 
had to be prepared to sustain heavy casualties. Ridgway 
sent a report to the President, which Ridgway felt "played a 
considerable, perhaps a decisive, part" in the subsequent
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American decision.62 Although Ridgway's opposition to 
intervention contributed to the subsequent American 
decision, a recent study more accurately states that "his 
opposition only reinforced prior decisions."63
Ridgway's report was probably the Army position paper 
submitted to the NSC in the first week of April, 1954. The 
tone of this eight point argument was that "U.S. 
intervention with combat forces in Indochina is not 
militarily desirable."64 The report contended that ground 
troops would be needed, that atomic weapons could not 
influence victory and that American contingency plans would 
have to account for all the possibilities which could occur 
should France withdraw, China intervene or both. Finally, 
the paper declared that should the United States decide to 
intervene, it would take five months to build up adequate 
ground forces.65
The Department of Defense and the JCS also took a dim 
view of achieving victory with United States personnel.
Their joint analysis was that victory lay with the French if 
the French would only adopt the policies necessary to that 
end. They felt that France was losing the war because "(1) 
lack of the will to win; (2) reluctance to.meet Indochinese 
demands for true Independence; [and] (3) refusal to train 
indigenous personnel for military leadership."66 The
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Department of Defense felt that it would be foolish to 
commit United States forces if these French deficiencies 
were not corrected. "The net effect of the Defense-JCS 
position was to challenge the notion that a quick U.S.1 
military action in Indochina would be either feasible or 
necessary."67 As April opened, the Army and General Ridgway 
felt Vulture to be unsound militarily for logistical 
reasons, while the Department of Defense and the JCS decried 
Vulture because victory seemed more likely should France 
follow political policies necessary to achieve it.
American policy makers were now determined on united 
action. On April 1, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles 
telegramed the American Ambassador in London, Winthrop W. 
Aldrich. Dulles told Aldrich that the United States "will 
not only not be a party to but will actively oppose any 
solution of any kind which directly or indirectly in [the] 
near future or over [a] period of time could lead to [the] 
loss [of] Indochina to Communists."68 Dulles directed 
Aldrich to see British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and 
encourage British support of the American position. Dulles 
also told Aldrich to give Eden a copy of Dulles' speech 
before the Overseas Press Club and to point out that part of 
the address where Dulles warned against giving the Chinese 
Communists what they wanted at Geneva.69
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In the meantime, Eisenhower was preparing the domestic 
front for the possible implementation of Operation Vulture. 
On April 1, he met with Roy Howard and Walter Stone, 
chairman and editor-in-chief of Scripps Howard Newspapers, 
to discuss the Indochina situation. Eisenhower stated that 
the United States might have to send squadrons from two 
aircraft carriers off the Indochina coast to bomb the Viet 
Minh at Dien Bien Phu. According to Jim Hagerty, Eisenhower 
stated: "Of course, if we did, we'd have to deny it 
forever." Why the President was prepared to tell 
newspapermen beforehand about an operation he wanted kept 
secret, is not explained. The following day, Hagerty 
recorded in his diary that Chinese Communists were supplying 
the Viet Minh with trucks, ammunition, and antiaircraft 
guns .70
On April 2, the Smith Committee issued a report which 
favored a mutual defense system for Southeast Asia. The 
Committee felt that such a "regional and Asian mutual 
defense arrangement" should be "subscribed and underwritten 
by the major European powers with interests in the 
Pacific."71 The State Department backed the Smith Committee 
position, but added a caveat. Fearful that Peking would 
view American intervention as a prelude to attacking China, 
the Department of State urged that the United States clearly
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disavow such intent. Beyond this, the State Department 
recommended that no immediate act or promise of intervention 
should be taken or made. Yet, State advised that plans for 
such an eventuality should continue. For the moment, State 
recommended negotiations to set-up a regional alliance if 
the results at Geneva proved unacceptable.72
While policy makers in Washington were struggling with 
the crisis of intervention, the American public was kept 
abreast of the situation. In an April 2, 1954 article, 
reporter Robert P. Martin accurately described the French 
debacle. Whether or not Martin knew of Operation Vulture, 
he did not mention it. Martin wrote that the war in 
Indochina "can be won...without direct U.S. 
intervention....But it....will require a basic change in 
French attitudes." Martin wrote, "this is a war for the 
loyalty of the people, and the side that secures that 
loyalty will win." Martin noted the French dilemma, stating 
that if they increased the size of indigenous forces "the 
French stand to lose in Indochina much of what they have 
been fighting for, a highly profitable protectorate."73 
Even so, Martin felt that if the French were to become more 
flexible, and changed attitudes by employing such techniques 
as psychological warfare and building up the Vietnamese 
National Army, then the French would be able to secure the
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loyalty of the Vietnamese people and win the war. United 
States troops did not have to be brought in because the 
needed military and political means were already present in 
Indochina. Although Martin recognized that for the French 
to carry out his recommendations they would lose their 
profitable protectorate, Martin failed to see that the 
French stood to lose Indochina if they built up the 
Vietnamese army and government or if they remained 
"inflexible." Instead, Martin blamed the French for their 
dilemma and pinned the probable loss of Indochina on French 
defeatists in future political negotiations.
On April 3, 1954, one of the most intriguing and 
significant events of the intervention crisis occurred. 
According to George Herring, because Eisenhower and Dulles 
were "sensitive to Truman's fate in Korea, they were 
unwilling to act without backing from Congress."
Eisenhower, therefore, "instructed Dulles to explore with 
Congressional leaders the conditions under which American 
military power might be approved."74 While Eisenhower spent 
the day at Camp David, Dulles and four members of the 
administration met eight congressional leaders. There were 
five Democrats and three Republicans.75
According to Chalmers Roberts, the primary source for 
the meeting, Dulles began by asking for "a joint resolution
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by Congress to permit the President to use air and naval 
power in Indo-China."76 Dulles feared being "forced back to 
Hawaii" should Indochina fall, which Dulles felt was a 
possibility since he "was not complimentary about the 
French" handling of the war. The day before the meeting, 
Eisenhower, Dulles, Wilson and Radford had met to draft a 
resolution to give the Congressional leaders. Although not 
actually presented, the resolution was designed to delineate 
executive and legislative authority over the President's use 
of force.77
Admiral Radford, speaking after Dulles, explained to the 
Congressmen why stepped-up Chinese aid to the Viet Minh 
required a response from the United States.78 Radford 
outlined his plan for Operation Vulture, which he said would 
only occur after a resolution was passed by Congress. The 
revised plan called for two hundred planes from the United 
States naval carriers Essex and Boxer, presently on 
"training" maneuvers in the South China Sea, to be escorted 
by Air Force fighters from Clark Field, in the Philippines, 
for the purpose of carrying out a single strike on the 
perimeter of Dien Bien Phu.79 The Congressional leaders did 
not like the plan because they were "not inclined to let the 
Executive embark on a course of action that could lead the 
United States into another conflict of the Korean type."80
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After their presentations, Dulles and Radford fielded 
some questions, three of which were particularly poignant. 
First, one of the Congressional leaders asked about the use 
of land forces. Because "Radford did not give a definite 
answer" to this question, the members of Congress grew 
suspicious.81 Second, Earle Clements (D-Ky and Minority 
Whip) then asked Radford: "Does this plan have the approval 
of the other Joint Chiefs of Staff?" "No," replied Radford, 
no one else agreed.82 Third, fearing another "Korea,"
Lyndon Johnson (D-Tex and Minority Leader) then asked if 
other nations had been consulted. Dulles answered that no 
one else had been approached, pointing out that the United 
Nations procedure would take too long to be of help. To 
make Vulture sound more palatable, Dulles waved off a 
possible Chinese or Soviet reaction.83 The leaders "were 
agreed that Dulles had better first go shopping for 
allies."84 The "meeting had lasted two hours and ten 
minutes. As they left, the Hill delegation told waiting 
reporters they had been briefed on Indo-China. Nothing 
more. "85
According to The Pentagon Papers, the Congressional 
leaders would not support Vulture for three reasons. In 
addition to the need for allies, the Congressmen wanted 
France to remain in Indochina and to declare "an interest to
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accelerate independence for the Associated States."86 Once 
these prerequisites were met, the Congressmen might have 
been amenable to granting Eisenhower a resolution. The 
Pentagon Papers also stated that the Essex and Boxer carried 
nuclear weapons, but that their use was not seriously 
considered except as a possible counter-attack against 
Chinese targets should China enter Indochina with large 
numbers of troops.87 The net result was that Vulture was 
temporarily blocked. A subsequent State Department Summary 
stated:
It was the sense of the meeting that the U.S. 
should not intervene alone but should attempt to 
secure the cooperation of other free nations 
concerned in Southeast Asia, and that if such 
cooperation could be assured, it was probable that 
the U.S. Congress would authorize U.S. 
participation in such "United Action."88
As Devillers has observed, Vulture may have been blocked but
the Congressional leaders "had provided themselves with a
foreign alibi that later enabled them to point to Great
Britain as the scapegoat."89
The following evening, Sunday April 4, Eisenhower met 
Dulles and Radford in the President's study in the White 
House. Eisenhower concurred with the three preconditions of 
Congressional approval, namely that there must be a 
coalition, France must accelerate independence— to remove 
the taint of colonialism— and France must not withdraw
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should the United States intervene.90 According to Townsend 
Hoopes, Eisenhower had "reasserted Presidential command."91 
Further, Hoopes felt that for Eisenhower to accept these 
preconditions, it reflected "[t]he solid common sense of a 
President with a feeling in his bones that military 
adventures ought not to be undertaken without allies, and 
that decisions involving war and peace must have explicit 
Congressional participation and support."92 Dulles' 
operational groundrules were "to be a coalition 'with active 
British Commonwealth participation'; a 'full political 
understanding with France and other countries,' and 
Congressional approval."93
United Action had replaced Operation Vulture as the 
basis of American diplomacy. The evening of April 4, 
Eisenhower dispatched a cable to Winston Churchill in order 
to arrange a collective security defense system for 
Indochina. Eisenhower stated that "there is no negotiated 
solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would 
not be either a face-saving device to cover a French 
surrender or a face-saving device to cover a Communist 
retirement." Drawing from their prior experience together, 
Eisenhower stated "we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and 
Hitler by not acting in unity and in time....May it not be 
that our nations have learned something from that lesson?"94
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Eisenhower's letter was just the first attempt by America to 
gain British support. According to Townsend Hoopes, 
Eisenhower's letter clearly showed that the United States 
was strongly opposed to "any serious search for a settlement 
at the forthcoming Geneva conference."95
Meanwhile, in Indochina, the men responsible for 
implementing Operation Vulture prepared as though the 
diplomats would approve the mission. On April 1, Lieutenant 
General Earle E. "Pat" Partridge arrived in Saigon to 
discuss the situation. Accompanying Partridge was Brigadier 
General Joseph D. Caldara who was chief of the FEAF Bomber 
Command, and who would fly and command the "Vulture" 
mission.96 Appalled by the lack of French preparedness and 
equipment, Caldara decided to judge the target from the sky. 
On the night of April 4th, Caldara flew a B-17 with an 
American crew over Dien Bien Phu.97 In the valley below, 
the Viet Minh had taken five strongholds protecting the 
eastern side of the fortress and a major position to the 
west.
The view from Paris was equally grim. The situation at 
Dien Bien Phu had grown so desperate that Prime Minister 
Bidault made an unusual request to Ambassador Dillon.
Dillon had been called to an emergency meeting of the French 
Cabinet on the evening of Sunday April 4th, at 11:00 p.m.
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With President Laniel present, Bidault informed Dillon that 
"immediate armed intervention of U.S. carrier aircraft at 
Dien Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation."98 
Bidault stated that the French request was based on Admiral 
Radford's personal assurances of United States support. 
Bidault continued, "the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on 
Dien Bien Phu" and that "Geneva would be won or lost 
depending on the outcome" of the siege.99 Less than two 
days after United Action had become the primary aim of 
American diplomacy, Bidault had called upon the United 
States to intervene unilaterally. Immediately after his 
meeting with Bidault, Dillon cabled Dulles with the request. 
The morning of April 5, Dulles called Eisenhower informing 
him that the French based their request on Admiral Radford's 
proposal which included the possibility of nuclear 
weapons.100 Eisenhower told Dulles to inform the French that 
they must have misunderstood Radford.101 Dulles instructed 
the Ambassador to inform the French that unilateral 
intervention would not be possible.102
That day the NSC issued a report which discussed United 
States military•intervention in Indochina. This report-- 
entitled NSC Planning Board Report on NSC Action No. 1074- 
a--considered three alternatives of United States 
involvement. These three were action: 1) "in concert with
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the French;" 2) "in concert with the French and others in a 
regional grouping;"3) "in concert with others or alone in 
the event of a French withdrawal."103 The report 
acknowledged that many people throughout the world viewed 
the conflict "as essentially colonial or imperialist in 
character" and recommended that "it would be most important 
to attempt to counteract or modify" that view.104 The report 
suggested that if the United States decided to intervene, 
the United States should obtain Congressional approval, 
continue military preparations, disavow possible settlement 
until greater Communist concessions appeared plausible, 
explore possible regional groupings, and determine the 
independence issue of the Associated States, and "prepare 
them to invite U.S." participation.105 The report also 
stated that under the third option, nuclear weapons would 
probably be available, that 275,000 United States personnel 
might be necessary, that the United States budget would have 
to be re-examined, and that "once U.S. forces and prestige 
have been committed, disengagement will not be possible 
short of victory."106 The report noted that nuclear weapons 
would be used only after consultation with allies and if 
collective security were seriously threatened.107
While the NSC was outlining the scenarios of 
intervention, the President's Special Committee urged
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political and diplomatic pressure be brought against France 
to keep her in the war. In Draft Report By The President's 
Special Committee; Southeast Asia- Part II, dated April 5, 
the Committee reaffirmed a position taken in NSC 5405 and 
Part I of the Special Committee Report, namely that "it be 
U.S. policy to accept nothing short of a military victory in 
Indo-China."108 The Smith Committee recommended against a 
negotiated settlement if the French did not support the 
United States position. In that event, the Smith Committee 
recommended direct overtures to the Associated States. 
Whether France supported the United States position or not, 
the report recommended action in concert with other nations. 
In order to facilitate this program, the United States 
should conclude economic and cultural treaties with the 
Associated States which could eventually culminate in mutual 
defense arrangements. The report, noting the inability of 
Western influence to stop the spread of Communism, listed a 
variety of measures which could be taken in Indochina. "The 
U.S. should, largely through covert means, take steps "to 
promote ... indigenous anti-Communist leaders ....[and to] 
exploit opportunities to strengthen western-oriented anti­
communist political parties."
On the evening of April 5, President Eisenhower gave a 
radio and television address to the American people. His
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main point was that there were many reasons why the Russians 
would not start a war. "None is greater," Eisenhower said, 
"than the retaliation that will certainly be visited upon 
them if they would attack any of our, or any part of our 
vital interests, aggressively and in order to conquer us."109 
In effect, Eisenhower was trying to reduce any fear of war 
that Americans might have had, as well as to justify 
retaliation should Russia attack a "vital interest" such as 
Indochina. Eisenhower excused the morality of American 
retaliation by saying "...it is up to us to lead this world 
to a peaceful and secure existence."110
Diplomatic activities continued apace. On April 5th, 
while Ambassador Dillon was giving Bidault America's 
rejection of Operation Vulture, Dulles was talking to a 
House Foreign Affairs sub-Committee on foreign aid stressing 
the idea of peace through strength and United Action.111 The 
following day, Dulles indicated to the Ambassadors of 
Australia and New Zealand that he anticipated those 
countries would pledge to contribute troops as part of 
United Action in Indochina.112 In Paris, at a closed session 
of the Council of Ministers, Dulles' proposal of United 
Action was rejected. The ostensible reason for the 
rejection was that "French opinion tended to regard the 
American plan as liable to reduce the chances of an
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acceptable compromise in Geneva."113 The United States had 
refused Vulture, and now the French had refused the 
multinational solution of United Action in order to retain 
freedom of decision-making in Indochina. Dulles received 
the French rebuff on April 8th. The day before, he had 
received a similar reply from Britain, although Churchill 
had expressed a desire to talk with Dulles in London on 
April 12th. Eisenhower, therefore, decided to send his 
Secretary of State to London and Paris in order to organize 
a regional grouping before Geneva.114
At the April 6 NSC meeting, Eisenhower stated that the 
passage of any Congressional resolution on regional 
arrangements must await prior agreement with allies. 
Reiterating his familiar position on intervention,
Eisenhower stated that unilateral intervention was out of 
the question and that the Vietnamese would have to invite 
American intervention. Otherwise, Eisenhower declared, the 
United States would appear as a colonial successor to French 
interests.115 Eisenhower also felt that the safety of 
Indochina did not depend on the success of Dien Bien Phu and 
that the loss of Indochina did not necessitate the loss of 
the whole of Southeast Asia in light of a Southeast Asian 
political organization for defense. Dulles supported the 
President, stating that if the United States could organize
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a regional grouping prior to the Geneva Conference, the 
Communists might back down. Dulles then recounted the three 
preconditions of Congressional approval.116 Secretary of the 
Treasury, George Humphrey, voiced concern that a regional 
grouping might induce the United States to try to police 
situations in every part of the globe; Eisenhower replied 
that "we cannot afford to let Moscow gain another bit of 
territory.... we are not prepared now to take action with 
respect to Dien Bien Phu in and by itself, but the coalition 
program for Southeast Asia must go forward." Eisenhower 
added that "[tjhis grouping would give us the needed popular 
support of domestic opinion and allied governments, and we 
might thereafter not be required to contemplate a unilateral 
American intervention in Indochina.117 The desideratum was 
to organize a regional grouping to avoid having to follow a 
unilateral course. In response to Vice-President Nixon's 
concerns, Dulles stated that such a grouping would relieve 
internal subversion as well as external aggression posed by 
Communist expansion. Dulles stated further that such a 
grouping would cause colonial powers to re-examine their 
colonial policies in light of the fact that "peoples of the 
colonial states would never agree to fight Communism unless 
they were assured of their freedom."118
The meeting ended without action on the use of American
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forces in Indochina, although Eisenhower clearly favored 
containment of Communism via united action and not 
unilateral American action. Concerning efforts to pursue 
united action, the consensus was that prior to Geneva the 
United States should organize a regional anti-Communist 
grouping and elicit British support for American Far East 
policies, and the United States should continue to press the 
French to accelerate independence for the Associated States. 
Those present also agreed to ask Congress to approve sending 
additional technicians and possibly aircraft to Indochina.119 
Eisenhower understood that a military action demanded 
domestic, allied and local support.
At a news conference on April 7th, President Eisenhower 
outlined one of the basic assumptions that guided American 
policy makers during the thirty year history of American 
participation in Indochina. Though prevalent for many 
years, no one had stated the assumption as cogently as 
Eisenhower did on this day. This basic belief would soon 
become known as the "domino theory." Robert Richards of the 
Copley Press had asked Eisenhower for a clarification of the 
strategic importance of Indochina. After noting the dangers 
of losing a sizable population and valuable resources to 
Communism, Eisenhower observed:
Finally, you have broader considerations that
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might follow what you would call the "falling 
domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set 
up, you knock over the first one, and what will 
happen to the last one is the certainty that it 
will go over very quickly;...[Specifically the 
President noted] the loss of Indochina, of Burma, 
of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia 
following.
...[I]t takes away, in its economic 
aspects,that region that Japan must have as a 
trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one 
place in the world to go— that is toward the 
Communist areas in order to live.120
Basic to an understanding of the "domino theory" is that 
it was used by Eisenhower as a psychological device to 
equate post-war Communist expansion to pre-war fascist 
expansion. In his letter to Churchill, Eisenhower had 
asked: "May it not be that our nations have learned 
something from that lesson" of failing to halt Hirohito, 
Mussolini, and Hitler in time? Now Eisenhower had set-up a 
row of dominoes— Indochina, Burma, Thailand, the Malaysian 
Peninsula, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand— identical 
to the path of fascist conquest perpetrated by Japan during 
the thirties. For Daniel Yergin, "'Appeasement' was being 
translated into what later would be called the domino 
theory."121 Eisenhower was letting the American public know 
that he was not ready to appease Communist expansion under 
any circumstances. Instead, he would contain Communism, and 
United Action was at the core of that policy.
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While United Action was inherently offensive in 
character— albeit as a counter measure— Japanese 
considerations were the "defensive component" of United 
States policy in Asia. Japan was the strongest link in the 
defensive island chain. One of Eisenhower's chief concerns 
was to prevent the loss of Japan to Communist expansion.
The loss of Southeast Asia was equated with the loss of 
Japan, for if the former were overthrown then the latter 
would "have only one place in the world to go"— the 
Communist areas. In that event, the United States would 
lose a valuable geo-political ally as well as a defensive 
buffer to American overseas interests. The defensive island 
chain was only as strong as the weakest link— Indochina.
In an article written for Volume V of the Gravel edition 
of The Pentagon Papers, John Dower has noted the sratetegic 
and political significance of Japan. "Japan's role vis-a- 
vis China, clear since 1950, has been to contain it 
militarily, isolate it economically and enable other less 
developed countries to do likewise."122 The fear was that 
should the United States fail to contain Communism in 
Southeast Asia, "Japan would move into the Communist 
camp."123 For this reason, Dower has called Japan the 
"Superdomino."
Besides delineating the "domino theory," Eisenhower
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answered other questions concerning United States foreign 
policy at his April 7th news conference. Eisenhower stated 
his concern for the independence of the Associated States. 
"No outside country can come in and be really helpful unless 
it is doing something that the local people want....the 
aspirations of those people must be met, otherwise there is 
in the long run no final answer to the problem."124 
Concerning allies, Eisenhower said "We must have a concert 
of opinion, and a concert of readiness to react in whatever 
way is necessary."125 When asked if he approved of Dulles' 
"scare-tactics," Eisenhower replied: "[s]o far as I know, 
Secretary Dulles has never made an important pronouncement 
without not only conferring and clearing with me, but 
sitting down and studying practically word by word what he 
is to say."12e When asked if the United States had 
approached "other free nations to join in a joint 
declaration warning Communist China against any aggression 
in Southeast Asia?" Eisenhower replied: "No," saying that 
to do so would be to propose an answer before the study of 
the question.127 On the chances of reaching a negotiated 
solution at Geneva, Eisenhower answered: "No, not one that 
the free world would consider adequate to the situation."128 
To another question, Eisenhower replied that no action would 
ensue unless agreed to on a "bipartisan basis."129 When
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asked if the United States would go it alone in Indochina, 
Eisenhower answered: "I am not saying what we are prepared 
to do because there is a Congress, and there are a number of 
our friends all over this world that are vitally engaged." 
The President said that to say anything more "stultifies 
negotiation. "130
The answers to these questions were indicative of 
Eisenhower's foreign policy at this time. The President 
expressed a genuine interest to help all Vietnamese people. 
He considered Congressional and free world approval as a 
sine qua non to any overt American action. He maintained 
control over foreign policy as evidenced by his screening of 
Dulles' every word. He disavowed a desire for a joint 
declaration. And, finally, while he held no hope for 
Geneva, he did not wish to hamper current diplomatic 
activity.
By April 7th, America had come very close to engaging 
forces in Viet Nam, and preparations for war were actively 
going on. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—  
Admiral Arthur W. Radford— had volunteered to his French 
counterpart, the use of American naval bombers escorted by 
American Air Force fighters, to raid the Viet Minh positions
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surrounding the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien 
Phu. Radford's plan was put forth as an informal offer and 
not as official United States policy. By the time the 
French had decided to accept Admiral Radford's proposal, 
however, the United States was unwilling to carry it out. 
President Eisenhower had deemed it necessary to ask for 
bipartisan Congressional support and to obtain British 
endorsement. Through it all, American policy was based on 
an anti-Communist ideology as well as practical issues of 
economics and geopolitics. The former dictated an effort to 
stop Communism, while the latter designated Indochina as the 
place of battle.
Operation Vulture was dead for the moment; replaced by 
United Action. Eisenhower left it up to Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles to secure the requisite support for 
United Action from London and Paris. Dulles' plane left for 
England on April 11, 1954.
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Chapter Five
Peace Through Strength:
French Indochina and United States Foreign Policy, 
April 10, 1954-May 1954
On April 11, 1954, John Foster Dulles flew to London to 
persuade Britain to join united action. In a White House 
press release issued that day, Dulles stated that his was "a 
mission of peace through strength."1
The British told Dulles that they favored a coalition 
aimed at securing Southeast Asia, but that such a coalition 
would have to await an outcome at Geneva.2 The British did 
not want to give the impression that certain options were 
foreclosed prior to Geneva, and were wary of signing on to a 
possibly open-ended future commitment that might lead to war 
with China and the Soviet Union and where atomic weapons 
might be used.3 Instead, they proposed the formation of a 
"working group" to study the possibility of an Asian NATO.4 
While Dulles liked the idea of collective security, he was 
thinking more along the lines of an ad hoc coalition to act 
immediately, but which later could develop into a Southeast
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Asian defense organization.5
British reluctance to entertain immediate action 
reflected their distrust as to "the true import of united 
action."6 Mainly, the British feared a wider war. Beyond 
this, Eden did not see the need for prompt action as he felt 
the French were strong enough to prevent a complete takeover 
of Indochina even if they surrendered at Dien Bien Phu. As 
Ambassador Aldrich had previously wired Dulles, Eden felt 
the "French cannot lose the war between now and the coming 
of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it."7 
The British also did not believe in the domino theory. The 
British, however, did agree to a joint communique with the 
United States that expressed a wish to examine collective 
security arrangements for the defense of Southeast Asia and 
the Western Pacific, within the framework of the principles 
of the United Nations Charter.8
On April 13, 1954, Dulles flew on to Paris. Laniel 
related that many Frenchmen wanted to get out of Indochina 
at any cost.9 In the diplomacy over the next two days,
Dulles failed to understand that the French just wanted a 
simple military victory at Dien Bien Phu and not a wider and 
longer war. His ignorance may have led him to follow the 
strange course of attacking French handling of the 
independence issue. On the morning of April 14, at the Quai
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d'Orsay, Dulles told Bidault that the Associated States 
should have their independence. Perhaps Dulles believed the 
French desperately wanted American aid, and in their 
desperation would accede to stringent United States 
conditions such as granting more substantial independence. 
Perhaps, too, he already assumed French willingness to keep 
on fighting. In any event, Bidault questioned Dulles' 
assumption that independence was a key to Vietnamese 
courage. Bidault stated that France would consider 
collective security if Geneva failed, but as of then, it was 
a French war. Bidault wanted to give Geneva a chance.10
Dulles mentioned that the French position on sovereignty 
for the Associated States appeared as but a disguise to 
perpetuate French control of Indochina. Dulles suggested 
that the French should develop some scheme to grant full 
independence and even mentioned the possibility of giving 
the Associated States an opportunity to opt out of the 
French Union. Bidault replied that the French public would 
not support the war effort in Indochina if the French Union 
were put in doubt.11 Dulles concluded that Eisenhower was 
prepared to go to Congress for powers to participate in a 
united effort in Indochina provided the French grant two 
prerequisites. These were a "real" sense of united action 
and that such action "was to preserve real independence for
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the states in the area," and not a veiled endeavor to 
perpetuate colonialism.12 Following their discussion,
Dulles, Laniel, and Bidault issued a statement similar to 
the British communique.13
Upon his return to the United States on April 15, Dulles 
spoke at Syracuse University. He stated that he was 
satisfied with the results of his trip. Noting that unity 
of purpose rested on a full understanding of interested 
nations, Dulles felt confident that his trip helped to 
create that understanding. At stake, Dulles stated, was the 
potential loss of people, resources and strategic position 
to the Chinese Communists should Southeast Asia fall.14 
Dulles' satisfaction and confidence would not last.
On April 16, at a meeting of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, Vice President Nixon said that the United 
States might have to send troops into Indochina should the 
French withdraw. Although Nixon spoke off the record, the 
New York Times printed the statement on April 17. The 
announcement was met with grave Congressional concern as 
Nixon mentioned neither Congressional nor allied support as 
prerequisites to armed intervention. A State Department 
Press Officer read a statement that day to the effect that 
Nixon's remarks were in response to the hypothetical case of 
French withdrawal. Such an event, the Department spokesman
209
related, was "highly unlikely." A truer statement of United 
States policy, the official stated, was set forth by the 
Secretary of State on March 29.15 While Nixon was upset 
about the furor his statement created, Eisenhower and Dulles 
told him not to worry because now the nation was awakened to 
the situation.16 Furthermore, his announcement had the 
beneficial effect of keeping the Communists guessing as to 
American intentions.17
Just after his return from Europe, Dulles had extended 
invitations to several nations to study collective defense 
in Southeast Asia in a meeting scheduled to begin on April 
20. On April 18, Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in 
Washington, reported the decision of his government not to 
attend. Dulles was furious with the British for reneging on 
the Communique of the previous week. His anger lasted until 
Eden told him in Paris on April 22, that Asian countries, 
including the former Commonwealth countries India and Burma, 
were meeting at Columbo on similar issues on April 26.18 
Eden's stated concern was that those nations meeting at 
Columbo who were not invited to Washington would believe 
that they also were not invited to the security arrangement. 
In which event, Eden feared harmful effects of bad publicity 
at Geneva.19 Dulles was convinced, however, that the 
British were worried about sending a negative impression to
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India.20 Additionally, Vice President Nixon's remarks had 
given the British cause for worry that attendance would lend 
British support to a military intervention.21 Thus, on 
April 18, Dulles hastily got the British Ambassador to agree 
to attend a meeting of twenty Ambassadors to discuss the 
upcoming Geneva Conference in general terms. Nonetheless, 
the British effectively had put an end to Dulles' concept of 
united action.22
On April 19, Eisenhower and Dulles met to discuss a 
Department of Justice report detailing the President's war- 
making powers, drawn up specifically to address the 
Indochina situation. Eisenhower felt it unwise to ventilate 
the problem before Congress and the American people in light 
of the Bricker amendment brouhaha.23 Eisenhower did state 
that he would take the responsibility of any action. Later 
that day, Dulles spoke to the press at Augusta, Georgia. 
Dulles stated that the Communists were recklessly 
squandering the lives of their soldiers at Dien Bien Phu in 
order to confront the Geneva Conference with a military and 
political victory for Communism. Dulles stated that the 
gallant defense of Dien Bien Phu was serving to draw the 
free world "closer together in unity of purpose" rather than 
succumbing to violent intimidation. Noting the creation of 
NATO following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Dulles
211
observed the series of Pacific mutual security pacts that 
followed the Chinese invasion of Korea. Once again Dulles 
urged collective defense to meet the menace of Soviet 
Communism and stated the "unity of purpose" of the West 
prior to Geneva.24 Dien Bien Phu appeared lost, but the 
United States had not given up hope to minimize the 
Communist victory. Dulles then flew to Paris for a pre- 
Geneva NATO meeting.
In Paris, Dulles confronted harried French requests for 
American assistance, as well as renewed French efforts at 
blackmail. On April 22, Dulles, Radford and Ambassador 
Dillon met with Bidault and General Ely. Bidault told 
Dulles that United States military intervention at Dien Bien 
Phu was necessary to save the garrison, and that if Dien 
Bien Phu fell the French would not only not support united 
action, but would leave Indochina altogether. Dulles cabled 
the renewed request for American aid to Eisenhower. 
Eisenhower replied, without mentioning the request, that 
Dulles should apprise the British of the seriousness of the 
situation. Empathizing with Dulles' frustration with 
France's vacillating position on American military 
intervention, Eisenhower felt the British should understand 
the importance of the fall of Dien Bien Phu.25
Dulles then met with Eden and Bidault to discuss the
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relationship of united action and the Geneva conference 
scheduled to begin in four days. Attempting some blackmail 
of his own, in the guise of moral suasion, Dulles stated 
that the Soviets would be a bit more conciliatory if they 
knew that the West had joined in a common defense system as 
envisioned by united action. A problem with Dulles' 
attitude, however, was that it implied that the French had 
bungled things in Indochina.26 Somewhat conciliatorily,
Eden told Dulles that Britain might entertain discussions 
concerning efforts to bolster Thailand should Dien Bien Phu 
fall.27
The next day, Dulles received a message from Bidault 
during the middle of an afternoon NATO meeting presided over 
by Bidault. To Dulles, the French Foreign Minister, who had 
just received a copy of a message from General Navarre, gave 
"the impression of a man close to the breaking point." 
General Navarre had cabled Laniel stating that Operation 
Vulture was the only practical solution other than a cease­
fire of saving Dien Bien Phu and Indochina. At Dien Bien 
Phu Giap's forces had just taken two strongholds to the west 
of the French command post. Their loss reduced the size of 
the camp and the drop zone to two kilometers on each side. 
French reinforcements and supplies would fall into Viet Minh 
hands in greater quantities now as the Viet Minh controlled
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over ninety percent of the airfield.28 After reading the 
message, Dulles told Bidault that Operation Vulture was 
probably out of the question. Dulles then cabled Eisenhower 
who confirmed Dulles' suspicions. Once again, Eisenhower 
had decided not to intervene.29 Two hours later, at 10 
p.m., Dulles sent another cable to Washington. Dulles 
observed that "[t]he situation here is tragic. France is 
almost visibly collapsing under our eyes....It seems to me 
that Dien Bien Phu has become a symbol out of all proportion 
to its military importance."30
That evening, the French Foreign Office hosted an 
official dinner at the Quai d'Orsay for the NATO powers. 
During a conversation with Eden and NATO Supreme Commander 
Alfred Gruenther, Dulles informed Eden of France's request 
to proceed with Operation Vulture. Eden told Dulles that he 
was against an air strike as far as Dien Bien Phu was 
concerned, because he was wary of precipitating World War 
III. Dulles tried to persuade Eden by telling him that the 
collapse of France in Indochina would signal the collapse of 
France as a world power. Dulles also stated that if Britain 
went along with Operation Vulture, Eisenhower was prepared 
to ask Congress for authority to intervene. Not persuaded, 
Eden asked Dulles to inform the British should the United 
States decide to intervene militarily. Dulles agreed.31 In
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the meantime, the French sought to keep Vulture alive. That 
evening, Bidault told Dilion that if the United States went 
ahead with Operation Vulture, the French would feel honor 
bound to continue fighting. Otherwise, defeatism would take 
over France, leading to the possible election of a leftist 
government.32
On April 24, Dulles met with Eden orice more. This time 
Dulles was accompanied by Admiral Radford who had just flown 
in from Washington. Dulles suggested that the British and 
the Americans join in collective action to support France, 
but ruled Operation Vulture out of the question. Radford 
stated that an air strike at that juncture was of little 
value, but an announced intent of collective defense would 
bolster French morale and possibly keep the Laniel 
government in power. Eden replied that such an announcement 
would be politically "hell at home."33
Later that afternoon, Dulles and Eden met with Bidault. 
Bidault requested American and British support, but did not 
say whether France would withdraw should Dien Bien Phu 
collapse. Bidault told Dulles he could not guarantee what 
France would do, for while both he and Laniel wished to stay 
in the fight, the psychological reaction in France would be 
severe. Bidault told Dulles that Dien Bien Phu had been a 
mistake, that the French had placed troops there for the
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political reason of protecting Laos, but that it is always a 
mistake to make military plans based on political 
considerations. Bidault stated that the French Cabinet, in 
a morning session, had given him instructions for the Geneva 
Conference. Bidault said that he was not bogged down with 
crippling instructions, but, rather, he could go to Geneva 
with free hands.34 In Washington that day, Hagerty recorded 
in his diary that Eisenhower had put the White House "Staff 
on an hour's call to return to Washington because of 
Indochina.1,35
After leaving Bidault, Dulles then met with Laniel. 
Laniel too was worried about the "psychological blow" should 
Dien Bien Phu fall. In Indochina, Laniel felt that 
indigenous troops would desert the French cause. At home, 
Laniel felt the loss of Dien Bien Phu would lead to the 
overthrow of his government and strengthen the position of 
those Frenchmen desirous of ending the war at any cost. 
Dulles informed Laniel that United States military action 
would require Congressional approval. Dulles told Laniel 
that if Britain would join a collective arrangement and if 
the Indochinese were granted complete independence, the 
resulting alliance might send troops to Indochina in the 
coming weeks.36
That evening, General Ely openly requested the
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commencement of Operation Vulture from Admiral Radford. 
Realizing American intervention would have no bearing on the 
situation at Dien Bien Phu, Ely stressed the importance it 
would have on opinion both in France and Indochina. Because 
Operation Vulture had undergone various interpretations 
since Radford suggested it to Ely a month earlier, Radford 
reported to the State Department that he did not know to 
which interpretation Ely referred.37
While Ely talked with Radford, Eden flew to London on 
the evening of April 24, to consult with Churchill 
concerning intervention in Indochina. Denis Allen, Under 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informed Eden that if Dulles 
pressed for American intervention Bidault probably would 
advise Laniel to reject the offer. When Eden discussed the 
matter with Churchill, Churchill felt it would be a mistake 
to join the United States in intervention. Churchill agreed 
with Eden that intervention would be ineffective and might 
lead to world war. Eden later wrote that "Sir Winston 
summed up the position by saying that what we were being 
asked to do was to assist in misleading Congress into 
approving a military operation, which would in itself be 
ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of 
a major war."38 Eden and Churchill then agreed that a 
partition of Indochina might prove the best solution, but
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that Britain could join a collective defense arrangement to 
support a settlement reached at Geneva. The British Cabinet 
endorsed the Eden-Churchill plan the next day.39
That night, at 10:15 p.m., Dulles met Eden when the 
latter flew into Geneva. Eden stated that intervention 
would prove ineffective.40 Eden then told Dulles that on 
his way through Paris to pick up his wife he ran into 
Bidault at Orly airport. Eden related that he had informed 
Bidault that Britain would support the French in Geneva as 
far as reaching a satisfactory settlement on Indochina, and 
that Britain would be willing to join with the United States 
in guaranteeing that settlement. Failing a satisfactory 
settlement, Eden told Bidault that Britain was prepared to 
examine the situation more thoroughly. Dulles told Eden 
that Britain should take a stronger stand. Dulles noted 
that the French needed some form of hope or they would 
withdraw from Indochina should Dien Bien Phu fall. Eden 
answered that Britain was opposed to any direct involvement 
in Indochina, let alone air intervention at Dien Bien Phu. 
Dulles rejoined that there was little comfort for the French 
in the British estimate of the situation.41
That evening, Dulles cabled Washington. He stated that 
intervention in his opinion was unwarranted, and that the 
security of the United States was not directly threatened.
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Further, he stated that in the event of a new government in 
France, the French may decide to leave Indochina regardless 
of United States intervention. He stressed that action 
without British support was not feasible, and that 
intervention would remove any leverage the United States 
presently had over the French.42 Dulles' denial of a threat 
to United States security given the Indochina situation, 
lends credence to the view that his dire forecast of March 
29, was aimed at its domestic psychological effect.
On April 2 6, the Geneva Conference opened as scheduled. 
In Washington, Eisenhower met with Republican congressional 
leaders. Eisenhower reported that the French "are weary as 
hell," and that Dien Bien Phu might fall within the week.
The President stated that "[t]he French go up and down every 
day— they are very volatile. They think they are a great 
power one day and they feel sorry for themselves the next 
day." Eisenhower further stated that if the United States 
put one combat soldier into Indochina, then our entire 
prestige would be at stake throughout the world. He felt 
that American troops would not be needed in Indochina unless 
our allies go back on us.43 Eisenhower believed that 
unilateral intervention would be a "tragic error."44 He 
felt that because indigenous forces could fight for 
themselves, the United States could be left to supply air
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and naval support as well as training for the indigenous 
forces. Eisenhower felt the United States must continue to 
press for collective security and show the Communists that 
the United States would not stand for any more chipping away 
of the free world. Eisenhower stated tliat collective 
defense was hindered by British reluctance to move in 
Indochina, for fear of Chinese retaliation in Hong Kong.45
At this juncture, the President considered domestic 
reaction. After meeting with the Republican congressmen, 
Eisenhower asked Hagerty to prime a reporter to ask a 
question about Geneva at his next news conference. In his 
answer, Eisenhower would attempt to de-emphasize the 
Indochina situation stating "that all is not lost if Dien 
Bien Phu falls, which probably it will within a week."46 At 
a Cabinet meeting that day, the President discussed the 
domestic impact of that eventuality. Aware that his 
popularity had soared after he extricated America from the 
Korean War, Eisenhower expressed the fear that the Democrats 
would accuse him of losing Vietnam, just as Republicans 
previously had accused Truman of losing China.47
On the afternoon of April 26, Under Secretary of State 
Bedell Smith held a meeting at the State Department for 
members of the Far East Subcommittees of the Senate Foreign
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Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees. Smith 
talked about possible use of air and naval forces in 
Indochina following a declaration of common interest with or 
without the British. Smith felt the key ingredient was to 
bolster French morale. To this end, he thought the United 
States should at least threaten to intervene without British 
support. Such a threat would also have the effect of 
creating uncertainty as to United States intentions.48
That afternoon, Dulles, Eden and Bidault met at Bidault's 
villa. During the conversation, Dulles formed the 
impression that the British were pressing the French to 
accept any kind of settlement because the British were 
fearful that United States policy was leading the allies 
into a major war with the Chinese. To counter this 
perceived British maneuver, Dulles suggested to Bidault that 
a cease-fire might encourage the Vietnamese to rise up 
against the French and massacre them.49 Perhaps, Dulles was 
attempting vainly to gain British support through French 
fears.
Sometime that day, President Eisenhower summarized his 
views in a letter to General Alfred M. Gruenther (Commander 
in Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe). Eisenhower stated that for over three 
years he had tried to convince the French that they could
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not win in Indochina, or receive American support unless 
they unequivocally pledged to grant independence to the 
Associated States upon attainment of military victory.
Beyond this, Eisenhower had argued that ho Western nation 
could use military force in Asia "except as one of a concert 
of powers, which concert must include local Asiatic 
peoples." For Eisenhower; "[t]o contemplate anything else 
is to lay ourselves open to the charge of imperialism and 
colonialism— at the very least— of objectionable 
paternalism." For this reason, Eisenhower believed that 
even if an air strike could save Dien Bien Phu, the 
conditions imposed by the French would render that effort a 
pyrrhic victory. Eisenhower opined that "[ejver since 1945 
France has been unable to decide whether she most fears 
Russia or Germany. As a consequence, "France was unwilling 
to make the sacrifices needed to reinstate- her as a great 
world power. Particularly, the French needed to recognize 
that failure to coordinate plans with allies reflected 
foolish false pride. Eisenhower believed that France's 
problem, then, was one of spirit. They needed a new 
inspirational leader who possessed the "capability of 
reversing the trend toward pessimism, defeatism and 
dejection. "50
Despite his discouragement, Eisenhower assessed the
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situation as follows. Principally, he believed that the 
fall of Dien Bien Phu would not necessarily lead to the loss 
of Indochina. The solution was for all interested Western 
nations to unite and stop "the Communist advances in 
Southeast Asia." In that union, each nation could provide 
its quickest most useful asset. France could provide the 
ground forces while the United States could foot the bill. 
Other European powers with troops in the area and local 
Asiatic powers could provide additional ground forces. The 
plan envisioned that this concert of nations "should assure 
freedom of political action to Indo-China promptly upon 
attainment of victory." Finally, Eisenhower believed that 
if the goals and peaceful purposes of the plan were publicly 
announced, "as in NATO," then the United States might not 
have to fight.51
On April 27, Radford sent Secretary of Defense Wilson a 
report stating that Operation Vulture could not save Dien 
Bien Phu and could serve to involve the United States 
militarily in Indochina. Ironically, Eisenhower reported in 
his diary that "[t]he situation at Dien Bien Phu has looked 
a bit brighter than it has for the last ten days."52 
Eisenhower then noted the latest reports from Dulles which 
stated the British position at Geneva. Apparently, the 
British wanted a cease-fire, regardless of the complex
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decisions that solution would entail for the French and the 
Vietnamese, because the British feared the possibility of 
World War III should the fighting continue. Eisenhower felt 
Australia and New Zealand were resentful of the British 
attitude and might approach the United States with the idea 
of forming a collective security agreement to the complete 
exclusion of the British. Eisenhower noted he would 
probably accept such a proposal because he felt the British 
showed a lack of awareness of the Communist threat in the 
area.53 That day in the House of Commons, Prime Minister 
Churchill stated that the British Government "was not 
prepared to give any undertakings about United Kingdom 
military action in Indochina in advance of the results of 
Geneva." Churchill stated further that Britain had not 
entertained any new political or military commitments.54 
Churchill's statement disappointed both France and the 
United States because Rene Massigli (French Ambassador to 
the Court of St. James) and Radford were then in London in a 
last ditch effort to pressure the British into accepting 
some sort of united action.55
On April 28, France signed two treaties with Vietnam. 
Although never ratified, one treaty granted Vietnam total 
independence and the other defined the terms for Vietnamese 
association with the French Union.56 Such belated attempts
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at clarifying the relationship between Vietnam and the 
French Union came far too late to support the legitimacy of 
the French position.
In Washington, President Eisenhower, met with Under 
Secretary of State Smith, Presidential Assistant Robert 
Cutler, and Admiral Radford, who had just flown in from 
London. Eisenhower unequivocally stated his decision that 
the United States would not intervene militarily in 
Indochina by executive action. While he authorized American 
assistance to rebuild three airfields in Indochina, 
Eisenhower stressed that United States personnel should 
avoid undue risk of getting involved in combat operations.57 
At his weekly press conference that day, Eisenhower stated 
that the United States would not go to war unless war was 
declared by Congress.
On April 29, the National Security Council held its 
weekly meeting.58 Allen Dulles stated that based on a 
national intelligence estimate, the possible loss of Dien 
Bien Phu would be "serious but not catastrophic." Under 
Secretary of State Smith then summarized activity at the 
Geneva Conference where Secretary of State Dulles was 
continuing to negotiate. Smith read parts of a cable he had 
just received from the Secretary. Dulles had written that 
in view of the weakening world positions of France, Britain
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and Italy, the United States had an increased obligation "to 
take the leadership in what we think is the right course, 
having regard to long-range US interest which includes 
importance of Allies."59 Eisenhower, fearing the 
implication of Dulles' words, stated that the United States 
could not use force in Indochina, except "in concert with 
some other nations and at the request of the Associated 
States themselves."60
Radford then informed the NSC about the probable fall of 
Dien Bien Phu and lack of allied support to intervene. 
Radford related that the French were still dropping troops 
in the fortress which had dwindled to an area 1500 yards in 
diameter. He stated that a relief column of 3000 indigenous 
troops with French officers were 29 miles from Dien Bien 
Phu, but probably would not affect the outcome unless 
reinforced from the air. Harold Stassen, Director for 
Foreign Operations, stated that the United States should 
intervene unilaterally. Eisenhower replied that if the 
United States replaced the French in Indochina, many Asians 
would consider American colonialism to have supplanted 
French colonialism. Eisenhower felt that unilateral 
intervention in world trouble spots would be tantamount to 
policing the entire world, open up the United States to 
charges of imperialism, and undermine America's free world
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support. For Eisenhower "the concept of leadership implied 
associates."61 Stassen stated that now and in Indochina 
were the time and place to take a stand. Eisenhower, 
perhaps sarcastically, replied that if that were so we might 
as well declare war on the Soviet Union, instead of "playing 
the enemy's game" of getting involved in brushfire wars.62 
In his memoirs, Eisenhower made the same point stating that 
the United States might as well strike "at the head instead 
of the tail of the snake, Red China itself."63
Under Secretary of State Smith then suggested a 
compromise. Smith felt that if the United States conducted 
air strikes, regardless of the fate of Dien Bien Phu, the 
French might continue the fight, and the United States might 
be able to take a stronger role in training indigenous 
forces, and keep United States forces at home. Further, if 
allies in Asia came forth the United States could still 
follow the united action principle, despite British 
unwillingness to participate. Nixon agreed with Smith 
stating that doing nothing was tantamount to giving the 
British a veto over the United States freedom of action.64 
Smith felt that as preconditions to such strikes, the French 
should remove General Navarre and give assurances for the 
complete independence of the Associated States. Eisenhower 
agreed to ask Congress to consider the idea if the French
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agreed to continue the fight even if Dien Bien Phu fell.
But, Eisenhower also decided to await Dulles' report upon 
his return from Geneva. Eisenhower then ended the meeting 
stating that intervention with United States ground forces 
was a politically unfeasible option.65
The NSC Planning Board met later that day and decided 
that Eisenhower's desire that the Associated States invite 
United States participation was not a possibility. The 
Planning Board noted that the French Cabinet was unwilling 
to grant full independence to Vietnam until after Geneva, 
thereby vitiating another Congressional prerequisite. The 
Planning Board then discussed the possible use of nuclear 
weapons. Eisenhower and Nixon felt nuclear weapons would 
not help Dien Bien Phu, but decided to consider offering 
them to the French. The President stated that the United 
States would not use the atom bomb unilaterally. Eisenhower 
reiterated that a collective defense arrangement remained 
his key policy goal.66
On April 29, Dulles, still in Paris, sent a telegram to 
the State Department. Dulles stated that some Frenchmen 
were hopeful that Dien Bien Phu would not fall. Dulles 
related that while the French Parliament was in recess, 
diplomatic activity was difficult. Bidault operated with a 
free hand because no one in his cabinet felt sure enough to
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suggest alternative courses. Consequently, any agreement 
must be considered undependable because it would be 
temporary. Dulles felt that a defense of enclaves in the 
deltas backed up by united action could keep the French in 
the war. Dulles concluded, noting the general weakness of 
the allies.67
President Eisenhower spoke about Dien Bien Phu to 
Hagerty on April 29. Eisenhower said: "[t]he French have 
built up Dien Bien Phu as a symbol and are trying to hold it 
against impossible odds. They are losing seasoned troops 
and most of the green reinforcements they are trying to 
parachute in. Navarre wouldn't take our advice— why I don't 
know— on ways to relieve Dien Bien Phu." Eisenhower 
mentioned French planes were sitting ducks for Viet Minh 
artillery fire because the pilots radio directly in French, 
which the gunners understand.68
On April 30, 1954, a National Intelligence Estimate 
examined the immediate consequences within Indochina 
following the fall of Dien Bien Phu.. Noting that French 
morale would receive a severe blow, the Estimate indicated 
that in the absence of native desertions, the relative 
military positions of the French Union and Viet Minh forces 
would not change. Politically, however, the Estimate stated 
that, unless checked, the French Union-position would
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collapse by the end of 1954.69
At 8 a.m. in the morning of May 5, i954, Eisenhower, 
Dulles, MacArthur, and Cutler met at the White House.
Dulles, who had just returned from Geneva, discussed recent 
relations with allies and the development of regional 
groupings. Dulles blamed the British and the French for 
frustrating United States policies at Geneva. The British, 
Dulles felt, were influenced by possible reactions from 
India and other Commonwealth countries, as well as the fear 
of world war following United States intervention in 
Indochina. The British solution to the problem was to 
divide Vietnam, and create a regional defense arrangement to 
defend the non-Communist division, Laos, Cambodia, and the 
rest of Southeast Asia. Dulles felt the Communists would 
balk at such a division, and, instead, want the removal of 
all foreign troops followed by a general election. The 
consensus of those present was that Eden's current behavior 
was attributable to domestic British politics and his bid to 
succeed Churchill as Prime Minister.
The French, Dulles thought, had resisted American 
efforts to internationalize the war and were not forthcoming 
in granting independence to the Associated States. Dulles
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felt that France, whose requests for United States 
intervention never progressed beyond informal offers, feared 
that if the United States entered the struggle, then France 
would "not have a free hand to 'sell out and get out.'" 
Dulles concluded his views by stating that conditions did 
not favor overt United States intervention. Eisenhower
f
agreed and then stated that "our allies are willing to let 
us pull their chestnuts out of the fire, but will let us be 
called imperialists and colonialists." Dulles then agreed 
with the decision of the April 28 NSC meeting to organize a 
regional defense system with as many members as possible.70
On the afternoon of May 5, Secretary Dulles held a 
meeting for congressional leaders at the State Department.71 
Dulles had invited the leaders as well as some members of 
the foreign policy and armed services committees of both 
Houses of Congress. Dulles noted the two informal French 
requests of April 4 and April 22, to conduct Operation 
Vulture and his trips to London and Paris. Describing the 
French mood as urgent, Dulles opined that British policy led 
to the subsequent failure of united action. When Dulles 
remarked that Eden had reneged on the April 13 communique, 
several Congressmen voiced their disapproval. Dulles 
explained Britain's change of heart by pointing out the 
British dilemma. On the one hand, France and the United
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States had asked for aid. On the other hand, fear of the 
Hydrogen bomb and pressure by Nehru in India, led some 
Englishmen to shy away from support of the French in 
Indochina. But, Dulles felt, the British were finally 
swayed against intervention because they feared the risk of 
a Chinese invasion should the West intervene. Some 
Congressmen remarked that Britain was trying to create for 
herself the position as "middleman" between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.
Dulles then stated his view of the future of American 
policy with regard to Southeast Asia. He felt the United 
States should not intervene in Indochina until United States 
preconditions were met, namely referring to the acquisition 
of allies. Dulles noted that fulfillment was not likely 
given Britain's decision not to participate and domestic 
opposition in France to internationalization of the war 
effort. Dulles felt the United States should help construct 
a Southeast Asia defense arrangement as soon as possible. 
Such a community, with British support, could "insulate" the 
rest of Southeast Asia against the possible loss of Vietnam. 
Discounting a partition of Vietnam, Dulles thought a 
coalition government based on general elections would follow 
the withdrawal of all foreign troops. For Dulles, such an 
eventuality "would probably result in the loss of Vietnam to
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the Communists."72 Dulles concluded that the United States 
should not "write off" the British and French as allies, 
because diversity of opinion was a welcome disadvantage of a 
democratic system. Although some members of Congress 
expressed concern over Britain's lack of support, most 
members supported the Eisenhower administration's handling 
of the situation.73
That day in Indochina, two United States civilians were 
killed at Dien Bien Phu. Captain James B. "Earthquake 
McGoon" McGovern, who was so big his C-119 had a specially 
built pilot's chair, and his co-pilot, Wallace Buford were 
flying supplies to the beleaguered French garrison.
McGovern was flying his forty-fifth mission over Dien Bien 
Phu when his plane was shot down by Communist anti-aircraft 
fire.74 McGovern and Buford were part of a squadron of CAT 
pilots flying United States Air Force C-119 transports 
camouflaged by gray paint.75 CAT pilots had flown C-119. 
"Flying Boxcars" to airlift supplies to the French as early 
as March 19, the sixth day of the siege.76 There were 
twenty-nine C-119's flying supply operations, and twenty- 
four had American crews. According to Bernard Fall,
"[o]fficially, the crews were all 'civilian' but in actual 
fact some American military pilots had been quietly detached 
to CAT to familiarize themselves with the area in case of
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American air intervention on behalf of the French."77
At a meeting in the President's office at 9:30 a.m., in 
the morning of May 7, Robert Cutler told Eisenhower that 
some members of the NSC Planning Board were against the 
proposal Bidault gave to the French Cabinet of a cease-fire 
in Indochina.78 These members— principally military 
members— felt that a cease-fire would erode the French and 
Vietnamese will to fight, causing fence-sitters to jump to 
the Viet Minh side and that "the Communists would evade 
covertly cease-fire controls." These members also felt the 
United States should intervene in Indochina following 
Congressional approval, if France agreed to certain 
conditions. These included a grant of genuine freedom to 
the Associated States; an increased share for the United 
States in military planning including the training of 
indigenous troops; a French guarantee to stay in the fight 
even though the United States would not intervene with 
ground forces; and for France to accept possible United 
Nations intervention.79
Cutler then told Eisenhower what opposing members of the 
Planning Board had indicated. These members felt that were 
the United States to follow the Board's plan it would do so 
without international backing as desired by Congress. They 
also felt that French internal politics did not favor United
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States entry. They noted that no French government of the 
present or foreseeable future was competent to make 
decisions that a subsequent government might abrogate, and 
that France had not indicated a present intention to 
internationalize the war. They were also afraid that in the 
eyes of the world, the United States would be "bailing out 
colonial France." Finally, they felt that the United States 
could not be international trouble-shooters and attempt to 
save every situation. Eisenhower remarked that any proposal 
of American intervention, like that presented by Harold 
Stassen at the April 29 NSC meeting, was not thoroughly 
thought out. In instructions to Dulles, who was the third 
member of the meeting and who was to meet Ambassador Bonnet 
that afternoon, Eisenhower remained firm to the three 
prerequisites that he had felt essential since the 
beginning. Eisenhower would not intervene alone, he 
required that there be some kind of invitation by the 
indigenous peoples, and he required that there be some kind 
of collective action.80 Congressional approval was not a 
prerequisite to Eisenhower's decision, only to actual 
approval.
At 5:30 p.m., on May 7, 1954, the fortress outpost at 
Dien Bien Phu fell to overwhelming Communist forces. Of 
16,544 defenders, 7,000 were taken prisoner. 40 percent of
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them were wounded.81 Under the battlefield truce, 885 
wounded soldiers, including 27 unwounded medical personnel, 
were handed over to the French. The remaining French forces 
faced a 500 mile march to Viet Minh prison camps. While 78 
prisoners successfully escaped during the march, many more 
died of their wounds. Among those who survived were 
Genevieve de Galarde-Terraube— a French.nurse whose plane 
was shot down on March 28, the last day the airstrip was 
serviceable— and Dr. Grauwin, who continued to care for the 
wounded while in captivity.82 Despite Grauwin's and 
Galarde's efforts, many wounded died during a brutal 
captivity. Only 3000 survivors eventually were freed in 
August as a result of the July 20 accord worked out in 
Geneva. Vietnamese casualties numbered close to 23,000, 
nearly 8, 000 of these had died.83
On May 7, President Eisenhower sent a message to French 
President Rene Coty, expressing respect for the gallant 
defenders at Dien Bien Phu. Eisenhower stated that their 
sacrifice "will forever stand as a symbol of the free 
world's determination to resist dictatorial aggression and 
to sustain its right to self-determination and its 
dedication to the dignity of the human being."84 Eisenhower 
sent a similar message to Bao Dai.85
That evening, in the United States, Secretary of State
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Dulles gave a nation-wide radio and television address. 
Previously, President Eisenhower had gone over the draft of 
Dulles speech and made "quite a few suggestions and changes 
in the text."86 Dulles said: "[a]n epic battle has ended.
But great causes have, before now, been won out of lost 
battles."87 Dulles related his fear that a cease-fire could 
lead to a Communist takeover of all of Indochina. But he 
noted that if hostilities continue "the need will be even 
more urgent to create the conditions for united action in 
defense of the area."88 Dulles then stated that "only the 
Congress can declare war," and that President Eisenhower 
would not seek Congressional support absent allied 
participation. The President himself had urged Dulles to 
include the necessity of "Congressional authority."89
Dulles concluded his address by placing the issue of 
Communist aggression in a larger perspective. Ascribing 
unity of purpose to the Communists, Dulles noted, "[glreat 
despotic powers have always known that they could impose 
their will and gain their conquests if the free nations 
stand apart and none helps the other."90 But, if free 
nations stand together, Dulles noted, the despots can be 
stopped. Dulles pointed to NATO which prevented further 
successful Soviet aggression in Europe. Dulles concluded by 
noting that the United States was "the first colony" in
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"modern history to win independence for itself," and that 
the United States must be in harmony with peoples of the 
world attempting to prevent Soviet Communism from co-opting 
their independence. If the United States is successful, 
Dulles stated, "we shall be in harmony with those moral 
forces which ultimately prevail."91
On May 8, the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference 
began in the former council chamber of the League of 
Nations. Nine powers were in Switzerland to take part in 
the Indochina phase of the conference. They were: the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam,
France, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, 
China, Cambodia and Laos. During the ensuing weeks, 
diplomatic activity at Geneva would reflect the powers 
attempts to integrate the events of the previous weeks into 
the Cold War framework. The position of the United States 
at the conference was ambiguous. Dulles, who turned his 
back on Chou En-Lai's proffered hand, had left for 
Washington on May 4, leaving Walter Bedell Smith in charge 
of the American delegation. The Chinese, who had heavily 
supplied the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, let the French talk 
to the Viet Minh only through Chinese intermediaries.92 For 
their part, the French regarded Churchill as a "1954 version 
of Chamberlain at Munich."93
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While the talks dragged on, the French National Assembly 
elected Pierre Mendes-France Premier on June 17, 1954. 
Mendes-France, a member of the Radical Socialist Party, 
promised to resign if peace in Indochina was not arranged by 
July 20. On the evening of July 20, the clocks in the 
meeting hall mysteriously stopped at midnight while last 
minute details concerning Cambodian objections were worked 
out. In the early hours of July 21, an agreement was 
signed. The truce agreement had three main parts: (1) it
created a temporary division at the 17th parallel; (2) it 
allowed 300 days for the people of Vietnam to move to their 
preferred side of the parallel (repatriation); and (3) it 
established an International Control Commission, with Indian 
(as Chair), Canadian, and Polish representatives, to 
supervise elections scheduled for July, 1956. In the final 
analysis, one-half of Vietnam and two provinces of Laos were 
placed under Communist control by the agreement. The French 
had lost 92,000 dead and 161,000 wounded while the Viet Minh 
lost up to 200,000 dead. Despite a strong Army still in 
Vietnam, the French decided to vacate her Asian colonies. 
North Africa would feel the repercussions.
After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, United States policy 
makers reappraised the domino theory. The Pentagon Papers, 
noting that the domino theory "had been at the center of
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United.States policy in Southeast Asia since the late 
1940s," stated the theory was no longer appropriate.94 
Indeed, at a press conference on May 11, Secretary of State 
Dulles observed that the loss of Indochina might not 
inexorably lead to the loss of Southeast Asia. The loss of 
these States, the Secretary noted, while important, did not 
create a hopeless situation. Foilowing.J^eneva, the concept 
of "united action" was transformed from a short-term 
military response to a long-range collective defense 
alliance. As the Pentagon Papers noted the "loss of Tonkin 
was no longer seen as leading necessarily to a Communist 
take-over of other territory between China and the American 
Shore."95 The creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), on September 8, 1954, was designed to 
insulate the loss of "one such domino."96
In the final analysis, sovereignty for Vietnam 
translated into the establishment of a pro-Western 
government, capable of surviving on its own, yet within the 
American sphere of influence. Throughout 1954, United 
States policy makers believed that the creation of such a 
government was best achieved if that government were 
responsive to the aspirations of its people.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion: The Quiet Diplomacy
President Eisenhower's handling of foreign policy fits 
the description: "the Quiet Diplomacy." Eisenhower 
possessed a strong degree of control over foreign policy.
In reaching foreign policy decisions, Eisenhower judiciously 
used the policy making apparatus so that each component was 
used to its best advantage. Eisenhower set-up a division of 
labor where he allowed all of his advisors to express their 
point of view. According to that division of labor, John 
Foster Dulles was the administration "point man" or "tough 
guy." Dulles was allowed to publicize administration 
policies and he was given a free hand to achieve those 
policies diplomatically. Eisenhower reserved for himself 
the role of the calming influence. If Dulles exceeded his 
bounds or his efforts created unfavorable domestic or world 
opinion, Eisenhower was ready to step in and add an air of 
even-handed sobriety. If Dulles' tactics succeeded, then so
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much the better. For Eisenhower, leadership and the quest 
to claim credit for successful policy were anti-thetical.
As Eisenhower preferred results to publicity, he probably 
preferred successful policies to an adoring posterity.
In the policy crisis occasioned by the battle at Dien 
Bien Phu the Eisenhower Administration considered military 
intervention in Indochina. President Eisenhower had drawn 
three requirements which had to be met before he would 
authorize intervention: "[t]he first requirement was a legal 
right under international law; second, was a favorable 
climate of Free World opinion; and third, favorable action 
by Congress."1 Fulfillment of the first requirement would 
lay the foundation for the second. If Eisenhower had 
presented a request to intervene in Indochina given 
fulfillment of these requirements, Congress most likely 
would have granted the request. Congressional endorsement 
was not a primary requisite for United States intervention 
in Indochina. Favorable action by Congress would merely 
give the imprimatur to intervention domestically, as 
favorable world opinion would internationally. The first 
hurdle for either was a legal right under international law. 
This demanded a sovereign legal status for the Associated 
States. On this fundamental issue United States policy and 
French policy differed.
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To fulfill the requirement of a legal right under 
international law, Eisenhower demanded overt requests for 
United States intervention from the French and from the 
Associated States. If the legitimate sovereign governments 
that ruled the territory in which the United States wished 
to intervene made the requests, then principles of 
international law made the intervention "legal." French 
approval was not enough for Eisenhower, for intervention so 
based would open up the United States to the charge of 
supporting colonialism. The Vietnamese themselves must 
invite United States intervention.
Numerous times during the Dien Bien Phu crisis the 
Eisenhower administration demanded that Vietnamese 
invitation precede American intervention. Eisenhower stated 
at the National Security Council meeting of March 25, 1954, 
that the United States would not intervene in Indochina 
"unless the Vietnamese welcomed our intervention."2 Six 
weeks later on May 7, Eisenhower repeated that he would not 
intervene alone, for he required that there be some kind of 
invitation by the indigenous peoples.3
Legally valid intervention, however, still had to avoid 
the risk of marking the United States with the taint of 
colonialism. In a letter to General Alfred M. Greunther 
(NATO'Supreme Commander) President Eisenhower stated that no
Western nation could use military force in Asia without the 
consent of the local population. "To contemplate anything 
else is to lay ourselves open to the charge of imperialism 
and colonialism— at the very least— of objectionable 
paternalism."4 Eisenhower's concern was not just that local 
invitation would pass international law muster, but also the 
practical matter that force only succeeds where the hearts 
and minds of the local inhabitants are in harmony with the 
proposed intervention. To this end the administration tried 
to persuade the French to modify their colonial aspirations. 
On March 26, 1953, Eisenhower warned French Prime Minister 
Rene Mayer that because Americans saw the war in Indochina 
as a colonial war, they would not support the French if they 
felt the French were delaying action on the EDC in order to 
secure that support. 5 Additionally, while attempting to 
enlist French support for united action, Dulles stated that 
Eisenhower would go to Congress for war powers if the French 
publicly stated their goal was to assure independence for 
Indochina and not a veiled endeavor to perpetuate 
colonialism.6 Unblemished by the taint of colonialism the 
United States could appear as champions of independence, 
thereby raising intervention to a high moral plane. In a 
radio and television address on May 7, 1954, Dulles stated 
that if the United States helped other nations secure their
253
independence, then "we shall be in harmony with those moral 
forces which ultimately prevail."7
Unsullied, legitimate intervention would lay the 
foundation for favorable world opinion, which was a sine qua 
non of Eisenhower's Presidency. Eisenhower's sense of 
American idealism required that America defend against 
aggression rather than become the aggressor. Support for 
independence of the Associated States would mark the United 
States as a moral leader and true champion of liberty. In 
terms of the East-West struggle, subject peoples and world 
opinion generally would look to the United States for advise 
and support. Congressional views were consonant with 
Eisenhower's belief. Senator Goldwater, for example, 
stressed that the United States should help the people of 
the Associated States meet their legitimate aspirations as a 
people.8 Senator Smith in his report on the Far East 
likewise intoned: "[t]here can be no more imperialism, no 
more colonialism, no more totalitarian dictatorships."9 
Unity of anti-colonial beliefs in the United States could 
show the world that Americans were sincere in their 
professed desires to meet the aspirations of subject 
peoples.
The Eisenhower administration's support of Indochinese 
independence divides into three separate parts. First, in
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order to conform with American idealism and to induce a 
favorable world opinion, United States policy makers 
genuinely believed that attainment of independence by 
colonial peoples served the interests of humanity. Second, 
armed with this belief, Americans put pressure on a 
recalcitrant France to grant independence to the people of 
the Associated States. Last, American pressure led France 
to grant small incremental grants of autonomy which 
ultimately proved inadequate.
Numerous Americans genuinely held the belief that France 
should grant independence to the people of the Associated 
States. On separate occasions Senators Goldwater, Kennedy, 
Mansfield, and Smith, and Congressman Judd all stated that 
independence was the fundamental solution to the problems in 
Indochina. Goldwater, for example, wanted to pressure 
France into setting a target date for the establishment of 
the complete independence of the Associated States, and Judd 
felt that independence would win over enough attentistes to 
correct the "real problem" of Bao-Dai's weak political 
base.10 In addition, reports from Indochina supported a 
policy geared to granting the Associated States 
independence. As far back as August 8, 1950, State 
Department official John F. Melby had cabled Washington 
recommending that France grant independence to the
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Vietnamese as they "will have it regardless of anything 
else. n11
President Eisenhower was an enthusiastic supporter of 
inducing France to grant independence to the Associated 
States. At the National Security Council meeting of May 6, 
1953, Eisenhower stated "that if France really desired to 
cut the best figure before the world, the obvious course to 
pursue was first to defeat the Viet Minh forces and then 
magnanimously to offer independence to the Associated 
States."12 At the January 8, 1954, NSC meeting, Eisenhower 
stated "if the French had been smart they would long since 
have offered the Associated States independence on the 
latters' own terms."13 As he subsequently stated at his 
April 7, 1954, news conference, "[n]o outside country can 
come in and be really helpful unless it is doing something 
that the local people want....the aspirations of those 
people must be met, otherwise there is in the long run no 
final answer to the problem."14
Armed with this belief, American policy makers put 
pressure on France to grant independence to the Associated 
States. On September 29, 1953, French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Georges Bidault, accepted National Security Council 
conditions of additional United States aid. Namely, Bidault 
stated that France was committed to "perfecting" the
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independence of the Associated States.15 But a recalcitrant 
France repeatedly refused to grant the needed reforms and 
American pressure continued. On March 23, 1954, Dulles told 
General Ely that overt American participation in the 
Indochinese war would incur American pressure for 
independence of the Associated States.16 The members of the 
National Security Council meeting of April 6, 1954, agreed 
that the United States should continue to press the French 
to grant independence.17 Additionally, Dulles felt 
constrained to resume direct pressure on Bidault on April 
14, 1954, and on Laniel on April 24, 1954.18
American pressure may have led France to grant small 
incremental measures of limited autonomy to the Associated 
States, but these measures ultimately proved inadequate.
The French leadership did not want to grant independence 
for, as a NIE of June 4, 1953, stated, they feared "the 
French National Assembly would then refuse to support a war 
in a 'lost' portion of the French Union."19 For France the 
French Union was defined as "an association of independent 
and sovereign peoples" where "all the associates place in 
common their resources in order to guarantee the defense of 
the Union as a whole."20 But, unlike the British 
Commonwealth system, the French Union gave France a dominant 
role, as the French constitution did not provide for the
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independence of overseas territories.21 Indeed, the French 
Union was a quasi-federal structure, in which Paris governed 
the Union as Rome governed the Catholic Church.22 Such 
dominance of one nation over another negated the very 
principle of sovereignty.
The French failed to clarify the legal relationship 
between herself and the Associated States to the 
satisfaction of the Associated States. Ever since March 6, 
194 6, when the French agreed to recognize the DRV as a "free 
state" within the French Union, the precise definition of 
that status remained cloudy. In an attempt to clarify that 
concept at Fontainbleau in the summer of 194 6, French action 
signaled that sovereignty was not part of the French concept 
of "free state." The talks at Fontainbleau showed the 
essential difference between the two sides:
[T]he French regarding [sic] the problem of the 
status of Vietnam essentially as one of internal 
constitutional law, and the Vietnamese seeing 
[sic] it in terms of international law; for the 
former it was a question of "autonomy within the 
French bloc", whereas for the latter it was a 
question of "independence complemented with 
association with France."23
The French maintained their perspective throughout the 
entire Dien Bien Phu crisis. When Dulles went to Paris to 
enlist French support in getting Britain to join united 
action, the French objected to Dulles' accusations that the
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French position on sovereignty for the Associated States 
appeared as but a disguise to perpetuate French control of 
Indochina. Even though the hands of the French leadership 
were tied by the French Constitution, they tried to 
legitimize their position by signing two treaties on April 
28, 1954, with the Vietnamese.24 The treaties granted 
Vietnam total independence and defined the terms for 
Vietnamese association with the French Union. Although 
never ratified, the treaties highlighted the fact that small 
incremental grants of autonomy failed to satiate the 
appetite for independence of the peoples of the Associated 
States ,25
While the French constitution may have been a good 
reason for the ultimate failure of the French to create 
under the umbrella of the French Union a relationship 
suitable to the Indochinese, a better reason was French 
national pride. Admiral Thierry D'Argenlieu, the French 
High Commissioner for Indochina during the Fontainbleau 
conference, caused the Indochinese delegates (save Ho) to 
walk out of the conference when he declared Cochin China a 
"free state." D'Argenlieu wanted to wage a military 
struggle with Ho instead of attempting to negotiate a 
settlement. After the military strategy failed, it was 
D'Argenlieu who pushed for the acceptance of the Bao Dai
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solution. Although a man's actions may not admit of simple 
deciphering, R. E. M. Irving posits that D'Argenlieu, who 
was appointed by DeGualle, was motivated by a desire to 
avenge France's humiliation suffered during World War II.26 
Irving states that a feeling of humiliation following the 
war led many Frenchmen to attempt to reassert France as a 
world power.27 Indeed, Irving states that avenging lost 
pride was the primary political motivating factor of the 
MRP, the Christian Democratic Party which dominated French 
politics for the first decade after the war. "For the MRP, 
with their Resistance background, the motive of national 
prestige was probably more important than any other single 
factor in their Indochina policy."28
Other sources confirm that wounded pride motivated a 
gradual, incremental French policy. On March 11, 1951, 
Minister Heath sent a telegram to Secretary of State 
Acheson. Heath stated that he had talked with the French 
Commanding General de Lattre who had launched into an 
analysis of the state of French spirit as a result of the 
last war and French economic losses and inferiority. De 
Lattre believed that the United States "must reckon with the 
inferiority complex and feeling of the humiliation in the 
French Government and among the French people." De Lattre 
mentioned there existed "forces in the US that were pushing
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American policy in IC to actions injurious to French 
prestige."29 At the end of December, 1953, David Bruce, 
United States Ambassador in Paris, cabled Washington echoing 
Heath's comments. Bruce stated that one reason why the 
French did not withdraw from Indochina at that time was 
"humiliation of national pride and loss of prestige abroad," 
including adverse repercussion in North Africa.30
French pride and American idealism were bound to come 
into conflict. The Blum controversy bears witness to the 
fact that Americans were not restricted by certain policies 
that shackled the French. Blum wanted "to foster indigenous 
resistance to Communism" by having France grant demands for 
political autonomy. The French, however, were constrained 
by their definition of the French Union.31 Blum was not 
alone. Other Americans in Indochina also were urging the 
French to soften the harshness of French colonial policies. 
Naturally, the French in Indochina rebelled. When he 
visited Washington in September 1951, de Lattre complained 
that problems were "caused by the fact that a number of 
young men with a 'missionary zeal' were dispensing economic 
aid with the result that there was a feeling on the part of 
some that they were using this aid to extend American 
influence."32 When General Ely visited Washington in late 
March 1954, he complained that "Americans acted as if the
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United States sought to control and operate everything of 
importance.1,33
Even though American idealism could cause friction 
between allies, Eisenhower believed that a policy imbued 
with American traditions and values would bear fruit in 
creating a favorable world opinion. Eisenhower wanted to 
add "real moral standing to a venture" which otherwise might 
appear as overt imperial aggression. While allies were 
important in themselves, Eisenhower felt a particular need 
for allies in his conception of united, action. United 
action could supply the moral element, justifying 
intervention in the eyes of the world, and thereby create 
favorable world opinion.
In addition to a legal right under international law, 
and a favorable climate of Free World opinion, Eisenhower 
also wanted favorable action from Congress before he made 
any decision to intervene in Indochina. President 
Eisenhower had enormous respect for the role of Congress in 
foreign policy decision-making. Not only was he aware of 
Congress' role in appropriating funds and approving foreign 
aid commitments, but also Eisenhower respected the Congress' 
position in the Constitutional balance of power. At the 
National Security Council of September 9, 1953, for example, 
Eisenhower stated that with respect to aiding the French in
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Indochina he wanted prior Congressional consultation so as 
to prevent handing them a fait accompli. This concern led 
Eisenhower on February 3, 1954, to tell Walter Bedell Smith 
to consult with Congressional leaders before sending 
technicians to Indochina. The "deal" worked out with 
Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Ma) is an example of 
Eisenhower's ability to establish congenial work 
relationships with members of Congress.
Although Eisenhower developed a close working 
arrangement with members of Congress, he may have felt 
constrained to pursue such a course because of 
constitutional limitations on his use of power. At a press 
conference on March 11, Eisenhower stated "...there is going 
to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result 
of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress 
to declare it."34 Eisenhower repeated this acknowledgment 
of Congress' role when he stated at the National Security 
Council meeting of March 25, "that the Congress would have 
to be in on any move by the United States to intervene in 
Indochina. It was simply academic to imagine otherwise."35 
Whether Eisenhower's view reflected mere adherence to duty 
and responsible use of Presidential authority, or he 
actually believed in the merits of Congressional 
participation, likewise is academic. On April 3, to prevent
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presenting Congress with a fait accompli, as Truman had done 
with respect to hostilities in Korea, Eisenhower called 
eight Members of Congress to a briefing session on possible 
Indochina activity.
At the meeting of April 3, Dulles asked for "a joint 
resolution from Congress to permit the President to use air 
and naval power in Indo-China."36 This request was a 
leading question for Dulles had a draft resolution that had 
been worked out the previous afternoon in his hip-pocket. 
Although not presented, the resolution was designed to 
delineate executive and legislative authority over the 
President's possible use of force in Indochina. Such 
delineation was important to Eisenhower. On April 19, 
Eisenhower and Dulles met to discuss a Department of Justice 
report also detailing the President's war-making powers. 
Perhaps by this juncture certain administration officials 
felt that Congressional approval of military power was more 
of a constraint than a necessity.
Despite the Constitutional requirement of Congressional 
approval, Dulles used said approval as a political football 
in order to garner allied support for United States 
intervention. On April 14, Dulles told Bidault that 
Eisenhower was prepared to go to Congress for powers to 
intervene in Indochina provided Bidault help create a "real"
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sense of united action by getting Britain to join, and that 
the French disavow attempts to perpetuate colonial rule in 
Indochina.37 On April 23, Dulles told Eden that if Britain 
supported Operation Vulture, Eisenhower was prepared to ask 
Congress for authority to intervene.38 Dulles's tactics 
worked to a limited extent. On April 25, the French 
Ambassador in London, Rene Massigli, stated on behalf of his 
government, that if the British supported United States 
intervention in Indochina, President Eisenhower could get 
the required support from Congress.39 Eden and Churchill, 
however, were unmoved by Dulles' tactics. To Eden, "Sir 
Winston summed up the position by saying that what we were 
being asked to do was to assist in misleading Congress into 
approving a military operation, which would in itself be 
ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of 
a major war."40 Churchill's analysis reflects his 
understanding that President Eisenhower felt allied support 
a necessary prerequisite to asking for Congressional 
approval.
Dulles wittingly used a domestic constitutional 
restraint to feign unity of purpose at home and thereby gain 
foreign support for a military venture. On April 16, Vice- 
President Nixon unwittingly evoked the same domestic 
constraint. In a response to a hypothetical question
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concerning United States action should France withdraw from 
Indochina Nixon stated that United States troops might fill 
the void. Nixon's off-the-record remark was printed in the 
New York Times and was met with Congressional and foreign 
concern as Nixon failed to mention the necessities of prior 
Congressional and allied support.41 Taken as a trial 
balloon for administration policy, their concern was well- 
founded.
The witting and unwitting tactics of those 
administration officials seeking intervention created a 
situation, as Gaddis has written, to "confuse the public, 
alarm allies, and bewilder the adversaries."42 To correct 
any possible misunderstandings held by the public, allies or 
adversaries, President Eisenhower stated at his weekly press 
conference on April 28, that the United States would not go 
to war unless declared by Congress.43 Additionally, in a 
radio and television address on May 7, Dulles stated that 
"only the Congress can declare war," and that President 
Eisenhower would not seek Congressional support absent 
allied participation. The President himself had read the 
text of Dulles' address and he urged Dulles to include the 
necessity of "Congressional authority."44
Even though Eisenhower occasionally had to clarify 
United States policy as a result of his subordinates
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excesses, he was able to make judicious and effective use of 
his subordinates. Eisenhower was not only an active 
participant at policy committee meetings, but he conducted 
those meetings so that all points of views were considered 
equally. For example, at the National Security Council 
meeting of April 29, 1954, Harold Stassen freely expressed 
his view that the United States should intervene 
unilaterally in Indochina. Eisenhower responded that such a 
move would open up the United States to charges of 
imperialism, thereby undermining America's free world 
support. Stassen persisted, stating that now and in 
Indochina were the time and place to take a stand. Once 
again, Eisenhower made known his contrary viewpoint.45 Nine 
days later, on May 7, at a meeting with General Cutler, 
Eisenhower expressed his view that positions such as the one 
expressed by Stassen were not thoroughly thought out.46 
This example reveals that Eisenhower's advisors clearly felt 
comfortable enough to express points of view directly 
opposed to those of the President, and that they felt free 
to repeat those views even as Eisenhower disagreed. In this 
particular matter, Eisenhower listened to a firmly held view 
by one of his advisors, let that view float for any other 
advisor to support it, and followed a course of action 
closer to his own firmly held beliefs.
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An analysis of two National Security Council meetings 
which sandwiched the Dien Bien Phu crisis serve to highlight 
Eisenhower's leadership ability with respect to the 
effective use of advisors. The first meeting occurred on 
January 8, 1954. Eisenhower wondered why France did not 
allow the Associated States to bring their case before the 
U.N., to which John Foster Dulles answered that France 
feared the psychological effect of airing the independence 
issue of one part of the French Union upon other parts of 
the Union. After disparaging French motives, Eisenhower 
plainly stated his view "with great force" that he refused 
to put ground troops in Asia. Eisenhower felt that to do so 
would transfer Vietnamese hatred of the French to hatred of 
the United States. Eisenhower then stated "with vehemence" 
that he was bitterly opposed to sending troops to Indochina. 
The President concluded by giving his military opinion that 
"[t]his war in Indochina would absorb our troops by 
divisions! "47
Even though the President spoke vehemently and with 
great force, further debate ensued. Nixon offered his 
doubts on the ability to build a strong Vietnamese National 
Army, to which Eisenhower stated his desire to have the 
French allow United States training of Vietnamese troops.
At this point, Admiral Radford suggested sending an air
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craft carrier to help defend against a possible attack at 
Dien Bien Phu. George Humphrey announced his disagreement 
with that idea for he felt that a possible loss at Dien Bien 
Phu would not be costly enough to engage United States 
forces. Eisenhower thereupon followed with a middle 
position of sending United States military equipment. To 
this proposal Radford agreed, but Humphrey, with Cutler's 
concurrence, stated that such a commitment would lead to 
greater commitments. Undaunted, Radford proposed a one day 
air strike. While he agreed that American CIA pilots might 
fly such a strike, Eisenhower closed the meeting charging 
the CIA and Defense Department with the task of presenting 
reports to the NSC on how best the United States could help 
assure the success of the Navarre Plan.48
The second National Security Council meeting which shows 
President Eisenhower's effective use of advisors occurred on 
April 29, 1954. Walter Bedell Smith reported on 
negotiations then under way at Geneva where Secretary of 
State Dulles reported that the United States had an 
obligation to boldly assume the leadership of the free 
world. Eisenhower, fearing Dulles' implication, stated that 
the United States would not use force in Indochina except 
"in concert with some other nations and at the request of 
the Associated States themselves."49 Even though Eisenhower
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stated his views clearly, the NSC debated a slew of policy 
options.
After Radford ,informed the NSC of French efforts to save 
the garrison at Dien Bien Phu, Stassen and Eisenhower 
debated unilateral intervention in Indochina. Understanding 
that policy options ranged the gamut from world war to naked 
appeasement, Smith suggested air strikes not to rescue the 
garrison but to encourage France to continue fighting. By 
this stratagem, Smith felt France might allow the United 
States a greater share in the training of indigenous forces 
and keep American troops at home. Smith believed his idea 
had the further advantage of eliciting the support of Asian 
allies, thereby breathing life into the united action 
principle, despite British unwillingness to participate. 
Nixon agreed with Smith stating that doing nothing was 
tantamount to giving the British a veto over United States 
freedom of action.50 Eisenhower agreed to present the idea 
to Congress, but wished to withhold judgment until Secretary 
of State Dulles reported from Geneva. Nonetheless, 
Eisenhower repeated his view that intervention with United 
States ground forces was a politically unfeasible option.51
The National Security Council meetings of January 8 and 
April 2 9 reveal that President Eisenhower encouraged his
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advisors to consider a wide range of policy options. Even 
though Eisenhower disagreed with some viewpoints, he 
nevertheless allowed each member to express their opinions. 
Collectively, the Council analyzed the implications of 
following certain options and avoided choosing the 
President's positions. Alternatives were discussed and, as 
could be expected, a middle position was found. As 
important a source as National Security Council meetings 
were to Eisenhower for policy advice, the President relied 
on other agencies as well. Specifically, on January 16, 
1954, Eisenhower created an ad hoc committee under the 
direction of Walter Bedell Smith to study the Indochina 
problem.
Called the Special Committee on Indochina, the Smith 
Committee was a self-contained independent think-tank 
personally accountable to Eisenhower.52 At the first 
meeting of this Committee, Eisenhower requested that "an 
area plan" be drawn up to discuss courses of action should 
Indochina fall.53 The implication was that "part of 
Indochina might be lost without losing the rest of Southeast 
Asia."54 The Smith Committee also set-up a Committee of its 
own called the Working Group headed by General G.B. Erskine.
During the course of the Dien Bien Phu crisis the Smith
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Committee and the Working Group discussed various policy 
alternatives. On January 29, the Committee decided to 
recommend to Eisenhower that the United States send 200 and 
not 400 technicians to Indochina.55 On March 11, Smith 
submitted for Eisenhower's perusal, a report written by the 
Working Group which stated that conditions in Indochina were 
favorable to a Communist defeat but that success was 
dependent on French willingness to inspire and utilize the 
native potential and instill a sense of fighting for 
freedom. Based on this analysis, the report recommended 
against direct United States intervention.56 Again, on 
March 17, the Erskine Group sent another report to 
Eisenhower which stated that active involvement in Indochina 
should await developments at Geneva, in light of the 
situation at Dien Bien Phu.57 On April 2, the Smith 
Committee issued a report which favored a mutual defense 
system for Southeast Asia. The Committee felt that "the 
major European powers with interests in the Pacific," should 
subscribe and underwrite such a "regional and Asian mutual 
defense arrangement."58 On April 5, the Committee issued 
another report which urged attempts to keep France in the 
war, and recommended against a negotiated settlement if the 
French did not support the United States. In that event, 
the report recommended direct overtures to the Associated
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States and a variety of other measures to take over the 
defense of Indochina.59
The range of alternatives discussed by the Smith 
Committee and Working Group reveals a steadfast purpose to 
arrive at the most efficacious policy. Significantly, the 
recommendations these committees presented accurately 
reflected administration policy at the time of presentation.
Operation Vulture was one policy alternative debated by 
Eisenhower's advisors. Admiral Radford first mentioned the 
possible use of air power at Dien Bien Phu at the January 8 
NSC meeting. At that time Radford suggested sending an 
aircraft carrier to Indochina to help defend the garrison. 
Radford believed that United States air power could destroy 
Viet Minh anti-aircraft guns which the French felt incapable 
of destroying on their own. Radford pressed his point. He 
recommended a one day air strike saying: "[w]e were already 
in this thing in such a big way that it seemed foolish not 
to make the one small extra move which might be essential to 
success.1,60
Radford met opposition at the meeting from Humphrey and 
Cutler who feared greater commitments following the use of 
air power. Their fears were reiterated several times during 
the next few months. General Ridgway wrote that his fears 
of a larger entanglement dissuaded Eisenhower from putting
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Vulture into action.61 The better view on that score, is 
that Ridgway's opposition merely reinforced Eisenhower's 
personal reluctance to employ air strikes over Dien Bien 
Phu. Nonetheless, Eisenhower proceeded to lay the proper 
groundwork should Operation Vulture ultimately prove viable. 
On April 1, he informed the chairman and editor-in-chief of 
the Scripps Howard Newspapers that the United States might 
have to send air planes from two carriers lying off the 
Indochina coast to bomb the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu.62 
Eisenhower laid the military groundwork as evidenced by 
General Caldara's dry-runs over the Dien Bien Phu valley on 
the night of April 4 and his follow-up visit to Indochina on 
April 2 6.63
Pursuit of Operation Vulture had become a side issue in 
the United States intervention decision. The April 3 
meeting at which certain members of Congress told the 
Eisenhower administration to shop for allies did not change 
the administration's outlook. According to Thruston Morton, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, 
the meeting did not change United States policy because 
Eisenhower was against intervention from the beginning.64 
Regardless of the accuracy of Morton's reasoning, the April 
3 meeting did not change administration policy for the three 
preconditions enunciated by the Congressional members were
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preconditions Eisenhower already had established for 
himself. As noted above, Eisenhower concurred with the 
preconditions that France continue in the war, and pledge to 
accelerate independence for the Associated States.
Eisenhower also believed in the need for allied support 
before engaging United States military effort in Indochina.
Dulles' address in which he mentioned "massive 
retaliatory power," on January 12, 1954, stressed a need for 
"allies and collective security."65 Allies provided the 
conventional force component of his strategy. Indeed, every 
developer of the containment doctrine recognized that allies 
were needed to thwart Communism.' Eisenhower, like Kennan, 
saw the East-West contest as essentially a political contest 
and in that context he considered allies necessary to 
support a favorable world public opinion which would 
accelerate the Soviets decline. The peoples of the world 
would see the fruits of freedom offered by the United States 
in juxtaposition to the shackles offered by the Soviet 
Union.
Even though Eisenhower saw a need for allies in the 
strategic sense, his administration pursued allies as an end 
in itself in the tactical sense during the crisis engendered 
by the battle at Dien Bien Phu. On March 12, 1954, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a Memorandum to Secretary of
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Defense Wilson in which they considered the implications of 
a French defeat in Indochina. The JCS believed that the 
United States should prevent the loss of Indochina to 
Communists either "in concert with the French; or in the 
event the French elect to withdraw, in concert with other 
allies or, if necessary, unilaterally."66 The first two 
choices were in concert with allies;.while the latter was 
explicitly ruled out by the President.
Indeed, the concept of defeating Communism in Indochina 
in concert with allies permeated Eisenhower administration 
policy formation. In anticipation of an unfavorable 
denouement at Geneva, the Working Group recommended that the 
United States continue fighting without the French, yet in 
concert with allies.67 The strategic and tactical need for 
allies came together in Dulles' United Action Speech of 
March 29. The speech was a call to action for free world 
nations to meet future aggression via some sort of 
collective defense or united action. But the real reason 
the Eisenhower Administration sought allied support was 
because allied support would conform with principles of 
international law. In Indochina, as noted above, Eisenhower 
was acutely aware that intervention required certain 
preconditions under principles of international law. The 
administration needed France and the Associated States to
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invite intervention. This necessitated allies. 
Additionally, allied support would have the further 
advantage of creating favorable domestic opinion.
Eisenhower's foreign policy reflected his belief that 
America's projection on world events must remain consistent 
with America's traditions and values. At a news conference 
in November 1953, Eisenhower said: "anyone who doesn't 
recognize that the great struggle of our time is an 
ideological one,...[is] not looking this question squarely 
in the face."68 A sense of idealism, steeped in the ethos 
of American civilization— guided Eisenhower's foreign 
policy. America's mission was not just to show the peoples 
of the world, and especially those behind the iron curtain, 
what freedom and liberty could accomplish, but to offer the 
fruits of that accomplishment to any who wanted it. This 
idea pervaded the ethos of American society after World war 
II. It was a sense of what America stood for to Americans.
A strong, vibrant America with total faith in her traditions 
and morals had accepted her historically-mandated role to 
secure world peace and elevate respect for the individual to 
a higher plane. This was what Eisenhower sought to achieve.
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